LATVIAN PASSPORT SCANDAL CONTINUES

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RIGA 000089 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2018 TAGS: CVIS KCRM KFRD PGOV PREL LG SUBJECT: LATVIAN PASSPORT SCANDAL CONTINUES REF: A. RIGA 23 ¶B. RIGA 36 Classified By: Ambassador Larson for reason 1.4(d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Recent meetings between Post, the GOL MFA and the Latvian security police (LSP) have yielded more specific information on developments in the passport scandal (ref. a). The LSP cautioned that the final numbers of cases, and all specific information on identities, is not complete, as the investigation is ongoing. Although the MFA promised Post on several occasions that new information would be forwarded as soon as it was available, this has not been the case so far. Coordination within the GOL has been a major problem, meaning that the MFA has been informed of developments at the same time we were. That aside, Foreign Minister Maris Riekstins, Prime Minister Ivars Godmanis and President Valdis Zatlers have all weighed in publicly on the potential damage the scandal has done to Latvia's hopes of joining the U.S. Visa Waiver Program. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) On February 6, RSO met with investigators from the Latvian Security Police Department (LSP) to discuss developments in the passport scandal (ref. a). Investigators stated that the investigation is still fluid and that they expect more fraudulently-obtained passports to be discovered in the coming months. Thus far, 30 of the 79 illegal passports had been recovered. Some of the passport recipients are outside of Latvia, making recovery of the passports difficult, but the LSP anticipated confiscating more in the near future. The investigators delivered to RSO a list of 79 names and passport numbers which were fraudulently obtained. When queried as to why it took so long to pass much of this information to us (ref. b),the Security Police representatives stated that the case was evolving, and the sensitive nature of the facts required some discretion until the facts of what happened were more thoroughly uncovered. LSP officials expressed exasperation with the media leaks which they felt hurt efforts to investigate the matter thoroughly. ¶3. (C) Embassy officers, including the DCM, RSO, CONS chief and Poloff participated in follow up meetings on February 11 and 14 with MFA U/S Edgars Skuja and Rulans Nikoforovs of the LSP to discuss further updates to the case. In the meetings, Skuja reiterated that the GOL was committed to keeping in contact with the U.S. Embassy regarding the scandal. He explained that they will continue to provide all the information that they have to us as it is available, and that preventive measures have been put in place in the passport agency to keep a similar problem from happening in the future. Skuja referred to the submission to the Embassy of a nonpaper, which detailed what happened (outlining the scope of the issue),why it happened (cited as mainly the human factor),and what preventive measures have been taken (specifically increasing security and to avoid human error and illegal intervention in the future). (Note: The revised process for passport adjudication was detailed in the February 14 meeting. Vilnis Jekabsons, Head of the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs, stated that the process for adjudicating passport applications now includes several verification checks involving three different bureaus within the agency in different physical locations. Under the previous adjudication process an application was accepted, approved and entered into the Citizenship data register by a single person from a regional office. In addition to a more secure application process, the GOL is conducting background checks on all passport office employees, including a check of their finances. End note.) The LSP underlined their continuing effort to increase reliability and internal checks to their passport issuing system. The Latvian MFA also forwarded a chronology of events in the case. DHS has requested a visit for March to receive their own briefing about the passport scandal prior to the negotiations on the Memorandum of Understanding on Visa Waiver. ¶4. (S) One of Post's greatest concerns has been the transfer of information from the GOL and Latvian law enforcement to the Embassy. Skuja committed to sharing all information as it was available and "to make (the information flow) absolutely transparent..." During the February 11 meeting, however, Nikiforovs detailed information that was not previously available to the Embassy. He said that LSP had uncovered eight additional cases in which Latvian passports were issued to false Latvian identities. (Thus the total number of false passports is now 87.) In addition, LSP was investigating an estimated 57 identities some or all of which might turn out to be false. (Note: According to CCD, person's having the same name and date of birth as several of the identities on this list have applied for and received NIVs on what is presumed to be their true identity. End Note.) LSP has identified the real names of 40 individuals who had illegally obtained false Latvian passports. (Note: One of the list of RIGA 00000089 002 OF 002 40 applied for an NIV but was refused because the company he intended to visit in New York City was a known front for Russian organized crime. This person's son applied at the same time and was also refused. End Note.) Nikiforovs stated that immigration services are continuing their investigations. DCM once again stressed the importance of providing us information as soon as they receive it. He added that it was unacceptable that the Latvians had not immediately passed us the eight false Latvian names and 40 real names. Skuja privately told us that this was the first the MFA had heard of the lists of 8 or 40. ¶5. (S) On February 13, detailed information on the 8 additional identities, which Post did not previously know about, was passed to the RSO. Nikoforovs stated these 8 names have now been removed from the Latvian citizenship register. (Note: A check of the Consular Consolidated Database (CCD) indicated that one individual with the same name and date of birth as one of these eight identities had submitted an application for a U.S. nonimmigrant visa (NIV) using a Russian passport. That application was refused because of known ties to Russian organized crime. End Note) ¶6. (U) In light of DHS's recent statement regarding the readiness of the Czech Republic, Greece and Estonia to join the VWP, GOL officials have been asked in the press about their views of how the ongoing situation will affect Latvia's chances of joining the program. Prime Minister Godmanis recently changed his opinion on the matter from his previous view that it had no effect (ref. a),now stating that the scandal had, in fact, negatively impacted Latvia's movement toward visa-free travel to the U.S. Foreign Minister Riekstins took a broader view of the situation, focusing on the recent reduction of the visa refusal rate, and asserting that Latvia met all other requirements. President Zatlers stated that the VWP is an important subject and one that is always raised at meetings with U.S. officials. Overall, the press has stated that it was naive to hope that the scandal would have no effect at all of Latvia's hope of joining the VWP. ¶7. (C) Comment: During the two MFA meetings it was apparent to all parties that there were breakdowns in communication among Latvian government agencies. The information that the LSP representative revealed was also not known to the MFA. The atmosphere became chillier when DCM stressed the need for timely communication with the U.S. Embassy, echoing Skuja's own thoughts about the LSP. The scope of the scandal is not fully known, although it is becoming clearer as investigations progress that it is quite large. The best, consistent dialogue we have had with the GOL is during high-level meetings where all Latvian offices are forced to reveal information that should be freely forthcoming. As Latvia's preparedness for VWP is assessed, we will need to ask tough questions about how they intend to address the information flow and coordination issues, both within the GOL and from the GOL to us, which this episode has highlighted. End Comment LARSON