WARPED THINKING IN BURMA: INSIGHTS FROM AN INSIDER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 RANGOON 000018

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DEPT FOR P, EAP/MLS AND IO
PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL BM
SUBJECT: WARPED THINKING IN BURMA: INSIGHTS FROM AN INSIDER

Classified By: CDA Shari Villarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)


1. (C) Summary: Yin Yin Oo, a Foreign Ministry official
close to Number Three General Thura Shwe Mann and the sister
of Deputy Foreign Minister Kyaw Thu, has been authorized to
engage in general discussions with the US and British
Embassies. She contacted Charge just before Christmas to
suggest a meeting, after not being in contact since last
July. Charge met her for dinner January 7 and in the course
of discussion garnered a number of useful insights into the
warped thinking of the senior generals, as well their general
lack of understanding about how the rest of the world
operates. Yin Yin Oo acknowledged they were xenophobic and
feared change. They have paranoid delusions about the United
States. The absence of common sense or logic, combined with
distorted information, in the twisted minds of the senior
generals helps to explain why it is so difficult to influence
them.

Fear of Change
--------------


2. (C) Yin Yin Oo came prepared to discuss the thinking of
the senior leadership, giving the Charge a chance to clarify
our views of the situation inside Burma. Most of the
discussion focused on the lack of dialogue, either internal
and international. Yin Yin Oo acknowledged the need for
Burma to change, but cited the leaders' desire to proceed
cautiously. Charge retorted that they had an excess of
caution and needed to just get moving, even if slowly. The
senior generals are afraid of change because they may not be
able to control it, explained Yin Yin Oo. Charge recounted
the Vietnamese Ambassador's tale of how hard change had been
to start in Vietnam, but once it began, change moved faster
as the leaders realized the benefits of opening up. She
added that change tends to take on its own momentum, beyond
any one person's control, and while there are always a few
people unhappy with change, most welcome it. Since the
impetus for change in Vietnam came from relatively
enlightened leaders, according to the Ambassador, Charge
asked if Burma had any relatively enlightened leaders now.
Yin Yin Oo thought carefully and replied, "maybe two."

Paranoid of the United States
--------------


3. (C) Revealing the regime's paranoia towards the United
States, Yin Yin Oo commented several times on the First
Lady's interest in Burma. Charge confirmed that the First
Lady's interest was very deep and very sincere, and for that
reason she kept very well informed about developments in
Burma. "Isn't that unusual for a First Lady?" Yin Yin Oo
asked. What was unusual, replied the Charge, noting we had a
former First Lady running for President. Yin Yin Oo
mentioned reports that the First Lady had met with UN
Secretary General Ban Ki Moon and UN Advisor on Burma

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Gambari. She said this showed that the U.S. controlled the
UN. Charge commented that most Americans think the UN does
not listen to us enough, noting USG views and UN views
diverged on a variety of issues. The whole world had seen
what happened in September in Burma--the shooting of monks
and peaceful demonstrators--and was very upset. Because of
her knowledge about the country, the Charge said it was
perfectly understandable for the First Lady to speak out
about what happened in Burma, and she would continue to do so.


4. (C) Charge pointed out that the Burmese people and
international community had hoped that a genuine dialogue
would have gotten underway by now. But the fact that it now
appears that the dialogue has gone nowhere, made it likely
that the First Lady and others would publicly criticize the
regime. Yin Yin Oo asked for more time and quiet, so that
change could proceed. Charge responded that time only moves
faster and faster. Everyone would like to slow time down,
but cannot. She pointed out that there had been little
attention on Burma since Gambari's last visit in early
November, so the generals had a couple of months of quiet.
Unfortunately they used that time to continue arrests, hike
satellite rates to restrict news, halt dialogue, and refuse

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to allow UN envoy Gambari to return. Forty-five years of
military rule had exhausted everyone's patience, even of the
Asians. The international community is not inclined to give
the generals another five years; they must get started now,
urged the Charge.

Where's Gambari?
--------------


5. (C) Charge informed Yin Yin Oo of the dismay of
Rangoon-based diplomats, who had learned recently that
Gambari would not be permitted to visit again until after the
mid-April water festival. As a result, Charge predicted that
international criticism would start up again. If the
generals do not like international criticism, then they must
start talking with the pro-democracy and ethnic minority
representatives, along with the UN. Yin Yin Oo tried to
explain the delays on the generals' schedules: Senior
General Than Shwe annually tours the country in December; the
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister were traveling
internationally in January; preparations for Armed Forces Day
in March. Charge said the international community could only
interpret the unwillingness to make time for Gambari as
evidence that the regime has no interest in working with the
UN.


