GAMBARI'S OUTBRIEF TO THE DIP CORPS: NO GOOD NEWS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000185 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/MLS, DRL, AND IO PACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM BM SUBJECT: GAMBARI'S OUTBRIEF TO THE DIP CORPS: NO GOOD NEWS RANGOON 00000185 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: P/E Chief Leslie Hayden for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Gambari briefed the dip corps before departing Burma, but declined to give a substantive readout of his conversations before he briefed UNSYG Ban Ki Moon in Dhaka. He discussed the conditions of the referendum with the GOB and offered technical assistance and international monitors, but indicated there had been no agreement on key issues. He recounted GOB complaints that each time Gambari visited Burma, additional international sanctions followed, so the regime no longer saw the benefits of cooperating with him. The regime also declined Gambari's request to establish an "economic forum" to relieve poverty, citing the futility of doing so as long as sanctions were in place. He noted that, based on reports he was receiving, the dialogue with ASSK did not seem to be moving substantively forward. End Summary. ¶2. (C) UN Special Envoy Gambari briefed the dip corps on March 10 at the conclusion of his March visit to Burma. Gambari opened the meeting by reminding the dip corps of the principles guiding his mission: that his visits were part of a process rather than a single event; his engagement must be comprehensive and span groups from both the opposition and the Burmese government; his mission should deliver tangible results; and that those who should participate in the process should be free to do so. He urged the dip corps against drawing any conclusions because discussions were ongoing. He would meet again with the regime's Spokes Authoritative Team and Aung San Suu Kyi he notified attendees, then he would fly to Dhaka that day to brief UNSYG Ban Ki Moon on the details of his discussions before he would discuss the details of his visit more widely. ¶3. (C) Gambari asserted that he had clearly articulated the international community's concerns and that the GOB had articulated their position just as frankly. He added that, in addition to the formal meetings he had with the Minister of Culture, Minister of Planning, and the Chairman of the Referendum Committee, there had been several informal discussions as well during evening events. He described his discussions as extremely frank, sometimes too frank. In the spirit of transparency, Gambari qualified, there had been no agreement between himself and the GOB on the key issues. ¶4. (C) Gambari pointed out that the text of his conversation with the Spokes Authoritative Team, published March 8 in the regime's mouthpiece daily "The New Light of Myanmar," did not include the many points he had made during the meeting, contrary to what he had been informed. He noted that sanctions have become a "deal breaker" for the regime, which complained that each time they cooperated with his visits, more international sanctions quickly followed so they no longer saw the benefits of cooperating with Gambari. Gambari told the ministers that the resolution to this problem was more cooperation rather than less. He also reported that the GOB rejected the utility of Gambari's suggested "economic forum" to address poverty as long as international sanctions remained in place. Gambari urged the GOB to keep the issue of sanctions separate from the economic forum and to instead look at the benefits the forum could bring the country's population. Gambari concluded his opening remarks by emphasizing that as long as he had minimal cooperation from the GOB, he would continue his mission. ¶5. (C) The Pakistani Ambassador asked what Aung San Suu Kyi had said during his March 8 meeting with her. Gambari responded that his conversations with ASSK were ongoing, and he would meet her again before departing Rangoon. He acknowledged her as the leader of the NLD and said she stood behind her party's positions. He declined to elaborate further. ¶6. (C) The Australian Ambassador noted that the GOB's accusation that Gambari was biased toward the West and their attack against sanctions were unwarranted, in as much as the GOB had not made progress meeting the demands of the international community, but had rather gone backwards. RANGOON 00000185 002.2 OF 002 Gambari responded to a question from the UK Ambassador that he had not been able to meet with any of the ethnic minorities but one group we know to be close to the regime. Charge d'Affaires pointed out that Gambari had not met with anyone from the senior leadership, which appeared as less cooperation with the UN's good offices than previously. Gambari expressed disappointment because he had a message from Ban Ki Moon to Than Shwe that he had been instructed to personally deliver. He explained that the Spokes Authoritative Team had been given "full power to engage with him on all issues and communicate upward." ¶7. (C) The Sri Lankan Ambassador jumped to the regime's defense and advocated that their cooperation with the UN so far should be recognized, describing the referendum and upcoming election as " good first steps" in the context of Burma's complicated history. Gambari responded that the UN had recognized that the Burmese had finally set a timeline. That said, Gambari qualified, the continued lack of inclusiveness of the roadmap diminished this positive step. The Singaporean Ambassador pointed out that the GOB had made clear at the November ASEAN Summit that their preferred interlocutor was the UN. He encouraged the GOB to bring all the stakeholders into a dialogue leading to national reconciliation. ¶8. (C) The French Ambassador requested Gambari elaborate on the points he had made during his meeting with the Spokes Authoritative Team that the regime had omitted in the transcript they published. Gambari declined to do so. The French Ambassador asked if Gambari had raised free access to the media for all; Charge d'Affaires expanded the question to inquire if Gambari had discussed the lifting of criminal penalties, which the regime was using to imprison over 2,000 people for voicing their opposition to the roadmap. Gambari responded that in regards to the referendum, he had offered technical assistance and international monitors. He asserted he had raised free access to the media and urged the regime not to engage in actions that limited free expressions and views. He noted that it was a pity that at a time when there was so much international support to provide such assistance, the regime had rejected it. He also clarified that the referendum would take place over the course of one day scheduled 21 days in advance, and would be by secret ballot. ¶9. (C) Asked by the Philippine Ambassador the minimum level of tangible results Gambari would need to consider his mission a success, Gambari replied, "an inclusive, time-bound, substantive dialogue." Gambari concluded that from the reports he was receiving, it did not seem as if the dialogue was moving forward substantively. Gambari concluded by emphasizing that the UN had made several suggestions to the regime on how they could enhance the credibility of their referendum, but it remained to be seen if they would take the UN up on them. Finally, he added, the regime must address the roots of socio-economic discontent in Burma. ¶10. (C) Comment: Gambari appears to have obtained nothing but rejection of all of his suggestions. This included his pet proposal on poverty alleviation, which he had been urged by diplomats and the UN Country Team to drop in order to focus on the credibility of the referendum. Once Than Shwe realized that Gambari could not deliver anything on sanctions, he relegated Gambari to lower level officials who have no negotiating authority. Than Shwe never had any intention of opening his directed transition to impartial outside scrutiny. This is very disappointing but should not come as a surprise. End comment. VILLAROSA