BURMA: REGIME BACKTRACKING ON ITS CYCLONE RELIEF

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000492 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/MLS, DRL, AND IO PACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM BM SUBJECT: BURMA: REGIME BACKTRACKING ON ITS CYCLONE RELIEF COMMITMENTS REF: A. A: RANGOON 471 ¶B. B: RANGOON 468 RANGOON 00000492 001.2 OF 003 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Vice Senior General Maung Aye appears to have taken control over the Cyclone Nargis relief efforts. The UN obtained some flexibility from Minister of Planning Soe Tha regarding the procedures the Minister announced June ¶10. However, the back and forth for easier access will likely continue slowing relief efforts. The Post Nargis Joint Assessment (PONJA) is going well, although the GOB has not yet shared data it had agreed to. Assessment teams found five villages that had not yet been reached with relief goods, and nine WFP helicoptes continue to deliver relief supplies several times a day. On June 10, the Minister of Planning ordered WFP to cease its cash assistance program in Rangoon Division because it was not using the official exchange rate of 6 kyat/1USD which no one in Burma uses. End Summary ¶2. (SBU) UN Acting Humanitarian Assistance Coordinator Dan Baker told donor representatives he met with Minister of Planning Soe Tha on June 13, to clarify the new humanitarian assistance guidelines the Minister had issued to the UN and INGOs on June 10 (Ref A). The two-and-a-half hour meeting began with Soe Tha giving a one-and-a-half hour monologue on his positive view of the relief efforts. Baker responded that the Minister,s new guidelines had complicated relief efforts and the new guidelines were a roadblock. NGOs were confused about which ministry to go to for travel permits and the line ministries were not granting the expedited approval the GOB had promised for international assistance workers at the TCG meetings. Baker emphasized the NGOs needed clear, quick procedures and standardized forms, not another bureaucratic layer. ¶3. (SBU) Baker reported that Soe Tha seemed surprised that the procedures caused delays. The Minister agreed to Baker,s suggestion that INGOs with no clear or established line ministry could seek permission through the ministry of Social Welfare. He also indicated that the Ministry of Planning would be flexible regarding the requirement that international staff travel with GOB liaisons. He clarified that relief goods could go directly to the field and did not need to first be stored in Rangoon. Soe Tha also said that a statement of intent regarding distribution of relief supplies would satisfy the requirement for a township-wide distribution plan, and international aid workers did not have to check in personally with Township Coordination Committees, but could rather send a representative to notify the committees of their arrival and departure in their respective areas. Baker also recommended each ministry designate a focal person for the UN and INGOs to work with concerning necessary permissions. ¶4. (SBU) Since the TCG had just been set up two weeks earlier as the relief coordination mechanism, the Minister of Planning had totally bypassed it. Baker suggested that the Minister of Planning join the TCG. Baker said that ASEAN TCG Co-Chair Robert Chua had forcefully raised the new guidelines with the GOB at a June 14 TCG meeting, as had ASEAN General Secretary Surin Pitsuan during a visit to Burma the same day. UNDP Deputy Sanaka Samarasinha observed that Vice Senior General Maung Aye had taken authority over relief efforts from the more pragmatic Prime Minister, Thein Sein (Ref A). Since the Minister of Planning was close to Maung Aye, he speculated that the Planning Minister had also injected himself into the process. ¶5. (SBU) Baker noted that during the last two TCG meetings, GOB TCG chair and Deputy Foreign Minister Kyaw Thu refused to say anything, which Baker concluded was Kyaw Thu,s recognition that his authority had been superseded. Although Baker acknowledged that the new procedures had created further delays, he emphasized that UN and NGO international staff were obtaining permission to travel to the Delta, and had even obtained permission to be stationed there. He had RANGOON 00000492 002.2 OF 003 urged the GOB to grant "multiple-entry" travel permits to facilitate travel and minimize bureaucracy. ¶6. (SBU) The ongoing Post Nargis Joint Assessment (PONJA) Damage and Loss Assessment (DaLA) teams had covered 84 of 128 quadrants. The World Bank representative reported good cooperation from local authorities. Teams had already begun to analyze the data collected. Although the Assessment teams had received some data from township authorities and ministries, the Ministry of Planning had not yet shared the aggregate data they collected on damage and loss in the cyclone affected areas, as previously agreed. Baker said the UN had not been able to obtain this data from the Ministry of Planning either. The DaLA assessors had to rely on secondary data so planned to compare the data they received with the more detailed data gathered by the Village Tract Assessors. ¶7. (SBU) Baker reported that the Village Tract Assessment (VTA) was on target to finish on June 19, although the team was slightly behind on its data entry due to equipment breakdowns. So far, the assessors had found five villages south of Labutta Township that had received no relief whatsoever, so the UN had dispatched its helicopters to quickly deliver food, shelter and water. In response to a question by the AUSAID representative, Baker said the UN had no reports that the presence of Home Affairs (police) officials on the assessment teams had hindered cyclone victims from speaking openly about their needs. ¶8. (SBU) Baker said some results of the assessment would be shared at the ASEAN roundtable planned for June 24-25, and a revised flash appeal would be issued in Geneva on July 3. The final assessment report was scheduled to be released on July 12. Regarding financing for long-term recovery and rebuilding, the UN and the World Bank were taking a "wait-and-see" approach. If the GOB remained "open and positive" to the relief effort, the international community would likely respond positively. The UN would continue to evaluate how the relief effort was proceeding for a possible donor,s conference in September. The representative from the UN,s Coordination Office in New York said it did not make sense to have another conference until donors had an opportunity to see how assistance was being implemented on the ground. ¶9. (SBU) WFP Representative Chris Kaye noted that nine WFP helicopters were currently operating and reaching villages with critical needs. Kaye also reported that on June 10, the Minister of Planning ordered WFP to cease its cash assistance programs in Rangoon Division because it was not using the official government exchange rate of 6 kyat/1 USD which no one in Burma uses. Kaye sent a letter to the Minister protesting the rationale of his decision and noting the Minister,s order challenged the WFP,s humanitarian imperative in Burma. ¶10. (SBU) UNDP noted that agricultural input needs must be integrated with other relief and early recovery efforts as the GOB was focusing its seed assistance only on farmers who own sixty acres or more. Accordingly the UN would focus on small landowners and the landless. UNDP suspended repayment requirements for the 50,000 active borrowers participating in its micro-credit program in the Delta, while permitting members to withdraw savings. Thus, UNDP would need an infusion of cash to meet the liquidity requirements of both its micro-credit program, with $3million in outstanding loans, and funds for its self-reliance groups in the cyclone affected areas. ¶11. (SBU) Comment: As we have seen too often the GOB will make a concession and then start backtracking. The TCG mechanism showed some promise to facilitate access for disaster relief efforts. It did succeed in getting a comprehensive needs assessment launched. However, the senior generals cannot resist micromanaging everything and the disaster relief effort is the most massive international RANGOON 00000492 003.2 OF 003 undertaking in Burma in years. The UN and NGOs which have been working here are used to this behavior and adept at pushing back or going around the obstacles constantly being erected. The UN and World Bank do not need to be planning ahead for longer-term efforts since there will be no donor money forthcoming if they cannot ensure adequate access and accountability. That will continue to be a struggle. VILLAROSA