Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08RANGOON213
2008-03-20 08:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:
BURMESE FOREIGN MINISTER SEEKS SOMETHING FOR
VZCZCXRO0209 PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH RUEHTRO DE RUEHGO #0213/01 0800830 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 200830Z MAR 08 FM AMEMBASSY RANGOON TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7324 INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1013 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 4564 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 8104 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5665 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1424 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000213
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR P, EAP/MLS, AND IO
PACOM FOR FPA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL BM
SUBJECT: BURMESE FOREIGN MINISTER SEEKS SOMETHING FOR
NOTHING
Classified By: CDA SVillarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000213
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR P, EAP/MLS, AND IO
PACOM FOR FPA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL BM
SUBJECT: BURMESE FOREIGN MINISTER SEEKS SOMETHING FOR
NOTHING
Classified By: CDA SVillarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)
1. (C) Summary: Foreign Minister Nyan Win finally agreed to
meet with Charge on March 18 after several months of
requests. When Charge asked about plans to ensure the
credibility of the upcoming referendum, the Foreign Minister
used the opportunity to complain again about economic
sanctions, claiming that poor nations needed to develop
economically before becoming democracies. He downplayed the
utility of dialogue to garner broader public support for the
political way forward on the grounds that once Burmese minds
are made up, they do not change. He claimed Aung San Suu Kyi
made up her mind nine years ago. Asked about the prospects
for additional visits by UN Envoy Gambari, the Foreign
Minister said that another would have to wait until after the
May referendum. The Foreign Minister reacted positively to
Charge's suggestion that copies of the proposed Constitution,
which he said had been published, be sent to diplomatic
missions. Charge also mentioned our concerns about aviation
safety and requested the Foreign Minister's assistance in
arranging a meeting with the Minister of Transportation. He
also agreed to recommend that the Culture Minister,
reportedly close to Than Shwe, meet with Charge.
Lift Sanctions, But No Dialogue and No Compromise
-------------- --------------
2. (C) Charge met Foreign Minister Nyan Win in Nay Pyi Taw
on March 18, and suggested that it would be useful to meet
more often. (We last met last July.) He replied that he
would welcome more discussion if it "was constructive, not
destructive." Charge responded that while we disagreed on
many issues, the U.S. always tried to offer constructive
recommendations. Burmese "do not react well to pressure,"
asserted the Foreign Minister, launching into familiar
complaints about economic sanctions. He said we should lift
the sanctions because "only prosperous countries can be
democracies," citing Asian and African history. Charge
noted that many poor countries have made transitions to
democracy in the past two decades, and the USG had been very
generous in supporting fragile democracies because we
understood how difficult it was. She urged Burma get started
now. He then complained that we provided no humanitarian
assistance. When Charge pointed out that we did, he
dismissed it as a fraction of what we spend in Iraq.
3. (C) Charge asked whether the senior leaders were still
pursuing a dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi and ethnic leaders
in order to develop broader support for their roadmap.
Burmese are reluctant to change their minds, the Foreign
Minister replied, claiming that ASSK made her mind up nine
years ago when the leaders tried to talk with her then.
Charge said that only through continuous dialogue would it be
possible to find areas of common agreement that could offer a
way forward. She noted that the 88 Generation Students had
said they could live with 90% of the proposed constitution.
Democracy works through compromise, she continued, and
developing broader agreement about the way forward would be
possible if all parties were willing to compromise. The
Foreign Minister suggested we tell the National League for
Democracy (NLD) leaders to compromise. Charge replied that
we cannot tell them what to do anymore than we can tell the
senior generals. However, she expected NLD would compromise
if they saw some signs of compromise by the military.
4. (C) The Foreign Minister returned to sanctions, saying
they should all be removed. Charge explained that it was not
realistic to expect that they could be lifted at once, noting
that many had been imposed by Congress. She added that
sanctions had strong bipartisan support, and did not expect
our elections in November would change the situation any.
More realistic would be a gradual lifting of sanctions as
Burma made concrete progress on dialogue and national
reconciliation; they would eventually all be lifted as Burma
continued to move towards a democratic transition. She noted
that many constructive suggestions had been made on how to
move forward on the referendum and the roadmap, but it
appeared that the senior leaders had rejected them all.
