MOROCCO: FLOATING NEW PEACEKEEPING INITIATIVES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 RABAT 000753

SIPDIS

STATE FOR IO/PSC, PM, NEA/RA, AND NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2028
TAGS: MOPS PREL MCAP KPKO KUNR MO
SUBJECT: MOROCCO: FLOATING NEW PEACEKEEPING INITIATIVES

REF: A. IRR 7 100 0391 08 (NOTAL)

B. 07 RABAT 00343

C. RABAT 01238

Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The Government of Morocco (GOM) is
exploring the possibility of increasing its peacekeeping
profile by creating a UN-sponsored regional training center
and/or augmenting its own ability to carry out peacekeeping
operations. It is soliciting preliminary international
reaction to both. Even with this support, the GOM would face
other challenges to these initiatives, such as resource
constraints and a lack of "buy-in" from its own military
leaders. In addition to the advantages of possibly receiving
material and training for its armed forces, Morocco likely
calculates these initiatives, if they came to fruition, could
garner good will with other countries through peacekeeping
training and contributions, which the GOM could then parlay
toward meeting its goals on the Western Sahara issue.
Despite these initiatives, the GOM is unwilling to commit
peacekeepers for Sudan at this time. Although Morocco's
vision for these initiatives is purely in the idea stage, the
GOM has opened a dialogue with at least the U.S. and Canada
to solicit ideas and gauge our support. End summary.

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Morocco: Exploring Higher Profile Role in Peacekeeping
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2. (C) On August 7, A/PolCouns met with Moroccan Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MFA) Chief of Staff Nasser Bourita to
discuss the possibility of the Government of Morocco (GOM)
establishing a UN-endorsed regional training center for
peacekeeping in Morocco, and other ideas for increasing
Morocco's peacekeeping profile. The purpose of the meeting
with Bourita was to follow-up on a series of meetings in
mid-July between A/PolCouns and MFA Office of United Nations
Affairs Counselor Amine Chabi to engage the MFA at a higher
level and to seek clarification of MFA's ideas. The GOM is
in the process of "preparing the terrain" diplomatically to
see if countries like the U.S. and Canada would support the
idea before moving any further.


3. (C) Although still in the idea stage, the MFA solicited
the U.S.'s opinion of the GOM creating a Morocco-based UN
facility that would specialize in the training of soldiers,
officers, and diplomats from Francophone Africa and the
Middle East to increase their effectiveness in peacekeeping
deployments world wide. Bourita underscored the GOM's robust
experience in peacekeeping operations, dating back to the
1960s, including past deployments to Angola, Bosnia,
Cambodia, Haiti, and Somalia, and current peacekeeping
operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cote
d'Ivoire (1,500 security personnel) and Kosovo, i.e., a fully
staffed military hospital. He also cited Morocco's
experience in "new areas of peacekeeping," such as
post-conflict reconciliation as a basis of Morocco's
peacekeeping credentials. In addition to its experiences in
Bosnia and Kosovo, the GOM had grown from its own
"reconciliation experience" -- after Morocco's infamous
"years of lead." In addition to raising its standard of
human rights protections, Morocco has gained valuable
experience in striking a balance between providing justice to
a post conflict society without causing a break in that
society or destabilizing the country, Bourita explained. He
expressed his belief that a demand exists for this kind of
training among countries in West African and the Middle East.
In addition to the U.S., Bourita said that the GOM had
opened a dialogue with the Government of Canada, through its
Pearson Peacekeeping Center, to add to Morocco's reflection
on the training center idea.


4. (C) Morocco's training center concept is the latest
indicator of Morocco's desire to explore ideas that may
increase its peacekeeping profile. In April, Morocco tabled
with the U.S., through UN channels, a proposal to commemorate
the 60th anniversary of UN peacekeeping by sponsoring a
high-level meeting at the next UNGA to discuss lessons
learned from past UN deployments and prospects for future

RABAT 00000753 002 OF 004


ones. Bourita said that Morocco would like to see greater
codification in the UN of peacekeeping to "bring it in line
with modern times." Bourita underscored that despite
peacekeeping being around for over half a century, it has yet
to be codified in serious way in the UN. He also cited a
number of areas of peacekeeping in need of reform such as
addressing the bias of Western countries leading peacekeeping
missions, seeking better burden sharing in peacekeeping
forces away from poor countries and toward rich ones, and
checking the European Union's (EU) effort to "regionalize
peacekeeping" -- a notion the GOM opposes. When asked to
square the GOM idea of opening a regional training center
with its criticism of the EU, Bourita countered by citing
Morocco's unique skills and experience, the cost
effectiveness of training "locally," and the ability to train
in Arabic and French. Bourita underscored his "train
locally, deploy globally" point by saying that it is often
politically difficult for countries, citing Morocco as an
example, to deploy peacekeepers within the region that it
resides.


5. (C) Bourita said that apart from the training center
idea, Morocco was also reflecting on the possibility of
expanding its peacekeeping operational capacity by increasing
the overall size of its peacekeeping-trained forces. The GOM
is considering training additional Moroccan forces in
peacekeeping in order to establish a three-part troop
rotation system, whereby one third of its peacekeeping forces
could be deployed at any one time while two-thirds of its
peacekeepers would be based domestically to rest, refit, and
train. Although Bourita did not mention specific targets,
with current overseas deployment figures, Morocco might be
looking to establish a peacekeeping contingent of
approximately 4,500 security personnel, putting it in the
league of Nigeria and Ghana (currently the two largest
peacekeeping contributors among Africa countries with over
5,200 and 3,200 personnel currently deployed to UN
peacekeeping missions, respectively, according to UN
figures). The MFA's expansion idea seems to be in line with
Ref A reporting that we have seen indicating that Morocco may
be willing to increase is peacekeeping force contribution to
the DRC.

