EXTREMISM AND TERROR IN MOROCCO PART I: HISTORIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 000398 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2017 TAGS: PTER KISL ASEC PINR MO XA XF SUBJECT: EXTREMISM AND TERROR IN MOROCCO PART I: HISTORIC AND POLITICAL ANTECEDENTS REF: A. RABAT 171 ¶B. 07 RABAT 1838 ¶C. 07 RABAT 1105 ¶D. 07 RABAT 751 Classified by Ambassador Thomas Riley for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) -- This is the first of a three-part cable series on Extremism and Terror in Morocco -------------- Summary and Introduction -------------- ¶1. (C) In Morocco, as in virtually every other country in the Arab-Islamic world, jihadist terrorism has emerged in the past 10 years as a threat to national stability. Morocco has also produced terrorists that have joined the international jihad, conducting violent attacks in Europe or enlisting with the foreign fighters in Iraq. With few exceptions, Moroccan terrorists have been adherents to Salafist/Wahabbi ideologies originating in the Middle East - austere doctrines which contrast sharply with traditional Moroccan Islam. Ironically, during the Cold War years, King Hassan II encouraged the growth of Salafist/Wahabbi interpretations of Islam as a counterweight both to leftist adversaries and to home-grown Moroccan Islamist opponents like the fundamentalist (but Sufi) Justice and Spirituality (aka Justice and Charity) Organization. ¶2. (C) The evolution of Salafism imported from the Middle East into both a domestic and transnational security threat was not highlighted until the Casablanca suicide bombings of May 16, 2003, which killed 33 civilians. Though the GOM has so far managed to prevent or preempt any further major attacks, Morocco has continued to produce suicide bombers. There have been a number of close calls and disruptions of cells in recent years planning operations that apparently would have had disastrous results if brought to fruition. ¶3. (C) This message, the first in a three part series, looks at the spiritual, historical, and political context in which extremist jihadism emerged in Morocco. A second message will focus on the extremists themselves, and a third message will deal with the GOM's response. This series is based on observations drawn from our discussions with government interlocutors, Islamist political contacts, academics, and multiple visits to the field. End Summary and Introduction. -------------- Moroccan Islam Spiritual and Ritualistic -------------- ¶4. (C) Traditional Moroccan Islam is heavily influenced by Sufi spiritualism and contains some residue of the paganism originally practiced by the indigenous Berber population. Though anathema to purist Sunni Muslims, Maraboutism, the veneration of deceased Islamic holy men or "saints," has persisted in Morocco since Islam first arrived here at the end of the seventh century A.D. Public festivals surrounding ritual visits to the tombs of learned Islamic scholars have been an enduring feature of Moroccan cultural life. Little if anything in traditional Moroccan Islam can be reconciled with the austere and absolutist teachings of Wahabbism, a purist doctrine of Islam which emerged in the central Arabian peninsula at the end of the 18th century. Today, contemporary applications of Wahabbism are propagated and applied with violence by Al-Qai'da and other Sunni "resistance" groups. -------------- Wahabbism Travels West -------------- ¶5. (C) The arrival of Wahabbi/Salafist thought in Morocco may be traced back to the Cold War period and the competing ideologies sweeping the third world at the time. King Hassan II strengthened ties with Saudi Arabia to form a bulwark against anti-royalist Nasserism and other leftist trends sweeping the third world. The royal families of the two kingdoms have longstanding ties and perceived common interests. Saudi Arabia picked up much of the tab for Morocco's expansion into Western Sahara and the costly hostilities that ensued. ¶6. (C) With Saudi money for the Moroccan royal treasury came Saudi investments in Morocco's cultural sector. In the early 1980's, the King Abdulaziz Foundation (KAF) opened offices in Casablanca, flooding Morocco with religious materials RABAT 00000398 002 OF 003 promoting the austere literalist Wahabbi/Salafi brand of Islam that radiates from the Nejd, the Saudi heartland. Between the 1970's and the mid 1990's, the KAF provided ample scholarships for thousands of Moroccans to pursue Islamic studies in Saudi Arabia. -------------- Two Birds with One Stone -------------- ¶7. (C) For Hassan II, encouraging Wahabbi Islam not only promised to check his leftist adversaries. The effort also offered a counterweight to emerging indigenous Islamist opponents. First and foremost among these was the Adl wal Ihsane - the Justice and Charity (or Justice and Spirituality) organization, the fundamentalist Sufi movement led by the charismatic Sheikh Abdesalam Yassine, who publicly challenged King Hassan II's (religious) legitimacy as leader of the Moroccan Umma (community of believers) in the early 1970's. Since it emerged in the 1970's, Al Adl wal Ihsane has grown into Morocco's largest Islamist organization, claiming up to half a million members (though this figure is impossible to verify). While it challenges the legitimacy of the Moroccan throne and implicitly advocates theocratic rule, Al Adl wal Ihsane has consistently eschewed violence and terror and has been tolerated but tightly constrained by the GOM (ref B). ¶8. (C) The emerging Salafist threat to leftists was illustrated by the assassination of socialist icon Omar Benjelloun in 1975 by the Shabaiba Islamiya, a radical Salafist youth group subsequently dismantled by the GOM. (Note: Many Shabiba alumnae would eventually be rehabilitated and take up prominent positions in the Party of Justice and Development (PJD),the second largest bloc in the current parliament. Former Shabiba members also figured prominently in the recently unveiled Beliraj terror