6. (C) Yin Yin Oo asserted Gambari visited often. Charge
countered that four times in two years did not constitute
often. Yin Yin Oo complained when Gambari issued the
statement from Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) in Singapore after his
last visit to Burma in November, it made him look biased in
her favor. Charge replied that if Aung San Suu Kyi could
communicate directly with the world, then she would not need
to issue statements through other people. Charge also
dismissed Yin Yin Oo's claim that the regime did not know in
advance about the statement as untrue, while acknowledging
that someone may have failed to inform Than Shwe it was
coming. Yin Yin Oo commented that the statement was a good
one, and that she was only reporting how senior levels of the
regime reacted. Charge expressed regret that the generals
had decided to trash the statement, rather than welcome it to
get the dialogue going. The international community would
have applauded a welcome as a positive step forward.


7. (C) Charge explained that the diplomats based in Rangoon
viewed Gambari's last visit as a failure because he allowed
himself to be kept captive in Nay Pyi Taw by the regime.
Issuing ASSK's statement was the only way he could salvage
his visit to show some semblance of progress to the
international community. The continuing military presence in
Rangoon after the demonstrations, according to Yin Yin Oo,
made Naw Pyi Taw better for receiving Gambari. Charge
commented that the diplomats had to correct Gambari when he
claimed that the arrests had stopped and the military
presence was gone from Rangoon. To the diplomats, it
appeared that Gambari had accepted completely the regime's
story because he could not see the situation for himself. By
parroting this to the diplomats who knew the truth, he lost
credibility. Yin Yin Oo pointed out that Pinheiro had been
allowed more time in Rangoon, which Charge acknowledged and
added that it only made Gambari look weaker. However,
neither Gambari nor Pinheiro could visit people they
specifically requested to meet, nor travel freely. Until
that happens, warned the Charge, it will appear to the
international community that the regime is trying to hide the
truth about the situation inside Burma.

Poor Communication Skills
--------------


8. (C) Yin Yin Oo described the difficulties Burmese
officials have in getting their story out. She said they
were afraid to meet with the press because they might not
have the answers or might face "rude" questions. Charge
responded that they could gain experience by interacting more
with the press. They should be prepared for tough questions;
that is the role of the press. If they do not have the
answers, they should offer to get back to the questioner with
the facts rather than huff off the podium as the Information

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Minister did at one press conference, recounted the Charge.
His pique at the press became the story, and only made him
look silly. Charge added that the practice of citing
exaggerated statistics that do not accord with reality
undermined the credibility of Burmese officials speaking to
people living here, who know the real inflation rate whenever
they shop, or whether they have electricity or not.


9. (C) Charge also suggested that Burmese officials permit
international journalists to visit Burma regularly. They
will publish critical stories, but also publish official
comments, to permit their readers to make up their own minds.
To gain confidence in dealing with the international press,
she suggested that officials traveling abroad meet with the
local press. Yin Yin Oo listened intently, and asked, 'but
what if they cannot speak about certain matters?" Charge
replied that then they should admit it. (Comment: This
would effectively reveal that no one has the authority to
comment on policies, except Than Shwe and/or Maung Aye.)


10. (C) Charge commented that she ascribed the discomfort
with the press similarly to official reluctance to meet with
her--fear. Yin Yin Oo reiterated the tendency of officials
to be very cautious. Charge asked if would be criticized for
meeting with her. Yin Yin Oo implied this could be possible.
She said there was no requirement to seek permission from
higher ups before speaking to us, but some officials might do
so, just to be safe. She quickly adopted the Charge's
description of this as "CYA," using it frequently during the
course of the evening.


11. (C) Yin Yin Oo mentioned that Burmese had great respect
for age, which made it difficult for younger people to talk
to their elders. She expressed disappointment that the
Culture Minister, whom she described as "very close to the
senior leader (Than Shwe)," had not made an effort to engage
the Charge at the Independence Day dinner in Nay Pyi Taw.
Charge said she had asked his opinion about the Beijing talks
and what he foresaw as next steps. He looked uncomfortable,
did not respond, and turned away to talk to the Japanese
Ambassador. Yin Yin Oo urged the Charge to meet with Aung
Gyi, the Liaison Minister to ASSK. She looked disappointed
when Charge replied that she had already, and had been told
that he was "too busy" without any suggestion of a time when
he might be free.

