AL-JAZEERA BUREAU CHIEF EXPECTS RABAT OFFICE TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 000493 SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/PPD, NEA/MAG, NEA/PI, AND DRL/NESCA LONDON FOR MOC DUBAI FOR PELLETIER E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/2018 TAGS: PHUM PGOV KPAO SCUL OIIP KIRC MO SUBJECT: AL-JAZEERA BUREAU CHIEF EXPECTS RABAT OFFICE TO CLOSE PERMANENTLY REF: RABAT 0416 Classified By: DCM Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Al-Jazeera's Rabat bureau chief dismissed Government of Morocco (GOM) claims that the suspension of Al-Jazeera's broadcast license was technical. Given that no one in the GOM would claim responsibility for the decision, he believed it came directly from the King. He criticized Moroccans for having "no clue" how news agencies make editorial and reporting decisions, and for thus having unreasonable and petty expectations about Al-Jazeera's coverage of local events. He held out little hope that the problem would be resolved, and reported that Doha would likely move the North Africa bureau to Madrid or Paris. End summary. ¶2. (C) Information Officer David Ranz and Information Specialist Salwa Jaafari met on May 21 with Rabat Bureau Chief Hassan Rachidi in Al-Jazeera's eerily dark and empty Rabat office, to discuss the GOM decision to suspend Al-Jazeera's broadcast license (reftel). When asked about prospects for re-opening the bureau, Rachidi stated "two days ago, I was hoping the Moroccans would change their mind, but now I don't have any hope." ¶3. (C) Following weeks of pleading for a meeting, Rachidi had finally been received on May 20 by Communications Minister Khaled Naciri, who stated flatly that he had nothing to add to the notification letter provided by the National Agency for Telecommunications Regulation (ANRT) suspending the license. Rachidi had been unable to get an appointment with anyone at the Higher Audiovisual Communications Authority (HACA),the agency ostensibly responsible for providing broadcast licenses. Sources in HACA had told him informally that they had been handed the portfolio suspending Al-Jazeera's license without prior consultation and were in no position to overturn the decision. ¶4. (C) Rachidi dismissed the official GOM line that the suspension was technical. Indeed, according to Rachidi, the ball had long been in HACA's court. Al-Jazeera had incorporated locally, as required by the Moroccan broadcast law. Al-Jazeera had submitted a license request in 2006, and had repeatedly followed up with HACA in writing asking to formalize its presence in Morocco. HACA was responsible for proposing a draft "cahier des charges" (terms of reference) for Al-Jazeera's consideration, but had repeatedly declined to do so. Every attempt on Rachidi's part to approach HACA had been rebuffed, he stated. Thus the fact that Al-Jazeera had been operating on a series of temporary three-month licenses was as a result of HACA's inaction, not Al-Jazeera's, Rachidi asserted. ¶5. (C) Rachidi stated that Al-Jazeera's opponents in the GOM had been carefully developing a file documenting reporting perceived to reflect anti-Moroccan bias ever since the bureau began broadcasting in 2006. He acknowledged that the slight against Fouad Ali El-Himma's followers cited reftel might have been the precipitating factor in the decision, but he believed Moroccan concerns about Al-Jazeera ran much deeper. He cited, for example, criticism he had received that Al-Jazeera had insufficiently trumpeted USG support for UNSYG Personal Envoy Peter Van Walsum's recent statements that RABAT 00000493 002 OF 003 autonomy was not a realistic option for Western Sahara. Moroccan critics would not accept his explanation that this was a UN and USG matter, which could only be covered by Al-Jazeera's U.S. bureaus, over which he exerted no control. He had also received complaints that Al-Jazeera had not covered the recent visit of the King to the village of Afengou to launch a series of socioeconomic projects, while Al-Jazeera had been the first television station to report that a number of the town's residents had frozen to death during the winter of 2006-7. ¶6. (C) Rachidi concluded that the ultimate decision to close Al-Jazeera's bureau had come from the King himself. He based this on the fact that no other individual or agency in the GOM would take responsibility for the decision, or even discuss it with him. For example, he related that a parliamentarian had been scheduled to pose a question about the closure, but the question had been withdrawn at the last moment. Prime Minister Abbas El-Fassi had not known about the decision until after it had been formally announced, he claimed. He found this surprising, as El-Himma had made no effort to hide his disdain for Al-Jazeera due largely to its coverage during the 2007 elections of a major scandal in El-Himma's past. ¶7. (C) Rachidi confirmed press reports that Al-Jazeera was considering moving its North African headquarters to Paris or Madrid. Unless the GOM changed its stance, which he judged very unlikely, Al-Jazeera headquarters in Doha would likely make the decision to move within a few weeks. ¶8. (C) As for himself, Rachidi stated he would leave Rabat shortly and return to Doha, where his family lives, regardless the outcome. A Dutch citizen of Moroccan descent, Rachidi had expected "when I accepted the job with Al-Jazeera to come back to my country as a hero." Instead, he said ruefully, he had lost many of his friends. Moroccans did not appreciate that most editorial decisions came from Doha; they treated Rachidi as a traitor for covering Morocco in a negative light. By way of example, he cited an instance in which Doha had ordered him to produce a story about a Moroccan whose permanent residence was a public toilet (it even said so on his ID card),a story his friends lambasted him for covering. ¶9. (C) Comment: The GOM decision, whoever made it, would seem to be spectacularly short-sighted. Whatever the criticism of Al-Jazeera's coverage ) and some of the examples cited by Rachidi seem awfully petty ) Al-Jazeera was very careful to temper its coverage of Moroccan affairs for fear of running afoul of local authorities. Al-Jazeera will feel no such restraint now, and indeed may sharpen its criticism of Morocco in retaliation for the office closing. Such was certainly the case in the immediate aftermath of the decision, when Al-Jazeera ran nightly reports for several days, including many man-on-the-street interviews (including from Morocco) critical of the GOM. ¶10. (C) We note as well that Al-Jazeera is not the only foreign news organization facing such problems; several Spanish journalists (the largest contingent of foreign journalists in Morocco) have recently been grappling with their own conflicts with the GOM. We are following up on reports that a Spanish television channel is considering RABAT 00000493 003 OF 003 leaving Morocco over licensing problems similar to those faced by Al-Jazeera, and senior Spanish journalists told us that a recent dispute over the accreditation of two Spanish print journalists in Morocco was resolved only after the Spanish Government was pressured by a local Spanish journalism association to intervene with the GOM. End comment. ***************************************** Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat ***************************************** Riley