RANGOON 00000213 002 OF 002
Charge suggested that removing the criminal penalties for
criticizing the draft constitution and permitting an open
debate would be a good first step that the international
community would welcome.
Getting Ready for the Referendum
--------------
5. (C) Charge asked if UN Envoy Gambari would be returning
to Burma anytime soon. After saying that he had received no
request for another visit, the Foreign Minister said one
would not be possible until June after the referendum.
Charge asked if that meant the referendum would take place in
late May. He only offered that the date might be announced
by the end of April. He volunteered that the constitution
would not be approved with 100% of the votes, and
acknowledged that "some" would vote no. Charge asked if it
would be possible to talk with someone regarding the
referendum procedures. He said that the national referendum
commission was already busy instructing the regional
commissions on the procedures. Charge suggested that the
members of the commission brief the diplomatic community when
they come to Rangoon. The Foreign Minister said there would
be too many questions, and most embassies would not be
interested. Charge said she could guarantee a strong turnout
from
all the embassies. After he acknowledged seeing a copy of
the draft constitution, Charge recommended that it be
distributed to all the embassies, which he agreed to arrange.
6. (C) Charge closed the meeting by requesting the Foreign
Minister's assistance with arranging meetings with the
Culture Minister, the member of the "spokes authoritative
team" reportedly closest to Than Shwe, and the Transport
Minister. She mentioned our serious concerns about aviation
safety based on reports we had received after the Air Bagan
crash. He agreed to assist.
7. (C) Comment: Many people tell us the Foreign Minister
understands the need to be more responsive to international
requests for information and suggestions, but his is not the
voice Than Shwe listens to. He seems willing to be of
assistance on small things, like distributing the
constitution and recommending other meetings, but he has no
influence on big issues, like putting measures into place to
ensure a credible referendum. He seemed resigned to have to
defend an outcome that he already knows few in the
international community will find credible. The incessent
drumbeat on sanctions sounds to us like the most recent must
be hurting. But no one, including the Foreign Minister, is
willing to tell Than Shwe what needs to be done. Nor have
they told him that a non-fair and non-free referendum will
not make the sanctions go away. Than Shwe seems to think he
can be the demandeur because no one has told him differently.
VILLAROSA
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR P, EAP/MLS, AND IO
PACOM FOR FPA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL BM
SUBJECT: BURMESE FOREIGN MINISTER SEEKS SOMETHING FOR
NOTHING
Classified By: CDA SVillarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)
1. (C) Summary: Foreign Minister Nyan Win finally agreed to
meet with Charge on March 18 after several months of
requests. When Charge asked about plans to ensure the
credibility of the upcoming referendum, the Foreign Minister
used the opportunity to complain again about economic
sanctions, claiming that poor nations needed to develop
economically before becoming democracies. He downplayed the
utility of dialogue to garner broader public support for the
political way forward on the grounds that once Burmese minds
are made up, they do not change. He claimed Aung San Suu Kyi
made up her mind nine years ago. Asked about the prospects
for additional visits by UN Envoy Gambari, the Foreign
Minister said that another would have to wait until after the
May referendum. The Foreign Minister reacted positively to
Charge's suggestion that copies of the proposed Constitution,
which he said had been published, be sent to diplomatic
missions. Charge also mentioned our concerns about aviation
safety and requested the Foreign Minister's assistance in
arranging a meeting with the Minister of Transportation. He
also agreed to recommend that the Culture Minister,
reportedly close to Than Shwe, meet with Charge.
Lift Sanctions, But No Dialogue and No Compromise
-------------- --------------
2. (C) Charge met Foreign Minister Nyan Win in Nay Pyi Taw
on March 18, and suggested that it would be useful to meet
more often. (We last met last July.) He replied that he
would welcome more discussion if it "was constructive, not
destructive." Charge responded that while we disagreed on
many issues, the U.S. always tried to offer constructive
recommendations. Burmese "do not react well to pressure,"
asserted the Foreign Minister, launching into familiar
complaints about economic sanctions. He said we should lift
the sanctions because "only prosperous countries can be
democracies," citing Asian and African history. Charge
noted that many poor countries have made transitions to
democracy in the past two decades, and the USG had been very
generous in supporting fragile democracies because we
understood how difficult it was. She urged Burma get started
now. He then complained that we provided no humanitarian
assistance. When Charge pointed out that we did, he
dismissed it as a fraction of what we spend in Iraq.
