Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08RABAT178
2008-02-27 10:44:00
SECRET
Embassy Rabat
Cable title:
GOM PROVIDES A/S WELCH WITH A MORE COHERENT
how-toVZCZCXRO8329 PP RUEHTRO DE RUEHRB #0178/01 0581044 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 271044Z FEB 08 FM AMEMBASSY RABAT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8193 INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 4695 RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY 0094 RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 3148 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 2295 RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR PRIORITY 0442 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3531 RUEHLE/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY 0110 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 5920 RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 3666 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 4941 RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0271 RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 9530 RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA PRIORITY 3915 RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 000178
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/CT, INL, INR, NEA AND NEA/MAG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2018
TAGS: PTER ASEC PINS PINR MO
SUBJECT: GOM PROVIDES A/S WELCH WITH A MORE COHERENT
PICTURE OF BELLIRAJ TERRORIST NETWORK
REF: A. CASABLANCA 0038 (NOTAL)
B. RABAT 0171 (NOTAL)
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for reasons 1.4 (b, c and d).
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 000178
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/CT, INL, INR, NEA AND NEA/MAG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2018
TAGS: PTER ASEC PINS PINR MO
SUBJECT: GOM PROVIDES A/S WELCH WITH A MORE COHERENT
PICTURE OF BELLIRAJ TERRORIST NETWORK
REF: A. CASABLANCA 0038 (NOTAL)
B. RABAT 0171 (NOTAL)
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for reasons 1.4 (b, c and d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: On February 25, Director General for
Studies and Documentation (DGED) Mohamed Yassine Mansouri
gave NEA Assistant Secretary David Welch and his party a
lengthy, comprehensive briefing on the Belliraj terrorist
network. Mansouri explained the network,s alleged
revolutionary aims, criminal and terrorist connections,
financing and money laundering, efforts to develop separate
political and military wings, and arms smuggling. END
SUMMARY.
2. (C) Mansouri suggested beginning the three-hour meeting
by discussing what has been happening in Morocco. Ambassador
Welch welcomed the idea, saying he had received a lot of
questions about it. Mansouri then spent the next hour
explaining the development of the cell over the last 20
years, with his deputy, General Abdeljabbar Azzaoui, both
translating and adding details.
IDEOLOGY
--------------
3. (S) Tracing the development of this unique cell and its
links to movements the GOM thought had disappeared, Mansouri
said that Abdelkader Belliraj was a Moroccan expatriate who
had grown up in Belgium and became enchanted with the
&Moroccan Islamic Movement8 and the Iranian Revolution.
Belliraj traveled to Iran in the 1980s, reportedly
subsequently meeting with Abu Nidal, Osama Bin Laden, Ayman
al-Zawahiri, other Al-Qaeda leaders, Algeria,s Armed Islamic
Group (GIA),the Moroccan Islamic Fighting Group. He
allegedly received some military training from Hezbollah in
Lebanon. To curry favor with Abu Nidal and the Iranians,
Belliraj allegedly assassinated six people in the 1970s and
1980s -- five Belgian Jews and a Saudi professor who opposed
the fatwa issued after Salman Rushdie published &The Satanic
Verses8 in 1988. Reportedly, they began to plan to
assassinate Moroccan Jews as far back as 1996.
4. (S) Mansouri stated that the terrorist and revolutionary
leaders influenced Belliraj,s ideology, which rejected
Al-Qaeda,s spectacular acts in favor of long-term
destabilization. He believed that destabilization was the
only viable avenue to power. To take power Belliraj and
co-conspirators realized that they needed both political and
military wings; so they developed the idea of using democracy
as a front. In 1995, they created an Islamist political
party, i.e., the &Civilization Alternative8 with links to
Iranian Shi,a in Morocco and the &The Nation,8 an Islamist
association that had been seeking party status until the cell
was uncovered. According to Mansouri, the party and the
association knew about the cell and its plans but did not
inform the authorities.
FUNDING: CRIME AND MONEY LAUNDERING
--------------
5. (C) Belliraj acquired weapons and legitimate businesses
through robberies in Belgium and Luxembourg, including the
theft of USD 18 million from a 2000 Brinks robbery in the
latter. Belliraj also masterminded the attempted, unsolved
robbery of a branch of the BMCE bank in Morocco in 1994.
WEAPONRY
--------------
6. (C) The cell acquired relatively sophisticated weapons
and smuggled them into Morocco relatively easily in the
1990s. The DGED believes that some of the weapons were
destined for the GIA.
RABAT 00000178 002 OF 002
IS ANYONE ELSE INVOLVED?
--------------
7. (S) The GOM has now made 38 arrests, and the number
continues to grow, although when Welch asked Mansouri if he
thought the GOM had &all of them,8 Mansouri said, &Yes.8
All allegedly have some link to Belliraj and support his goal
of destabilizing Morocco.
COMMENT
--------------
8. (C) Mansouri,s explanation of this loose and dispersed
network offers a possible picture of this complex network and
plot that are unlike anything we have previously seen in
Morocco. While many questions remain unanswered, the picture
may be slowly coming into focus. END COMMENT.
