MARKERS REGARDING A NEW USAID PROPOSAL FOR BURMA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000753


SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP, DRL, F
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USAID/AME
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTR
STATE PLEASE PASS TO COMMERCE
TREASURY FOR OASIA, OFAC
BANGKOK FOR USAID/RDMA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM EAID BM
SUBJECT: MARKERS REGARDING A NEW USAID PROPOSAL FOR BURMA

Classified By: CDA Larry Dinger for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)

Need a rapid, flexible aid mechanism
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1. (C) Embassy Rangoon offers a few thoughts as the
interagency considers how best to address assistance for
Burma. A new assistance mechanism to allow a rapid, flexible
response to new opportunities for democratic development in
Burma is important. We stand ready to work closely with
Washington agencies, USAID/RDMA in Bangkok, and a selected
contractor to develop and implement such a mechanism, if it
is approved. In that context, several key points require
emphasis.

Keep near-term expectations realistic
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2. (C) While the need for a mechanism to permit rapid,
flexible aid delivery is clear, we do not believe the
situation on the ground in Burma today will permit near-term
distribution of large amounts of funding for overtly
political activities. The pool of potential recipients is
limited currently due to arrests, regime harassment, and
self-exile among activists. We do see occasional
possibilities: we are, for example, seeking DRL approval to
fund a political conference in Shan state in an area
controlled by the Shan State ARMY (septel). However, at
present few activists are likely to risk direct political
action with U.S. assistance. Those who would take the risk
on a large scale are likely to be arrested. Thus, funds for
overtly political activities will most likely be drawn down
in small amounts initially, with the intention that, as
circumstances change and new opportunities arise, the
mechanism can spring into much greater activity.

Target civil-society development for now
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3. (C) The best bet initially is for the mechanism to fund
a broad range of activities that counter the regime's control
over society, even if they are not overtly political: funding
activities that enhance grass-roots organizational and
networking skills and build a platform to promote or
capitalize on change in the future. The goal should be to
fund political action when sensible. For now, though, less
direct efforts to undermine the government,s writ and create
alternate centers of power can still contribute significantly
to USG long-term interests.

Continue funding for post-Nargis recovery
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4. (C) Recent visits to Burma,s Delta provide convincing
evidence that pressing humanitarian needs there will continue
well into 2009 and beyond. Recipients are extremely thankful
for USG assistance, and beg for it to continue. Beyond that,
continued funding for cyclone recovery efforts would provide
important cover for the new USG assistance activities and
capacity-building objectives. It would also provide
presumably palatable justification to the GOB for assignment
of a permanent USAID representative here, a crucially
important step for successful implementation of the new aid
mechanism.

Ensure USAID presence on the ground in Burma
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5. (C) Staff at Embassy Rangoon are small in number with
many responsibilities, yet on the ground oversight of the new
aid mechanism is essential. No outside observer can measure
with sensitivity the various aspects of the risk/reward
calculations in Burma, something that will have to be done
constantly. USAID/RDMA Bangkok and Embassy Rangoon are
already consulting closely on how the new aid mechanism can
best be managed. We look forward to working together
seamlessly. But there is no doubt that the new mechanism

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will require at least one full-time, highly talented USAID
staffer in Rangoon. If, despite best efforts, the Burma
Government denies permission for USAID staff here, we flag
that the whole concept for the new program has to be
re-visited.

Bottom line: worth the effort, with realistic expectations
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6. (C) Embassy Rangoon is convinced a flexible,
rapid-response aid mechanism makes total sense and we are
ready to support it enthusiastically, so long as expectations
are clear and reflect the limiting realities on the ground.
DINGER