RESPONSE: IMPACT OF RISING FOOD/COMMODITY PRICES - MOROCCO

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 000391 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE DEPT FOR EEB/TPP/ABT/ATP JANET SPECK AND NEA/MAG E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAGR EAID ETRD ECON PGOV MO SUBJECT: RESPONSE: IMPACT OF RISING FOOD/COMMODITY PRICES - MOROCCO REF: A. STATE 39410 ¶B. RABAT 00265 ¶C. 07 RABAT 1525 ¶D. RABAT 372 Sensitive but unclassified. Please protect accordingly. -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Rising food prices have quickly become Morocco's principal domestic issue, sparking sporadic protests and threatening to bring the ongoing "social dialogue" between the Moroccan government and labor unions to an impasse. The government and the King will handle this cautiously, remembering the food price riots of the 80's and 90's that threatened the stability of the nation. Even before the recent increases there was some generalized resentment about growing disparities of wealth, kept in check by the relatively widespread impact of economic growth. ¶2. (SBU) To date, the impact of rising prices has been mitigated by the Moroccan government's "Compensation Fund," which subsidizes flour, bread, sugar, fuel, and gas. Mounting budgetary pressure is forcing the government to re-think this whole subsidy system, but privately, finance ministry officials note that social pressures virtually rule out the changes that are necessary. Unless pressures ease soon, increased labor unrest appears inevitable. Already, popular media has seized on the issue, characterizing the country as being "at the edge of an explosion." The government will not risk a price rise on the commodities that keep the poor alive, but might choose to highlight other issues in order to divert popular attention. End Summary. -------------- Political Impact -------------- ¶3. (SBU) In recent weeks, despite government efforts to shift attention, price increases have crowded out almost all other issues in the public eye. The government has sought to ensure that the far left and the Islamists do not seize on the issue and exploit it for political benefit. Planned demonstrations by the Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD) have been banned, and other NGO-organized protests have been swiftly broken up by riot police. ¶4. (SBU) This government vigilance reflects recognition of the fact that rising prices have historically been politically explosive, and have led to civil strife and protests with extensive casualties. Subsidy cuts brought riots in 1981, 1984, and 2007. In 1990 a national strike against rising food prices led to severe riots in Fez that killed 30 people. In the most recent instance of unrest, in September 2007, a government announced plan to increase the price of subsidized bread by 8 percent sparked a riot in Sefrou and an immediate government repeal of the increase. The government also immediately took control of the wheat market, fixing the price of wheat at the mill and the price of flour. Tellingly, final decisions on such price increases are in the hands of the Ministry of Interior, rather than the Ministry of Finance or that of Economic and General Affairs. -------------- Economic Impact -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The scope of the economic impact of rising global food and oil prices is only now becoming apparent in Morocco. After a year in which it essentially achieved a balanced budget for the first time in decades, Morocco faces the prospect of a sizeable budget shortfall that has already led one international ratings agency to lower its outlook from "positive" to "stable." This downgrade reflects both spending on subsidies, which may double its budgeted level of 20 billion MAD (USD 2.7 billion-- itself a five-fold increase since 2002),but also expectation that the government may have to make concessions in its ongoing "social dialogue" with the unions that will further undermine budgetary discipline. ¶6. (SBU) Reform of the subsidy system to better target the truly needy has long been an objective of Moroccan government policy (Minister of Finance Mezouar recently conceded that only 10 percent of the subsidies actually benefit Morocco's poorest 20 percent); but privately, Finance Ministry officials tell us they see no RABAT 00000391 002 OF 003 possibility of reforming the system in the current climate. (Note: The Prime Minister's Office has shared with us a concept to create special retail stores selling only heavily subsidized products at which only the certified "poorest" people could shop. This would focus aid on the truly need and prevent subsidies from reaching hotels, restaurants, the middle class, etc. It may be a good idea but is subject to its own abuses and will take time to implement. End Note.) This leaves the government in an untenable position. Without a significant break in commodity prices, which does not appear likely soon, the government of Morocco will either continue to pay subsidies which it cannot afford, or risk instability. ¶7. (SBU) Increased spending is also likely to result from the ongoing "social dialogue" between unions and government. The former pushing both for an increased minimum wage (currently 1800 MAD/month),salary increases for civil servants, and reductions in tax rates. The government's initial offer, valued at 14-16 billion MAD, was rejected by the unions as too modest, particularly as it would not take full effect until 2010. If the dialogue results in an impasse, as appears possible, serious unrest could emerge in coming weeks. For now, the ongoing "social dialogue" has actually served to help keep a lid on potential protests. ¶8. (SBU) Surprisingly, despite the dramatic increase in world food prices, Morocco's inflation index for 2007 remained relatively benign at 2.3 percent. However, analysts point out that Morocco's official