Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08RABAT495
2008-05-30 13:21:00
SECRET
Embassy Rabat
Cable title:  

MOROCCAN EFFORTS TO STOP THE FLOW OF FOREIGN

Tags:  PTER EAIR PREL MO 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0816
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 000495 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/CT, NEA/RA AND NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2018
TAGS: PTER EAIR PREL MO
SUBJECT: MOROCCAN EFFORTS TO STOP THE FLOW OF FOREIGN
FIGHTERS

REF: A. STATE 050900 (NOTAL)

B. STATE 037910 (NOTAL)

C. RABAT 0422

D. RABAT 0400

E. RABAT 0398

F. RABAT 0150

Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for reasons 1.4 (b),(c) and
(d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 000495

SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/CT, NEA/RA AND NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2018
TAGS: PTER EAIR PREL MO
SUBJECT: MOROCCAN EFFORTS TO STOP THE FLOW OF FOREIGN
FIGHTERS

REF: A. STATE 050900 (NOTAL)

B. STATE 037910 (NOTAL)

C. RABAT 0422

D. RABAT 0400

E. RABAT 0398

F. RABAT 0150

Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for reasons 1.4 (b),(c) and
(d).


1. (S/NF) Summary: The Mission has followed up with
appropriate Moroccan officials regarding the flow of foreign
fighters (FF) to Iraq (Ref A) and determined that the
Moroccan security services are actively engaged in preventing
FF from leaving the country. Morocco is well aware that the
USG considers the elimination of foreign fighters a priority
for building peace and stability in Iraq, and Moroccan
security officials support USG efforts to reach out to source
countries to stem the flow of FF. The Kingdom,s motivation
to detain those citizens intent on fighting in Iraq is
primarily based on self-interest. The Moroccan services are
concerned that FF who return from Iraq are likely to be
battle-hardened and ready to commit terrorist acts in
Morocco. Moroccan authorities effectively monitor the
movement and activities of extremists and have prevented over
139 Moroccan fighters from traveling to Iraq since 2003 (Ref
F),including approximately 40 between late 2006 and early

2008. End summary.


2. (S/NF) Prior to the release of the Objective Massey data,
Moroccan security officials had identified some 15 suicide
bombers who had left Morocco for jihad in Iraq. The
Objective Massey documents enabled Moroccan officials to
confirm these individuals had reached Iraq, and Morocco
launched a full-scale investigation into the names listed in
the Massey files. The Moroccan services have used the
information recovered by U.S. forces to investigate
associates of the Abu Ghadiya foreign fighter facilitation
network who are involved in the movement of Moroccan fighters
to and from Iraq.


3. (S/NF) Moroccan security services, relations with the
Syrian services are improving, particularly in regard to
foreign fighter issues. The security services have noted
that the Syrian government has detained several Moroccan
foreign fighters traveling through Syria en route to Iraq and

has cooperated in extraditing them back to Morocco. Moroccan
officials have stated, however, that Syrian cooperation is
dependent on whether the Syrians perceive it to be in their
national interest. The Moroccans are aware that the Syrians
knowingly allow foreign fighters to cross through Syria, but
the security services try to provide the Syrians complete
dossiers on such Moroccans en route to Iraq to facilitate
Syrian detention.


4. (S/NF) The Moroccan Government is aware of the potential
danger represented by foreign fighters going to Iraq and
subsequently returning to the Kingdom to commit a terrorist
act. The security services, which are actively detaining
jihadists and investigating new leads on foreign fighter
cells, have a proven track record in wrapping up FF cells and
individuals. The services in December 2006 dismantled a
major foreign fighter facilitation network and passed
information that led to the arrest in Sweden of the cell,s
leader, al-Qa,ida member and Moroccan national Abdelali
Miftah; they arrested in March 2007 Sa,ad al-Husayni, a
Moroccan Islamic Fighting Group (GICM) military wing
commander who had facilitated the travel of jihadists to

RABAT 00000495 002 OF 002


Iraq; and they helped target Moroccan al-Qa,ida in Iraq
extremist Muhsin Khaybar, a jihadist facilitator recruiting
foreign fighters from North Africa and Europe, who was
eventually killed by U.S. forces in Iraq. Early in May 2008
another FF cell of 11 was arrested. The GOM has announced
that all such investigations, arrests, prosecutions and
detentions will be in accord with the rule of law and human
rights standards prevailing in the country. As far as we
know, in recent times, it has generally fulfilled this
commitment, and even terrorists who are arrested get their
day in court.


5. (S/NF) Intelligence collection on FF issues is of high
importance to the Moroccan Government, and the services are
engaged. In an effort to enhance domestic intelligence
collection, the Government in April 2008 implemented the new
biometric enabled National Identification Card which will
help the Government better track suspected terrorists. The
National Police are also establishing guidelines for a future
Moroccan biometric passport. In addition, Morocco,s
Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Endowments closely supervises
the country,s mosques and monitors speeches given by local
religious leaders to ensure they are promoting a tolerant,
moderate interpretation of Islam. Moroccan intelligence
sharing on foreign fighter pipeline issues with other North
African partners is good, but longstanding regional disputes
have hindered cooperation with Algeria.


6. (S/NF) Concerning air travel to Syria, Turkey and other
countries bordering Iraq (Ref B),the Ambassador met with the
President of Royal Air Maroc to brief him and seek his
cooperation. Other mission officers have followed up with
counterparts on sharing airline passenger manifests. The GOM
is prepared to pursue the idea in principle. However, the
Mission understands that Morocco is not currently a priority
country in spite of the growing volume of passengers,
including passengers in transit.


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Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat
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Riley