MOI FEEDBACK ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 000111 SIPDIS SIPDIS NEA FOR DAS GGRAY DEPT OF ENERGY PASS TO A/S KKOLEVAR, A/S KHARBERT, AND MWILLIAMSON S/CT FOR GFEIERSTEIN AND BAVERILL DS/ATA FOR KMALOY TREASURY PASS TO A/S CLOWERY DHS PASS TO TWARRICK AND DGRANT CIA PASS TO TCOYNE E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2018 TAGS: KCIP EPET ENERG PTER ASEC SA SUBJECT: MOI FEEDBACK ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION REF: A. "TECHNICAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT B/T USA AND KSA" ¶B. 1/24/2008 GRAY-RUNDELL EMAIL ¶C. 2007 RIYADH 2486 Classified By: CDA David Rundell for reasons 1.4 (b) (c) and (d). -------------- Expanding the CIP Relationship -------------- ¶1. (S) The Saudi Government has made a decision to expand the relationship between the USG and and Ministry of Interior (MOI) with regards to Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP),building on the existing Joint Working Group relationship. This will involve the USG working with many, probably most, of the various directorates of the MOI. The MOI expects cooperation will go beyond the new Facilities Security Force (FSF),to include other MOI branches such Border Guards, Intelligence, Public Security, the Mujahideen Force and Civil Defense. -------------- Single Point of Contact Preferred -------------- ¶2. (S) The Saudis consistently have been clear that they want a single point of contact with the USG for CIP projects. They do not want the alternative, a multipoint of contact system in which MOI negotiates with numerous USG entities for various types of technical assistance programs. The MOI has been receptive to looking at the JECOR (Joint Economic Commission of Riyadh) program from the 1970s as a possible organizational model. Under JECOR, the Department of the Treasury coordinated many USG assistance programs within the Kingdom. ¶3. (S) For CIP assistance to the MOI, the Department of State is now proposed as the lead coordinating agency. The Saudi Ministry of Finance (MOF) is familiar with and receptive to a JECOR-type model, in which Saudi funds would be placed in a disbursement account held by the USG. MOI has not expressed a clear preference on funding mechanisms. -------------- FSF Mission -------------- ¶4. (S) We have again requested a written mission statement for the Facilities Security Force, and the MOI has indicated they will provide this within days. MOI contacts have stated that the FSF mission is protecting critical infrastructure, to include energy, water, power, petrochemical, and communications systems, from internal and some external attack. Nonetheless, the MOI and MODA have yet to clarify key areas of responsibility in the event of an internal or external attack. Cyber security is not an immediate concern for the MOI. -------------- Caveats and Limitations on USG Involvement -------------- ¶5. (S) Senior Security Advisor to the Assistant Minister for Security Affairs, Major General Dr. Saad Al Jabri was quite clear in a recent meeting that his government had not decided to have USG involvement in all aspects of MOI operations, such as passports issuance or prison administration. The MOI was interested in engaging all RIYADH 00000111 002 OF 003 relevant branches of the MOI with the USG on CIP issues. The Saudis were not receptive to sharing all of the Bearing Point consulting report on MOI modernization, and it was in this context they clarified that while the report covered all MOI activities the proposed cooperation with the USG was focused only on critical infrastructure protection. -------------- New FSF Maritime Force; Force Integration Challenges -------------- ¶6. (S) Dr. Al Jabri was clear that the Facilities Security Force will have its own maritime force, separate from the Coast Guard and Navy. The FSF will be the closest to the infrastructure being protected, with the next layer of protection provided by the Coast Guard, and then the Navy. The FSF will have a helicopter force for maritime interdiction. ¶7. (S) The MOI claims there is an integrated Command and Control center for MOI, the Ministry of Defense and Aviation (MODA),and the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG). (Comment: We have not seen this center, and we question whether this exists in a meaningful way. These three organizations in our collective memories never have conducted joint exercises together. End comment.) -------------- Foreign Military Sales -------------- ¶8. (S) MOI has told us they are in the process of preparing a list of weapons they would like to purchase under a possible Foreign Military Sales (FMS) mechanism. -------------- Feedback on Proposed Draft Agreement -------------- ¶9. (S) Post would like to provide the following feedback on Ref A: -- The Saudis have asked for assistance on Critical Infrastructure Protection. That phrase should be added to the second paragraph. Other items such as civil defense and border protection can be left in, as they are part of infrastructure protection. -- The Saudis have not asked for assistance with the overall modernization of the MOI. Therefore, the third paragraph should be dropped. Once we have in agreement in place, it can expand to cover other areas of the MOI as needed. -- Finally, the agreement should state that funds will be deposited in an account held by the Department of State, probably at the New York Federal Reserve Bank. We understand this is the practice of the Department of Energy in such cases. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶10. (S) While the MOI has indicated they are in the process of preparing a list of equipment they might be interested in under an FMS program, they will likely want our assistance to help them clarify their procurement needs. The MOI is unlikely to be able to tell us RIYADH 00000111 003 OF 003 what type of equipment and training they need for which units. They likely would be open to working with us on preparing their list of needs, and the entire process may move faster and more smoothly if we are able to furnish some assistance along the way. FRAKER