inflation index does not take into account real estate prices and is lowered by Morocco's subsidy system. Latest figures released by the government show a sharp increase in both the cost of living and inflation. In the first three months of 2008, overall inflation rose 2.4 percent, while food products rose 4.5 percent. ¶9. (SBU) Morocco's trade balance has also deteriorated as a result of increasing grain and fuel imports. The two categories showed the largest increases in the country's most recent balance of payments statistics, and officials expect the trend to continue. -------------- Demand -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Morocco is a net importer of cereals to meet a domestic demand of approximately 12 million metric tons annually. On average, domestic production supplies 5 million tons, with the remainder coming from imports. Wheat, used for bread and couscous, is the key agricultural staple, while imported corn supports the domestic poultry industry, another key element in the Moroccan diet. ¶11. (SBU) A government Compensation Fund subsidizes a number of basic commodities, including bread, sugar, and fuel. Other essential staples are not subsidized. In the past six months, the price of cooking oil has increased 70 percent, butter 50 percent, pasta 40 percent, and couscous 40 percent. These sharp price increases have particularly hurt lower and middle-income Moroccans, who already spend a higher proportion of their salary on foodstuffs. As a result of the subsidy, demand for bread has remained relatively constant, despite the doubling in price of wheat in the world market. Press reports and anecdotal evidence we have accumulated throughout the country confirms, however, that Moroccans of modest means have had to significantly tighten their belts as a result of other price increases, forgoing or reducing their consumption of other basic staples. -------------- Supply -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Moroccan domestic cereal production varies greatly, depending on rainfall. In 2006, Morocco had a particularly good harvest at 8.3 million tons. By contrast, Morocco experienced a severe drought in 2007, yielding only 2 million tons. Due to this poor harvest and world market conditions, the government removed import duties on feed grains and wheat during 2007. Preliminary projections reported by the media are that the harvest should return to near normal levels in 2008, or approximately 5 million tons. ¶13. (SBU) Morocco has significant room to maneuver on the supply side, though any such effort is unlikely to show results in the short term. Although 75 percent of its agricultural land is dedicated to cultivation of cereal crops, tremendous inefficiencies through the production and marketing system limit cereal crops to RABAT 00000391 003 OF 003 only 10-15 percent of Moroccan output by value. Official policy, as reflected most recently in the MCA Compact concluded between the U.S. and Morocco last August, seeks to provide farmers in marginal lands alternative sources of income, with the intent of moving them towards sustainable and higher value-added products. This approach remains central to the newly announced Moroccan strategy for the agricultural sector (Ref D). -------------- Environmental Impact -------------- ¶14. (SBU) Increased commodity prices have not had an environmental impact in Morocco. However, if the government carries out plans to eliminate or reduce subsidies for cooking gas it would be easy to foresee acceleration in the rate of deforestation. -------------- Moroccan Government Policy Response -------------- ¶15. (SBU) Morocco's primary policy response to date has been to stress that consumers will remain insulated from increases in world market prices for those goods which benefit from a government subsidy. To address the sharp rise in commodity prices the GOM also eliminated import duties on corn and other feed grains in the fall of 2006 and phased out wheat import duties during the summer of ¶2007. The Moroccan government will soon face the question of whether to extend the zeroing-out of duties beyond May 31, when it is set to expire. Duties may be re-imposed during the Moroccan harvest (June-July) to support domestic prices, but would likely be removed soon after. -------------- Impact on Post Programs -------------- ¶16. (SBU) Key programs within both the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and USAID seek to provide Moroccan farmers alternative sources of income through production of other crops such as olives, figs, and almonds. The Moroccan government remains committed to this approach, and reiterated it in the new agricultural policy (or "Plan Maroc Vert") which was unveiled in Meknes in April 2008. The government recognizes that notwithstanding the sharp rise in commodity prices Morocco must seek investment and modernize its agricultural system and develop alternate income sources for traditional farmers. -------------- Policy Proposals -------------- ¶17. (SBU) We remain convinced that this transition is in the long-term interest of Moroccan agriculture. Certainly the need for reform of Morocco's tangled subsidy system has been highlighted by the current budgetary pressures upon it. Such a change is highly unlikely, however, until commodity prices return to a lower level, given the GOM's primordial goal of ensuring social stability. In recent years, post has quietly worked with the National Agricultural Research Institute to support research in biotechnology and keep scientists informed of developments with potential benefits to agriculture. The increase in commodity prices could serve to help Moroccan decision-makers to develop policies which would enable Morocco to benefit directly from modern agriculture production methods. Post recommends increased outreach to this end. RILEY SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED