MOROCCO: ISLAMIST DISSIDENTS FEELING THE HEAT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 000462 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2018 TAGS: KISL PGOV PINR ECON SCUL MO SUBJECT: MOROCCO: ISLAMIST DISSIDENTS FEELING THE HEAT REF: A. 07 RABAT 1838 ¶B. 07 RABAT 396 Classified by Polcouns Craig Karp, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: A senior leader of Morocco's largest Islamist organization, Al-Adl wal-Ihsane (AWI),recently told us that the group was facing intensified pressure from the GOM. AWI Political Committee Chairman Abdelwahed Motawakel underscored the group's rejection of formal political/electoral participation, deeming the system irretrievably corrupt. AWI does not aspire, however, to seize power, but rather has a gradualist, collaborative approach, we were told. Motawakel assessed Morocco's political system as unsustainable and destined to collapse under its own weight. He also offered some interesting details about the founding of the AWI and its early history. Our conversation reinforced our view of AWI as a political group in religious clothing, a point underscored subsequently by AWI's support for a general strike called for May 21 by a major labor union. End summary. ¶2. (C) On May 9, Polcouns and D/Polcouns called on Abdelwahed Al-Motawakel, founding member and Chairman of the Political Bureau of Al-Adl wal-Ihsane (AWI). (Note: the group is commonly called the Justice and Charity Organization or JCO in western media. Its own translation is Justice and Spirituality, but we find a more accurate translation to be the Justice and Good Works Organization. Because of this confusion we plan henceforth to refer to it by its Arabic name and acronym. End note.) Observers assess Motawakel as the third ranking leader after Spiritual Guide Sheikh Abdessalam Yassine and AWI spokesman Fathallah Arsalane. This large and influential Islamist organization -- it controls most university student governments -- is unrecognized by the GOM, but tolerated, if tightly constrained, as a counterweight both to more radical Islamists and to the more moderate variety - the (Islamist) Party of Justice and Development (PJD),which holds the second largest bloc of seats in parliament. -------------- Repression and Containment -------------- ¶3. (C) Motawakel complained that AWI was facing unprecedented pressure from the GOM, which has pursued a series of seemingly arbitrary arrests and police raids on AWI meetings since the group launched a short lived "open house" public outreach initiative in the spring of 2006. Motawakel expressed particular outrage at a mass arrest in April of 60 AWI members and their families in the obscure village of Tinejidad in Central Morocco, whom, he complained, the police "had caught red-handed having lunch," to celebrate the return of a pilgrim from Mecca. ¶4. (C) Among the 60 arrested and briefly detained in Tinejidad included numerous women and children, Motawakel charged, thus crossing a red line even the ruthless King Hassan II would have never allowed. The police themselves confessed to having been ashamed and apologized for "having to follow instructions," in carrying out the arrests, he claimed. Also in April, Motawakel reported that he had personally twice been blocked by police from conducting scheduled lectures at university campuses in Al-Jadida and Agadir. ¶5. (C) The GOM denies AWI the right to openly hold meetings, publish a newspaper, or put its name on a public banner or sign, Motawakel complained. This despite a series of past court decisions confirming that AWI is not an illegal organization, he asserted. "The state uses the law against us when it suits them, and ignores the law when it does not suit them," Motawakel charged. (Comment: AWI's legal status is murky and open to interpretation. Their attempts to register with the Ministry of Social Affairs as an NGO have been repeatedly rebuffed and they are thus unrecognized. However, they have received court judgments in their favor, finding them not illegal. End comment.) ¶6. (C) Another aspect of the state's containment strategy is in the media, Motawakel asserted. Al-Jazeera TV, whose North Africa bureau is seated here in Rabat, routinely ignores the group, implying that AJ's policy is followed in deference to the GOM. AJ solicits commentary from Moroccans from every conceivable political and social trend, even from very tiny and obscure groups, but studiously ignores Al-Adl wal Ihsane, he maintained. Likewise, pro-government news outlets only RABAT 00000462 002 OF 003 mention the group in negative and conspiratorial tones. (Comment: However, the PJD-associated Islamist Arabic daily Al-Tajdid routinely covers AWI developments in neutral to positive tones. End comment.) ¶7. (C) The GOM continuously tries to infiltrate AWI with informers, Motawakel claimed. Many of these informers become racked with guilt and reveal themselves, he asserted, allowing that others no doubt continue to observe and inform on the group. With arrests and aggressive attempts to contain AWI, "the GOM wants to frighten us, but we are not frightened," Motawakel stated, "just the opposite." He claimed that the ranks of AWI continue to grow, despite the GOM's best attempts at containment. "I remember when I personally knew every AWI member in (his hometown of) Al-Safi. Now there are so many, I only know a small fraction of them." He would not, however, venture even a suggestion of how many members they have. -------------- The Moroccan State is "Illegitimate" -------------- ¶9. (C) Reprising a familiar AWI theme, Motawakel underscored the group's view that the GOM lacks legitimacy. The low turnout (37 percent) in the September elections is the clearest indication of the state's illegitimacy, he asserted. Motawakel challenged the notion that the problem was public apathy - it is rather