network (ref A). End note.) -------------- Wahabbism in State Policy -------------- ¶9. (C) Abdelkebir Alaoui M'Daghri, who served as Minister of Islamic Affairs from 1983-2002, was widely seen as tilted toward Wahabbism. During M'Daghri's term, Morocco's indigenous religious orders, including the spiritualist Tijani and Bouchichi brands of Sufi Islam, were sidelined from the national religious establishment. ¶10. (C) Over the years, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs also recruited Egyptian Islamic scholars, many with apparent ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, to come settle and preach their stricter and more austere brand of Islam in Morocco. (Note: M'Daghri was relieved of his duties as Minister by King Mohammed VI in 2002 and now serves as Chairman of the Bayt al-Mal Al-Quds Al-Sharif, the Moroccan-controlled OIC fund which finances development projects intended to preserve the Arab and Islamic character of Jerusalem. End note.) ¶11. (C) Moroccan educational reforms of the 1980's removed philosophy from high school and university curricula, replacing the subject with Islamic Studies. While philosophy had been a field dominated by leftists, the new Islamic Studies instructors were almost without exception Saudi-trained. This may have been the single most influential factor, over time, in the promotion of conservative Wahabbi Islam in Morocco. -------------- Control Gradually Slips Away -------------- ¶12. (C) Islamists of various stripes in Morocco were emboldened by the triumphant images of the 1979 revolution in Iran, even as they condemned Shi'a as heretics. In Moroccan society, a shifting tide against secularism put Moroccan leftists and secularists on an increasingly tenuous footing. However, the GOM gradually lost control of the forces it had unleashed. ¶13. (C) By the early 1990s, Saudi-trained clerics like Sheikh Mohammed Fizazi in Tangier and Sheikh Abdelwahab Rafiqy (a.k.a. Abu Hafs) in Fes were stirring up youth in poor neighborhoods, encouraging moral vigilantes to enforce hijab, vandalize and burn local shops selling alcohol, and in some cases, murder local drug dealers, alcoholics, or other undesirables. ¶14. (C) Abu Hafs and Fizazi came to be known as the RABAT 00000398 003 OF 003 ideological godfathers of the Moroccan Salafiya Jihadiya ideology. This ideology, essentially transplanted in tact from Saudi Arabia, rested on two key pillars: First, Qur'an (the word of God),and Sunna and Hadith (the sayings and deeds of the prophet) are to be interpreted literally - "innovation" is a sin; second, extant Arab regimes are illegitimate agents of the Kufar (infidels) - they should be replaced by a revived Islamic caliphate. Fizazi and Abu Hafs would later be jailed by the GOM (they remain imprisoned today) for inciting violence, but their stark and simple message continued to resonate among some disenfranchised youth seeking radical solutions to their perceived exclusion from society and denial of opportunity. (Note: In a letter from prison in 2007, Abu Hafs offered a recantation of his earlier advocacy of violence in defense of Islam. While potentially an important development, his motivation and ultimate sincerity are unproven. End note.) -------------- Wake Up Call -------------- ¶15. (C) Although the growth of Wahabbi influence and jihadist activism in Morocco generally paralleled processes underway in the Middle East, potential danger did not translate into violent reality until May 16, 2003, when 14 suicide bombers (two of whom were captured alive) struck several western and Jewish targets in central Casablanca killing 33 civilians and injuring scores of others. This unprecedented incident badly shook the country and dealt the tourism industry, a vital sector of the domestic economy, a setback from which it took several years to recover. ¶16. (C) The GOM responded with an iron fist, rounding up over 2000 suspected Islamist extremists. Through a combination of aggressive action, vigilance, and luck, the GOM has so far managed to prevent or preempt any repeat of the 2003 mass casualty attacks. However, in the following years, the GOM has continued to roll up a steady stream of terror cells (as many as 83 since 2003, according to the GOM) that were planning to attack the government and/or foreign interests. This has underscored the fact that, five years later after Casablanca the threat remains present and real. -------------- Counterproductive Response -------------- ¶17. (C) AQhough they almost certainly disrupted extremist networks, the scope of Moroccan security forces' mass arrests in reaction to the May 16 bombings has been a subject of controversy. Critics note that of those arrested, a number who were subsequently pardoned later became suicide bombers. Often separated from the general prison population, subject to mistreatment or torture during interrogation, and then incarcerated together with hardened Salafists, Moroccan academics posit that a number of those detained apparently made the transition from at-risk youth to real terrorists. ¶18. (C) Casablanca youth Abdelfatah Raydi, among those detained in 2003, claimed he had been tortured and raped in prison. Raydi and hundreds of others would eventually be released under a mass Royal pardon. In March of 2007, Raydi detonated himself in a Casablanca Internet cafe. Two weeks later, his brother Ayyoub was killed when he and other accomplices detonated themselves during a police raid on a terrorist safehouse across town (ref D). The Raydi brothers were two of 10 suicide bombers who blew themselves up in a series of incidents and raids in Casablanca in March and April of 2007, although they only succeeded in causing one (non-terrorist) fatality, a policeman. The incidents nonetheless shattered any illusions that Morocco had put the terror threat behind it. ***************************************** Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat ***************************************** Riley