PARLIAMENTARY REFORM VIEWED WITH SKEPTICISM

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000577

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/2032
TAGS: PGOV KDEM MO
SUBJECT: PARLIAMENTARY REFORM VIEWED WITH SKEPTICISM

Classified By: PolCouns Craig M. Karp for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: A parliamentary staffer from the
Berber-dominated Mouvement Populaire (MP) political party
recently told us that real constitutional reform was
necessary to advance democracy, but unlikely in the near
term. For now, the Parliament could exercise better the
authority it already holds. Palace insider Fouad Ali
El-Himma is on track to build a new political entity that
could dominate Morocco's political scene, but is also
reinforcing the tendency in Parliament to let the Palace "run
the show." The (Islamist) Justice and Development Party
(PJD),the second largest party in parliament, seems
powerless in opposition, but is slowly increasing its
political support in society. Islamic extremists are gaining
political strength in prisons. Their sympathizers are
building on their prisoner support movement to show the first
signs of political organization. End summary.


2. (C) On June 6, 2008, Poloffs met with Abdelouahad
Dryweish (strictly protect),a senior parliamentary staffer
and key younger activist in the Mouvement Populaire, the
Berber dominated party with the third largest bloc of seats
in parliament. Dryweish said that many changes and reforms
were needed to turn the Parliament into a quality institution
capable of providing representation for the Moroccan people.
USAID's parliamentary support program (implemented by SUNY -
the State University of New York) was having a positive
impact, with a focus on building parliament's capacity to
exercise oversight of the state budget. Other reforms were
needed such as the establishment of parliamentary research
office, which would serve as a rough equivalent to the United
States' Congressional Research Service. Morocco needed to
catch up to other African countries that have such a capacity
in their parliaments already, he opined.


3. (C) Dryweish said Constitutional amendments were
prerequisite to real structural transformation, adding that
leading opposition politicians, like PJD Deputy Secretary
General Lahcen Daoudi, were openly calling for Constitutional
reforms. Seemingly resigned to the notion that
constitutional reform was an unlikely possibility in the near
term, Dryweish said that many key improvements could be made
short of re-writing the Constitution. One such element could
be the voluntary withdrawal of the Palace from meddling in
the internal machinations of the Parliament. He complained
that currently, many Parliamentarians use their offices
merely as a means of positioning themselves to receive favors
and political rewards from the Palace, implying that the
Palace rewards this behind the scenes patronage. There
exists "a paralyzing culture of subservience to the Monarchy
among most Parliamentarians," according to Dryweish, killing
any initiative of the institution as a whole. Dryweish
complained that some powers of the Parliament are simply
never exercised, citing the Parliament's supposed power to
censure the government. Dryweish added that he thought that
Parliament should be more involved in the dialogue regarding
security issues. (Note: security issues are generally
considered part of the "sovereign ministries," an exclusive
domain of the Palace. Parliament has been trying to insert
itself gradually into the process by calling for hearings of
the relevant Ministers.)


4. (C) Thinking out load, Dryweish opined that perhaps the
controversial entry of Royal intimate Fouad Ali El-Himma to
the Parliament as a MP may be a positive development for
Parliamentary reform. Perhaps El-Himma will be able to
demonstrate to other Parliamentarians that they do not
necessarily have to wait on the Palace or the Interior
Ministry before taking political initiatives; "perhaps
al-Himma can break the cycle of subservience." Unfortunately,
El-Himma had not publicly concentrated on issues of real
substance, including Parliamentary reform.


5. (C) The Movement of All Democrats (MTD),the broad
political association led by El-Himma, is growing stronger.
El-Himma appeared to use a recent conference in Marrakech for
alliance building with established political parties like the
pro-Palace/centrist Rally of National Independents (RNI) and
the Berber-dominated MP. El-Himma was also swamped by
conference attendees who were apparently more interested in
getting him to pass notes petitioning the King for personal
favors or assistance than they were in discussing the MTD's
political strategy. Apparently detracting from any reformist
credentials, El-Himma was challenged by a young Berber
activist who asked him how MTD, a registered civil
association, was allowed to openly conduct political
activities, when Moroccan law expressly limits such
activities to registered political parties. El-Himma was
reportedly "blindsided" by the question and unable to offer a
coherent response.


6. (C) Another part of El-Himma's political strategy is
reaching out to universities. Dryweish opined that part of
El-Himma's motivation is to cultivate a new generation of
supporters for the MTD, carving out a place for MTD discourse
at the university level: a space currently dominated by
Islamist and Amazigh (Berber) organizations.


7. (C) Dryweish speculated that the Palace, through El
Himma, appeared to be trying to establish three political
poles within the Parliament. These poles included the Koutla
(i.e., the ruling minority coalition including the
conservative Istiqlal, the leftist Socialist Union of Popular
Forces (USFP) and Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS); the
"Liberal pole" (i.e., led by al-Himma, MP, RNI,
Constitutional Union (UC),among other small parties); and
the Islamist parties (i.e., principally the PJD). Due to
leadership problems, the MP had lost its bearings after being
excluded from the coalition following the fall 2007
elections. Now the party was hoping to receive a signal from
El-Himma or the King that it would be permitted to join the
MTD. If offered, the MP would readily join, he said.


8. (C) The Islamist PJD, which received the most popular
votes and took the second largest number of parliamentary
seats last fall, held little institutional power, being an
opposition party in an already weak parliament. However, the
PJD marshaled considerable political influence in society
writ-large, according to Dryweish.


9. Meanwhile, sympathizers of the Moroccan Salafia Jihadia
(MSJ or SJ) were becoming increasingly strong and organized
in prisons, where SJ adherents, paradoxically, gain
credibility among fellow adherents, and public sympathizers,
for being incarcerated, according to Dryweish. SJ is not a
coherent organization, but rather a term used by Moroccan
authorities to generically describe radicals, terrorists, and
cells they form subscribing to an extreme fundamentalist
Islamic ideology in Morocco. SJ sympathizers were also
becoming increasingly organized, in part through the prisoner
support movement, and in three to four years may enter
mainstream politics, even participating in the political
process. Dryweish said that the recent photo distributed
widely on the internet of the local Chief of Moroccan Police
in Casablanca beating a woman, who was demonstrating for
improved prison conditions for her husband who was
incarcerated for extremist activity, had garnered huge
resonance among SJ sympathizers and was a propaganda coup for
jihadists.


10. (C) Comment: Many observers share Dryweish's skepticism
about near term prospects for constitutional change, while
whispering their preference for it. This has reinforced our
strategy of enhancing institutional capacity as a
prerequisite for reform. Most party leaders and
Parliamentarians, with the exception of those from the PJD,
opt publicly for the second approach. Continuation of the
status quo is having a deleterious effect on the Moroccan
polity's faith in the Parliament and political parties, as
witnessed by the low voter turnout in September Parliamentary
elections. On the margins, the PJD appears to be garnering
political points and the grudging respect of other parties,
for at least publicly admitting the problem and calling for
constitutional reform.


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Riley