Missed Opportunities
--------------


12. (C) Charge said these examples were missed opportunities
the regime had to increase understanding about their plans.
Their unwillingness to discuss their plans had caused the
regime to lose the support of most of its immediate
neighbors, who saw the need for changes, but had no sense
that the Burmese leaders recognized this. The ASEANs had
made it clear to us they would no longer defend the regime,
and had thrown up their hands, the Charge reported, since the
regime was unwilling to talk to their ASEAN partners. Yin
Yin Oo seemed surprised to be hearing this, further revealing
how little information flows inside the regime.


13. (C) Charge cited the Burmese CDA in Washington as
another missed opportunity to communicate. She asked why a
non-English speaker, who had never traveled outside of Burma,
had been assigned to a place like Washington? Yin Yin Oo
quickly distanced the Foreign Ministry from him, as do most
other Foreign Ministry officials, saying that he was not a
diplomat, but brought in from the military to "hold the
fort." Charge offered her impression that his primary
responsibility, along with his predominantly military staff,
was to spy on Burmese in the U.S.


14. (C) Yin Yin Oo clarified that the defection of the DCM
from the Burmese Embassy in 2004 had been a major shock, the
regime did not want another, and so brought in the current
CDA. She claimed that the former DCM now worked for the CIA.
Charge noted that he reportedly worked for the now-defunct
Military Intelligence, and suggested he worried what might
happen to him if he returned after the dismantling of MI in

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the wake of Khin Nyunt's downfall. Yin Yin Oo replied that
no MI officers working as diplomats had been imprisoned after
their recalls to Burma. To Charge's question whether they
still had jobs, she blithely asserted "they are all rich, you
don't have to worry about them." Continuing to push the CIA
connection, she said the former DCM had published an article
under his name that could not have been written by him
because the English was too good. Charge dismissed this as a
crazy assumption, pointing out that it is routine in the U.S.
to have editors go over any articles prior to publication to
correct language and grammar.

Visa Problems
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15. (C) Charge also raised our inability since September
2007 to get visas and re-entry permits for our permanently
assigned staff and TDYers. Yin Yin Oo, who formerly directed
the Consular Department, agreed that this was contrary to
normal diplomatic practice and offered to check on the issue.
Charge said that we had heard that Than Shwe had ordered no
more visas for Americans after the September demonstrations.
Yin Yin Oo suggested that the Foreign Minister might have
been reluctant to move the visas forward to the Foreign
Affairs Policy Council (a cabinet level committee chaired by
Prime Minister Thein Sein) because several months ago
someone had questioned why so many official Americans were
traveling to Burma. Charge acknowledged that the large
number of visa requests as we got ready to move into our new
Embassy might have overwhelmed the system, but the requests
had significantly declined after September. Although Burmese
Embassies have the authority to issue most visas, Yin Yin Oo
knowledged
that many, particularly Bangkok with the heaviest workload,
might be referring them back to the FAPC out of caution.

Comment
--------------


16. (C) That Yin Yin Oo has been instructed to reach out
again to the U.S. and British Embassies is an indication that
some within the regime are interested in resuming some
dialogue with us. She knew that much of what she asserted
made little sense, regularly prefacing her remarks with "just
so you know how these people think." We do need to know how
they think, their xenophobia, their paranoia, their fear of
change, their lack of awareness of how the rest of the world
thinks. We also need to understand that their poor
communication is not only with us, but with each other
because they do not know whom they can trust, which adds to
the dysfunctionality of the regime. No one speaks truth to
power for fear of losing their privileged positions. Few of
Charge's points will filter very far up, and those that do
will likely to be edited to present a good news story. For
this reason, to get the attention of Than Shwe, we must keep
raising Burma at the UN. This irritates him to no end
because it challenges his legitimacy. He can try to control
the news coming into and going from Burma, but he cannot stop
the outside world criticizing his stranglehold on power in
Burma. Steady criticism of Than Shwe, and how he has
destroyed this country, might persuade those few generals
ready to open up to risk his wrath.
VILLAROSA