public recognition that the parliament and public organs of the state are merely a facade, he insisted, the real power lies with the "makhzen" - the Palace and its circle of political and business elites. ¶10. (C) The "makhzen" is driven by self-interest and materialism, caring little for the welfare of the masses, he contended, and cannot be voted out of power. The public sees this clearly, and is repulsed by the reality, Motawakel asserted. For AWI to support the (Islamist) Justice and Development Party (PJD) in the fall 2007 elections would have been a betrayal of the group's principles, Motawakel underscored. "How many groups have tried to change the system from within, only to be themselves changed by the system?" he asked. -------------- Gradualism not Hegemonism -------------- ¶11. (C) Ultimately, Motwakel asserted, the current political system is destined to collapse under its own weight. Staggering unemployment, rampant public corruption, decrepit educational and health care systems are unsustainable, and there are no serious attempts to reform them, he maintained. Motawakel insisted that AWI did not seek to topple the regime and seize power. The group rather pursued a gradualist, collaborative approach, he maintained. "We want to participate and be involved," not to take over, he insisted. ¶12. (C) For example, although AWI members now composed a plurality of the membership of the Moroccan Engineers Syndicate, they recently chose to occupy only three of the dozen seats on the syndicate board, leaving the outnumbered leftists in board leadership positions. This was the first time they have taken any seats at all. Asked about the dominance of AWI members in university student governments, Motawakel mused that the results of these elections, largely free from tampering, mirrored the standing of AWI in Moroccan society and the student leaders' reputations for piety and integrity - characteristics in short supply in the GOM leadership, he mused. -------------- Historical Notes -------------- ¶13. (C) Interspersed with his comments, Motawakel offered some interesting details about the AWI's past. The group was founded in September 1981 when he, spokesman Fathallah Arsalane, and several other founding members joined with the charismatic Sheikh Abdessalam Yassine to organize a group that could bring about change. "I found that I shared with Yassine many of the same ideas," about an Islam-based national renaissance, Motawakel recalled. (Comment: Yassine had already established himself as a prominent Islamist dissident. In 1974 Yassine was jailed after publishing an open letter to King Hassan II criticizing his authoritarianism and questioning his claim to the religious title "Commander of the Faithful." End comment.) RABAT 00000462 003 OF 003 ¶14. (C) Bio note: Abdelwahed Motawakel received a BA in English from Mohammed V University in Rabat and an MA in political science from Warwick University in the UK. He taught English at High Schools in Rabat and in his hometown of Safi. In 1989 he was jailed for two years, convicted of membership in an illegal organization. He was also banned from work in public schools and from international travel for 20 years. However, in 1998 he benefited from an amnesty for political opponents and was allowed to return to his teaching job, although he accepted soon after a "buy out" for early retirement. The travel ban was also lifted in 1998 and he has been abroad several times since, including a trip to the U.S. in the summer of 2007. Despite disagreements with USG policies in the region, he is a congenial and accessible interlocutor. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶15. (C) Our discussion with Motawakel reinforced our view that, despite its spiritual pretensions, AWI is a group with a principally political and populist agenda. Serious and transformative, if gradualist, it is an unspoken factor that looms large in Morocco's current political background. Much of his critique of the GOM's corruption and the makhzen's determination to guard its prerogatives rings true, though we believe he underestimates the King's commitment to reform. In the often contradiction-filled world of Moroccan politics, it appears that the government uses them, perhaps unwittingly, as a counterweight to the Islamist PJD. The non-declared AWI boycott of the 2007 elections may be one reason the PJD did not do as well as many anticipated. We have seen reports that former Interior Minister and master manipulator Driss Basri, maintained discreet links to the organization and met its founder. ¶16. (C) Shortly after our meeting, AWI spokesman Fathallah Arsalane announced that the group would support the calls by the Moroccan Democratic Labor Confederation (CDT) for a general strike on May 21. Although a leftist, CDT President Chairman Noubir Amaoui is reported to have close ties with the organization. While AWI's support may increase adherence to the strike, the lack of coordination among labor unions will considerably dilute the effort. AWI's support for the strike may be more moral than material in any case -- we note that despite Arsalane's expression of support for the strike, there have been no calls for adherence on the group's website. For its part, the CDT appears to be solidly secular, though it has no doubt welcomed the additional publicity and support from AWI. ¶17. (C) AWI is likely aware that a major mobilization of the public by Islamists, particularly at a time of very sensitive and painful increase of food prices, is a red line the GOM would not tolerate. It has certainly made this clear by preventing, including by force, any demonstrations or public meetings by AWI or PJD on the subject. End comment. ***************************************** Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat ***************************************** Riley