3. (C) Charge asked whether the senior leaders were still
pursuing a dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi and ethnic leaders
in order to develop broader support for their roadmap.
Burmese are reluctant to change their minds, the Foreign
Minister replied, claiming that ASSK made her mind up nine
years ago when the leaders tried to talk with her then.
Charge said that only through continuous dialogue would it be
possible to find areas of common agreement that could offer a
way forward. She noted that the 88 Generation Students had
said they could live with 90% of the proposed constitution.
Democracy works through compromise, she continued, and
developing broader agreement about the way forward would be
possible if all parties were willing to compromise. The
Foreign Minister suggested we tell the National League for
Democracy (NLD) leaders to compromise. Charge replied that
we cannot tell them what to do anymore than we can tell the
senior generals. However, she expected NLD would compromise
if they saw some signs of compromise by the military.
4. (C) The Foreign Minister returned to sanctions, saying
they should all be removed. Charge explained that it was not
realistic to expect that they could be lifted at once, noting
that many had been imposed by Congress. She added that
sanctions had strong bipartisan support, and did not expect
our elections in November would change the situation any.
More realistic would be a gradual lifting of sanctions as
Burma made concrete progress on dialogue and national
reconciliation; they would eventually all be lifted as Burma
continued to move towards a democratic transition. She noted
that many constructive suggestions had been made on how to
move forward on the referendum and the roadmap, but it
appeared that the senior leaders had rejected them all.
RANGOON 00000213 002 OF 002
Charge suggested that removing the criminal penalties for
criticizing the draft constitution and permitting an open
debate would be a good first step that the international
community would welcome.
Getting Ready for the Referendum
--------------
5. (C) Charge asked if UN Envoy Gambari would be returning
to Burma anytime soon. After saying that he had received no
request for another visit, the Foreign Minister said one
would not be possible until June after the referendum.
Charge asked if that meant the referendum would take place in
late May. He only offered that the date might be announced
by the end of April. He volunteered that the constitution
would not be approved with 100% of the votes, and
acknowledged that "some" would vote no. Charge asked if it
would be possible to talk with someone regarding the
referendum procedures. He said that the national referendum
commission was already busy instructing the regional
commissions on the procedures. Charge suggested that the
members of the commission brief the diplomatic community when
they come to Rangoon. The Foreign Minister said there would
be too many questions, and most embassies would not be
interested. Charge said she could guarantee a strong turnout
from
all the embassies. After he acknowledged seeing a copy of
the draft constitution, Charge recommended that it be
distributed to all the embassies, which he agreed to arrange.
6. (C) Charge closed the meeting by requesting the Foreign
Minister's assistance with arranging meetings with the
Culture Minister, the member of the "spokes authoritative
team" reportedly closest to Than Shwe, and the Transport
Minister. She mentioned our serious concerns about aviation
safety based on reports we had received after the Air Bagan
crash. He agreed to assist.
7. (C) Comment: Many people tell us the Foreign Minister
understands the need to be more responsive to international
requests for information and suggestions, but his is not the
voice Than Shwe listens to. He seems willing to be of
assistance on small things, like distributing the
constitution and recommending other meetings, but he has no
influence on big issues, like putting measures into place to
ensure a credible referendum. He seemed resigned to have to
defend an outcome that he already knows few in the
international community will find credible. The incessent
drumbeat on sanctions sounds to us like the most recent must
be hurting. But no one, including the Foreign Minister, is
willing to tell Than Shwe what needs to be done. Nor have
they told him that a non-fair and non-free referendum will
not make the sanctions go away. Than Shwe seems to think he
can be the demandeur because no one has told him differently.
VILLAROSA