BURMESE LIAISON HAS NOTHING FOR ASSK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000098 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR P, EAP/MLS AND IO PACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL BM UN SUBJECT: BURMESE LIAISON HAS NOTHING FOR ASSK REF: RANGOON 73 Classified By: CDA Shari Villarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Charge met with Aung San Suu Kyi's doctor, Dr. Tin Myo Win aka Douglas, to get his assessment of the current state of any political dialogue. He last met with his patient on January 24, and offered her views of her most recent meeting with the government-designated liaison on January 30. Aung Kyi reportedly told ASSK that she would not have any talks with higher level officials, nor would there be any tripartite dialogue bringing in representatives of the ethnic minorities, and the regime would not make any adjustments to its "roadmap to democracy" to make the process any more inclusive. Accordingly, Douglas confirmed that ASSK does not see any effort by the Than Shwe regime to engage in a serious dialogue. Instead, Aung Kyi appears to be trying to persuade her to endorse the sham roadmap without any substantive changes. ASSK has also begun questioning the utility of UN envoy Gambari, referring to his fruitless travels in the region. She believes that that the regime only moves when scrutinized by the UN Security Council. ASSK reiterated to Douglas her appreciation for U.S. efforts to keep the issue of Burma on the world stage, especially the statements by the First Lady. NO, NO, and NO ¶2. (C) ASSK received three main messages from Aung Kyi when they last met on January 30, which apparently were responses to questions she put to him when they previously met on January 11. ASSK would not have any higher level talks with the regime leaders, there would be no tripartite dialogue bringing ethnic minority representatives, and the regime would not make its "roadmap to democracy" any more inclusive, according to Douglas. Instead Aung Kyi proposed that they could continue regular discussions, but that he would not be able to meet her weekly as she had been told last November. Realizing even before this most recent meeting with Aung Kyi that the dialogue was not going anywhere, ASSK advised the NLD (National League of Democracy) members with whom she met that they could go ahead and publicize her dissatisfaction with the lack of a serious dialogue (reftel). Douglas said she agreed now that Than Shwe and Maung Aye needed to be sidelined for a genuine political dialogue to be able to move forward. ¶3. (C) ASSK believes now that Aung Kyi's task is to persuade her to bless the roadmap without any substantive changes. According to Douglas, ASSK has no interest in starting over on a new constitution, and could accept the regime's roadmap framework if participation could be expanded. For instance, she would support NLD and ethnic minority groups meeting with the current constitution drafting commission to exchange views. She would also insist on free debate of the pros and the cons of the draft constitution prior to any referendum. Instead, she noted to Douglas that people have been arrested for criticizing the process, and she has been asked to not make any statements against the process. ¶4. (C) Douglas told Charge that he had heard that the regime planned to complete the draft constitution by April with the referendum on the draft scheduled for November. He asked if the international community would accept the results of referendum without any changes in the process. Charge replied that the U.S. and Europe would not accept the results if debate was restricted and there was no secret balloting. She added Burma's less-than-democratic neighbors might accept the results, but then they already tolerated the regime as it is. BUT WE CAN KEEP TALKING ¶5. (C) Aung Kyi also indicated to ASSK that "talks among ourselves" could continue, which she interpreted as meaning without the UN, according to Douglas. ASSK, he said, will keep meeting with Aung Kyi, and intends to focus on rule of law issues. Charge asked if this meant that ASSK no longer saw a role for UN envoy Gambari. Douglas replied that she RANGOON 00000098 002 OF 002 wants a substantive dialogue with the regime, and does not see Gambari doing very much to advance that. She questioned why Gambari spent so much time traveling around the region, without any observable result. She told Douglas that the only time the regime showed any pretense at dialogue was when the UN Security Council addressed Burma. She also asked Douglas to relay her appreciation for U.S. efforts to keep world attention on Burma. In particular, she mentioned that she listened carefully to the statements of the First Lady. ¶6. (C) Douglas reported that he had heard that the Chinese want the roadmap to be completed quickly and more focus on economic development, but that they were not interested in a political dialogue. Charge agreed in part, but added that the Chinese recognize that some progress on a political dialogue would be required in order to assure long-term stability in Burma. She reported that the Chinese are also frustrated with by regime unwillingness to commence any dialogue, and for that reason had sent high level officials here and called the Deputy Foreign Minister to China recently to urge the regime to enter into a dialogue with the Burmese people. While the Chinese may not share our views on democracy and human rights, she said, they acknowledge that ASSK has broad popular support and can smooth a political transition forward. KEEPING NLD'S NAME BEFORE THE PUBLIC ¶7. (C) Douglas said that ASSK wants the Burmese people to demand change, but Douglas explained people's reluctance to take on the military, saying many people were afraid. ASSK also urged him to do be more active in delivering social services to the community, thereby showing people that NLD recognized their needs. He told ASSK about his project funded by a US Embassy small grant to provide social services to NLD members in need, in particular former political prisoners and the families of current political prisoners. He said she commended the attention to the political prisoners. Douglas reported also that he had heard that trials would begin shortly against 88 Generation Students and NLD members now in prison. He noted that the lesser charges indicated that the regime did not intend to sentence them to long prison terms, adding that any conviction would then bar those convicted from politics for ten years after they are released. COMMENT ¶8. (C) Than Shwe has no intention of ceding any power. He wants ASSK's blessing to a process that will keep the military in power forever. If he cannot gain her blessing, he has shown since last August that he will arrest every critic to stifle dissent. Gambari has done nothing to change this dynamic, and international focus on his next visit just permits Than Shwe to stall and imprison more critics. Gambari now serves just as a diversion from the key issue of the need for a genuine dialogue to begin immediately. Than Shwe had the opportunity to utilize the good offices of the UN. He might have expected UN blessing for his flawed roadmap, and once he realized that he would not get it, he has no time for the UN's envoy. Nor apparently does ASSK see Gambari as advancing her goals. She will continue meeting with Aung Kyi to keep the door open for further dialogue. ¶9. (C) Than Shwe hates it when the UN Security Council addresses Burma because it challenges his legitimacy as ruler of Burma. While some claim that megaphone diplomacy does not work with the generals, we have seen repeatedly that they do move, however slightly, when Burma gets addressed directly by the UNSC and the ILO. If Than Shwe objects to UNSC scrutiny, then he needs to start talking. The UN needs to state clearly that all the relevant parties--military, pro-democracy, ethnic minorities--need to start talking now to come up with a more acceptable way forward. Otherwise the risks of more violence escalate. VILLAROSA