Iceland's economic troubles: Implications for the defense

C O N F I D E N T I A L REYKJAVIK 000264 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/NB, EUR/RPM OSD-P FOR FENTON OSLO FOR DATT E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2018 TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL NATO PGOV IC SUBJECT: Iceland's economic troubles: Implications for the defense and security sector Classified by Ambassador Carol van Voorst for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Iceland's economic collapse is spurring painful but necessary cost cutting measures by the Icelandic government. One expected target of reductions is the defense budget, a very small part of the national budget but a line item with a high profile. Although a funding reduction is not certain, Post anticipates a reduction in the Icelandic Defense Department's budget and a consequent reduction in the frequency of defense exercises and host nation financial support for NATO air policing. Reductions in Icelandic Coast Guard (ICG) operational tempo brought on by the economic collapse will also likely negatively impact the country's defense and security posture and will increase costs to nations deploying to Iceland. End summary. ¶2. (C) The Icelandic government has had to ditch its planned 2009 budget because of the massive downturn in the economic and financial situation of the country. Although we have not seen an economic recovery "master plan" yet, the Icelandic government is prudently forging ahead with consideration of internal cost cutting measures. While budget estimates for FY2009 are still in flux, many voices both within and outside government advocate for a reduction in the second annual Icelandic defense budget, a tempting target for a parliament not accustomed to having to fund defense. ¶3. (U) The very first Icelandic defense budget was enacted for the 2008 Icelandic fiscal year (January to December). At the then current exchange rate the defense budget was approximately USD 20M; USD 12M of which was budgeted for the operation of the Icelandic Air Defense System (IADS) with the remaining money divided among exercise and other operational requirements of the Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs Defense Department and its sub-directorate, the Icelandic Defense Agency (IDA). (Note: The Defense Department implements defense policy while the IDA executes that policy in the form of operation of IADS, exercise planning, and managing relationships within NATO and EUCOM.) Until the economic crash, the expectation was that the level of 2009 defense spending would remain more or less at this level, allowing all programs to continue as planned. ¶4. (C) When a senior IDA official was asked by the resident EUCOM LNO about his expectations for budget cuts, the official could not offer any solid information, stating that his senior defense leadership was waiting on direction from the senior executive level within the MFA. He opined, however, that budget cuts were expected but in an unknown amount, that a hiring freeze was in place, and, although no layoffs were expected, there would be no new hiring to replaced anyone who resigned or retired. He further indicated that continued Icelandic sponsoring of the annual Northern Viking exercise and NATO air policing missions - at least in their present form - were very much points for discussion. ¶5. (SBU) The cornerstone of the Icelandic defense program is IADS. Public statements by the Defense Director have been, not surprisingly, in favor of continued funding, citing Iceland's role within, and contribution to, the NATO integrated air defense system. Since IADS is one program the Defense Agency can cite as adding real world value to NATO operations, Post anticipates that the Defense Agency will fight hard to sustain its funding. Other defense programs, however, may suffer from budget cuts. ¶6. (C) Iceland envisioned NATO air policing deployments to occur quarterly and thus far Denmark, France, and the US have fulfilled this mission. The UK is scheduled to deploy to Iceland in December -- bilateral political tensions notwithstanding -- with Denmark recently agreeing to deploy here during the first quarter of 2009. Up until now, Iceland paid for messing, berthing, and ground transportation for visiting forces as well as ground handling for the aircraft. These costs -- roughly $500,000 per deployment, or a total of less than 2.25 percent of the MFA's entire 2008 budget -- are small, but have a high political profile in a country that does not have a standing military. Although Iceland's financial contribution to NATO air policing is very small relative to the cost incurred by the deployed forces, sources at the IDA and at Iceland's mission to NATO tell Post that Iceland is likely to ask for a reduction to three quarterly deployments vice four or, in the alternative, significantly reduce or even eliminate its host nation logistic support. ¶7. (C) Two Northern Viking exercises have been conducted since the closure of U.S. NAS Keflavik in 2006 and it has been Iceland's stated objective (laid out in our Joint Understanding of 2006) to continue the exercise on an annual basis. As with the NATO air policing deployment, Iceland as host nation provides significant logistic support for visiting forces, thus making the exercises a likely target for budget reductions. Given the budget issues there has been some discussion within the IDA of converting this annual event to a biannual exercise. ¶8. (SBU) Although reporting to the Ministry of Justice, the Icelandic Coast Guard (ICG) has a significant role to play when it comes to defense and security issues in the High North. The current economic issues--most especially the cost of fuel--have forced the ICG to eliminate underway time for its two patrol vessels and its one hydrographic vessel. These vessels have remained pier side for the last six weeks. Fortunately, a local fuel supplier has agreed to a deferred payment plan thus allowing one of the patrol craft to get underway November 10 with the other patrol craft to follow shortly. ¶9. (C) Funding shortfalls have had an impact on ICG air operations as well. The ICG's three search and rescue (SAR) helicopters and one fixed wing aircraft remain grounded except for only those flights necessary to maintain crew qualifications and for actual search and rescue operations. Furthermore, two of the three helicopters are leased from a Norwegian firm and the ICG has seen a 100 percent cost increase since the beginning of the year (both fuel and lease costs). Compounding this is the leasing company's threat to terminate the leases and recall the helicopters due to the leasing company's perception that the ICG lacks the financial ability to make the lease payments - not to mention the ICG's actual problems with converting the Icelandic krona and transferring the payment internationally, a result of the collapse of Iceland's banking sector. These concerns have more than just domestic implications: the ICG provides real world SAR services for the Northern Viking exercises and NATO air policing. If reduced funding translates into an inability to take on this tasking, visiting forces will have to provide their own SAR which, in turn, will dramatically increase the cost of their deployments to Iceland. ¶10. (C) Comment: The Icelandic government is facing a financial and social catastrophe, and the demands on its 2009 budget will be severe. A huge government debt plus growing need for social services as unemployment skyrockets will require the government to watch every penny. We must expect budget reductions in defense spending that will most likely impact Iceland's ability to host military exercises or its financial support of NATO air policing deployments. Post is coordinating with other NATO Allies here to encourage the government to keep a long-term security perspective in mind as it looks for places to trim the budget, and to look at the optional (exercises) before the essential (IADS, air policing support). VAN VOORST