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... But Many Constraints Exist
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6. (C) Training, equipment shortfalls, and security
requirements in the Western Sahara will likely constrain
Morocco's vision of increased peacekeeping capacity.
According to Chabi, the GOM would welcome U.S. assistance to
meet these shortfalls. Specifically, the GOM would be
interested in exploring any possibilities of U.S.-provided
training for Moroccan soldiers, police, and diplomats in the
areas of peacekeeping/building, preventative diplomacy, and
post-conflict development. He also mentioned large lift
capacity helicopters, e.g., Chinook-class, as a key operating
constraint for Morocco. Complimenting U.S. efforts
supporting resolution of the Sahara conflict, Chabi said that
if the issue could be resolved, Morocco would contribute more
troops to UN peacekeeping operations.


7. (C) GOM initiatives are also suffering from a lack of
"buy-in" from the Moroccan armed forces. Despite the steady
signals from MFA that the GOM is interested in at least
preparing the diplomatic terrain for an increase in its
peacekeeping posture, we have heard scant corroboration of
this effort through GOM military channels. According to
embassy military personnel, the Moroccan armed forces have
not requested equipment or training in support of
peacekeeping operations. Although a U.S. military police
unit trained Moroccan personnel in PKO as part of the
"African Lion" training exercise in June 2008, top level
officers, including Armed Forces Commander General Abdelaziz
Bennani and Army Operations Chief Colonel Abdelfatah, have
not tabled this issue in discussions with embassy officers.
Military Intelligence Chief and newly promoted Brigadier
General Abdallah Hamdoun flatly denied any knowledge of the
initiative when asked by embassy defense attaches in early
July, suggesting a lack of MFA consultation with the military

RABAT 00000753 003 OF 004


on this issue. (Comment: The military's lack of knowledge
about the MFA's peacekeeping proposals is unsurprising given
the palace's penchant for keeping the military at arms length
from policy decision-making, stemming back to several failed
military coup attempts in the early 70s. Consequently, the
lack of "buy-in" from the military on the government's
peacekeeping efforts is likely to delay implementation of any
new initiatives. End Comment.)


8. (C) Another area of potential challenge for GOM
peacekeeping initiatives are past allegations of Moroccan
soldier sexual misconduct during peacekeeping deployments to
the DRC in 2004 (Ref B) and Cote d'Ivoire in 2007 (Ref C).
Moroccan soldiers have been identified to have engaged in
soliciting prostitutes, fathering unwanted children, and in
some cases, accused of rape. However, Morocco's rapid
response to these events, through professional investigations
and the meting out of punishments, is likely to ameliorate,
if not fully reverse, concerns of Moroccan expansion of its
peacekeeping activities.

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... And Deployment to Sudan Unlikely
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10. (C) Bourita told us that it would not consider
contributing to a peacekeeping operation in Sudan at this
time. Morocco considered the quality of the peacekeeping
forces already committed there and their management by the
African Union (AU) to be poor. Morocco was also
uncomfortable with the command of the force being shared
between the UN and the AU -- an international body from which
Morocco withdrew in 1984. In addition, the GOM was not
satisfied that there was agreement among the warring parties
to invite a peacekeeping force into the country -- a point
reiterated to us by Brigadier General Hamdoun in early July.
Finally, the GOM was not comfortable with the rules of
engagement set for the current force in Sudan -- although he
did not elaborate on what he meant by this.


11. (C) Speaking more broadly, Bourita told us that the GOM
will only consider participating in a deployment if minimum
criteria are met. Although not set in stone, he said that
the below list of principles serves the MFA internally as a
guideline when considering peacekeeping deployments. Bourita
considered the first two, if not first three, of the criteria
to be absent from the Sudan context.

-- (1) All parties to the conflict in a country must agree to
host peacekeeping forces. Without political consensus on
this point, a successful deployment is impossible.

-- (2) The peacekeeping deployment has a clear mandate from
the UN via a UN Security Council Resolution.

-- (3) The nature of the peacekeeping operation and how it
will be carried out must be established in detail before the
deployment begins. One of the major strategic decisions in
this regard is whether the operation will have a military or
humanitarian component, or a combination of both.

-- (4) The territorial integrity of the state requesting the
peacekeeping force must be respected.


12. (C) Comment: Morocco's exploration of its peacekeeping
profile by hosting a UN center for training and/or by
expanding its own capacity has multiple potential payoffs for
Morocco and the U.S. The possibility of receiving funding,
equipment, and training -- from foreign countries -- to
further professionalize its armed forces presents the
immediate potential payoff for the GOM. Morocco would
undoubtedly parlay any increased peacekeeping capacity into
winning favor with countries toward legitimizing its claims
to Western Sahara. In the long run, it would also provide a
new mission for forces in the Western Sahara should the
impasse with the POLISARIO be overcome. For the U.S., the
initiatives represent the prospect of increasing peacekeeping
capacity world wide, further improve upon its bilateral
relationship Morocco, and send a message of reward and
recognition of Morocco's improvements in human rights and

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peace building in the region. After appropriate
consultations with affected embassies and other actors, it
might be productive for the Department to instruct Embassy
Rabat to provide preliminary reflections to the GOM on its
proposed peacekeeping initiatives. End Comment.


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Riley