PARTICIPANTS
--------------
9. (U) U.S. Moroccan
-------------- --------------
NEA A/S C. David Welch DGED Director General
Amb. Thomas T. Riley Mohamed Yassine
DCM Robert P. Jackson Mansouri
RAO Counselor George Gaydos Gen. Abdeljabbar Azzaoui
Executive Assistant to
DAPNSA Elliot Abrams
Erin Yerger
NEA Staff Assistant
Kimberly Harrington
10. (U) NEA A/S Welch has cleared this message.
*****************************************
Visit EMBASSY Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat
*****************************************
Riley
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/CT, INL, INR, NEA AND NEA/MAG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2018
TAGS: PTER ASEC PINS PINR MO
SUBJECT: GOM PROVIDES A/S WELCH WITH A MORE COHERENT
PICTURE OF BELLIRAJ TERRORIST NETWORK
REF: A. CASABLANCA 0038 (NOTAL)
B. RABAT 0171 (NOTAL)
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for reasons 1.4 (b, c and d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: On February 25, Director General for
Studies and Documentation (DGED) Mohamed Yassine Mansouri
gave NEA Assistant Secretary David Welch and his party a
lengthy, comprehensive briefing on the Belliraj terrorist
network. Mansouri explained the network,s alleged
revolutionary aims, criminal and terrorist connections,
financing and money laundering, efforts to develop separate
political and military wings, and arms smuggling. END
SUMMARY.
2. (C) Mansouri suggested beginning the three-hour meeting
by discussing what has been happening in Morocco. Ambassador
Welch welcomed the idea, saying he had received a lot of
questions about it. Mansouri then spent the next hour
explaining the development of the cell over the last 20
years, with his deputy, General Abdeljabbar Azzaoui, both
translating and adding details.
IDEOLOGY
--------------
3. (S) Tracing the development of this unique cell and its
links to movements the GOM thought had disappeared, Mansouri
said that Abdelkader Belliraj was a Moroccan expatriate who
had grown up in Belgium and became enchanted with the
&Moroccan Islamic Movement8 and the Iranian Revolution.
Belliraj traveled to Iran in the 1980s, reportedly
subsequently meeting with Abu Nidal, Osama Bin Laden, Ayman
al-Zawahiri, other Al-Qaeda leaders, Algeria,s Armed Islamic
Group (GIA),the Moroccan Islamic Fighting Group. He
allegedly received some military training from Hezbollah in
Lebanon. To curry favor with Abu Nidal and the Iranians,
Belliraj allegedly assassinated six people in the 1970s and
1980s -- five Belgian Jews and a Saudi professor who opposed
the fatwa issued after Salman Rushdie published &The Satanic
Verses8 in 1988. Reportedly, they began to plan to
assassinate Moroccan Jews as far back as 1996.
4. (S) Mansouri stated that the terrorist and revolutionary
leaders influenced Belliraj,s ideology, which rejected
Al-Qaeda,s spectacular acts in favor of long-term
destabilization. He believed that destabilization was the
only viable avenue to power. To take power Belliraj and
co-conspirators realized that they needed both political and
military wings; so they developed the idea of using democracy
as a front. In 1995, they created an Islamist political
party, i.e., the &Civilization Alternative8 with links to
Iranian Shi,a in Morocco and the &The Nation,8 an Islamist
association that had been seeking party status until the cell
was uncovered. According to Mansouri, the party and the
association knew about the cell and its plans but did not
inform the authorities.
FUNDING: CRIME AND MONEY LAUNDERING
--------------
5. (C) Belliraj acquired weapons and legitimate businesses
through robberies in Belgium and Luxembourg, including the
theft of USD 18 million from a 2000 Brinks robbery in the
latter. Belliraj also masterminded the attempted, unsolved
robbery of a branch of the BMCE bank in Morocco in 1994.
WEAPONRY
--------------
6. (C) The cell acquired relatively sophisticated weapons
and smuggled them into Morocco relatively easily in the
1990s. The DGED believes that some of the weapons were
destined for the GIA.
RABAT 00000178 002 OF 002
IS ANYONE ELSE INVOLVED?
--------------
7. (S) The GOM has now made 38 arrests, and the number
continues to grow, although when Welch asked Mansouri if he
thought the GOM had &all of them,8 Mansouri said, &Yes.8
All allegedly have some link to Belliraj and support his goal
of destabilizing Morocco.
COMMENT
--------------
8. (C) Mansouri,s explanation of this loose and dispersed
network offers a possible picture of this complex network and
plot that are unlike anything we have previously seen in
Morocco. While many questions remain unanswered, the picture
may be slowly coming into focus. END COMMENT.
PARTICIPANTS
--------------
9. (U) U.S. Moroccan
-------------- --------------
NEA A/S C. David Welch DGED Director General
Amb. Thomas T. Riley Mohamed Yassine
DCM Robert P. Jackson Mansouri
RAO Counselor George Gaydos Gen. Abdeljabbar Azzaoui
Executive Assistant to
DAPNSA Elliot Abrams
Erin Yerger
NEA Staff Assistant
Kimberly Harrington
10. (U) NEA A/S Welch has cleared this message.
*****************************************
Visit EMBASSY Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat
*****************************************
Riley