S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 000111

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NEA FOR DAS GGRAY
DEPT OF ENERGY PASS TO A/S KKOLEVAR, A/S KHARBERT, AND
MWILLIAMSON
S/CT FOR GFEIERSTEIN AND BAVERILL
DS/ATA FOR KMALOY
TREASURY PASS TO A/S CLOWERY
DHS PASS TO TWARRICK AND DGRANT
CIA PASS TO TCOYNE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2018
TAGS: KCIP EPET ENERG PTER ASEC SA
SUBJECT: MOI FEEDBACK ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

REF: A. "TECHNICAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT B/T USA AND KSA"

B. 1/24/2008 GRAY-RUNDELL EMAIL

C. 2007 RIYADH 2486

Classified By: CDA David Rundell
for reasons 1.4 (b) (c) and (d).

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Expanding the CIP Relationship
--------------


1. (S) The Saudi Government has made a decision to expand
the relationship between the USG and
and Ministry of Interior (MOI) with regards to Critical
Infrastructure Protection (CIP), building on
the existing Joint Working Group relationship. This will
involve the USG working with many, probably most,
of the various directorates of the MOI. The MOI expects
cooperation will go beyond the new Facilities
Security Force (FSF), to include other MOI branches such
Border Guards, Intelligence, Public Security,
the Mujahideen Force and Civil Defense.

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Single Point of Contact Preferred
--------------


2. (S) The Saudis consistently have been clear that they
want a single point of contact with the USG for CIP
projects. They do not want the alternative, a multipoint of
contact system in which MOI negotiates with
numerous USG entities for various types of technical
assistance programs. The MOI has been receptive to looking
at the JECOR (Joint Economic Commission of Riyadh) program
from the 1970s as a possible organizational model.
Under JECOR, the Department of the Treasury coordinated many
USG assistance programs within the Kingdom.


3. (S) For CIP assistance to the MOI, the Department of
State is now proposed as the lead coordinating agency.
The Saudi Ministry of Finance (MOF) is familiar with and
receptive to a JECOR-type model, in which Saudi

funds would be placed in a disbursement account held by the
USG. MOI has not expressed a clear preference on
funding mechanisms.

--------------
FSF Mission
--------------


4. (S) We have again requested a written mission statement
for the Facilities Security Force, and the MOI
has indicated they will provide this within days. MOI
contacts have stated that the FSF mission is protecting
critical infrastructure, to include energy, water, power,
petrochemical, and communications systems, from
internal and some external attack. Nonetheless, the MOI and
MODA have yet to clarify key areas of responsibility
in the event of an internal or external attack. Cyber
security is not an immediate concern for the MOI.

--------------
Caveats and Limitations on USG Involvement
--------------


5. (S) Senior Security Advisor to the Assistant Minister
for Security Affairs, Major General Dr. Saad Al Jabri
was quite clear in a recent meeting that his government had
not decided to have USG involvement in all aspects of
MOI operations, such as passports issuance or prison
administration. The MOI was interested in engaging all

RIYADH 00000111 002 OF 003


relevant branches of the MOI with the USG on CIP issues. The
Saudis were not receptive to sharing all of the
Bearing Point consulting report on MOI modernization, and it
was in this context they clarified that while the
report covered all MOI activities the proposed cooperation
with the USG was focused only on critical
infrastructure protection.

--------------
New FSF Maritime Force;
Force Integration Challenges
--------------


6. (S) Dr. Al Jabri was clear that the Facilities Security
Force will have its own maritime force, separate
from the Coast Guard and Navy. The FSF will be the closest
to the infrastructure being protected, with the next
layer of protection provided by the Coast Guard, and then the
Navy. The FSF will have a helicopter force for
maritime interdiction.


7. (S) The MOI claims there is an integrated Command and
Control center for MOI, the Ministry of Defense and
Aviation (MODA), and the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG).
(Comment: We have not seen this center, and we
question whether this exists in a meaningful way. These
three organizations in our collective memories
never have conducted joint exercises together. End comment.)

--------------
Foreign Military Sales
--------------


8. (S) MOI has told us they are in the process of preparing
a list of weapons they would like to purchase
under a possible Foreign Military Sales (FMS) mechanism.

--------------
Feedback on Proposed Draft Agreement
--------------


9. (S) Post would like to provide the following feedback on
Ref A:

-- The Saudis have asked for assistance on Critical
Infrastructure Protection. That phrase should be added
to the second paragraph. Other items such as civil defense
and border protection can be left in, as they are
part of infrastructure protection.

-- The Saudis have not asked for assistance with the overall
modernization of the MOI. Therefore, the third
paragraph should be dropped. Once we have in agreement in
place, it can expand to cover other areas of the MOI
as needed.

-- Finally, the agreement should state that funds will be
deposited in an account held by the Department of
State, probably at the New York Federal Reserve Bank. We
understand this is the practice of the Department of
Energy in such cases.

--------------
Comment
--------------


10. (S) While the MOI has indicated they are in the process
of preparing a list of equipment they might be
interested in under an FMS program, they will likely want our
assistance to help them clarify their
procurement needs. The MOI is unlikely to be able to tell us

RIYADH 00000111 003 OF 003


what type of equipment and training they
need for which units. They likely would be open to working
with us on preparing their list of needs, and
the entire process may move faster and more smoothly if we
are able to furnish some assistance along the way.


FRAKER