SCENESETTER FOR A/S WELCH'S VISIT TO MOROCCO

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000170 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA A/S WELCH E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ECON MO SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR A/S WELCH'S VISIT TO MOROCCO REF: A. RABAT 116 ¶B. RABAT 91 -------------- Summary and Overview -------------- ¶1. (C) Ambassador Welch, the Moroccans will roll out the red carpet for you, including an audience with King Mohammed VI in Marrakech, as well as expected meetings with Foreign Minister Fassi Fihri and Intelligence Chief Mansouri. They are delighted you are visiting them before Algiers and will impress on you their view that Algerian obstinacy is the principle obstacle to Maghreb integration and a solution to the Sahara dispute. We hope you can underscore the need for Morocco to improve its human rights practices in the territories, which can build confidence and promote an autonomy-based settlement. ¶2. (C) The Moroccans have good (but low key) working contacts with Israel, and have a pragmatic approach to the Middle East Peace Process. At the same time, the GOM keeps a wary eye on public opinion, particularly during flare ups such as in Gaza and is loath to publicly break with Arab League consensus positions. Despite sympathy for Lebanon and support for a Sleiman presidency, they again will stick with the Arab consensus. ¶3. (C) Defense ties with Morocco received a boost last year with the GOM's decision to purchase 24 F-16 fighters. The timing is good to seek clarity on how they will pay for the aircraft and to reiterate that the USG cannot provide financing or a loan guarantee for the purchase. ¶4. (C) There are visible changes since your 2006 visit, a sign of continuing growth and reform. However, terrorism is again on the front pages. The GOM announced on February 18 the arrest of a network of 33 terror suspects and cache of weapons and explosive precursors. The Interior Minister charged that the tourism industry, high level officials and Moroccan Jews were targets and that they may have had links with Al-Qa'ida. Details remain murky. ¶5. (C) The Moroccans look proudly on their status as major non-NATO ally. They help us in international fora, as when they lobbied in 2006 against Venezuela's seat on the UN Security Council. Two recent Rabat scenesetters (reftels) cover general and internal issues and terrorism. This message concentrates on USG marquee issues in the region and on theirs -- Western Sahara and relations with Algeria, the �A;Free Trade Agreement and our vexing school tax problem. End Summary and Overview. -------------- Morocco and the Middle East -------------- ¶6. (C) The Moroccans jealously guard their distinct Med-Atlantic North African identity but also identify with the Arab and Islamic worlds. Al Jazeera appears to be the information source of choice both among officialdom and the educated public. They will be keenly interested in your assessment of the state of play in Israel and the Palestinian Territories. The King's position as Chairman of the OIC's Al-Quds Committee gives him a platform to engage on Arab-Israeli questions. He calmly tried to defuse the dispute over excavations at the Jerusalem's Maghrebi Gate in late 2006. The Moroccan crown also controls the Bayt Al-Mal Al-Quds As-Sharif, an OIC body which supports USD 10 million in projects in Jerusalem every year. ¶7. (C) Morocco maintains good, if low key, working contacts with the GOI. The Director-General of the Israeli MFA led a delegation to Rabat in June 2007, laying the groundwork for a meeting between Foreign Minister Livni and then Foreign Minister Benaissa in Paris in July 2007. Israelis have also participated in international conferences hosted by Morocco. The Moroccans nominally observe the Arab League boycott, but in practice some Israeli goods are available here, and indirect travel is hassle-free. ¶8. (C) The Moroccans also provide public support to Abu Mazen and the Palestinian Authority and privately underscore to us that they are the only Arab government that has not received representatives of Hamas. Our impression is that the public, by contrast, is more sympathetic to Hamas. In engaging in Arab-Israeli affairs, Moroccan officials tell us frankly that they feel constrained by public opinion. ¶9. (C) Anti-Israeli and anti-U.S. sentiments among the Moroccan public spiked during the summer 2006 Lebanon war and after some cooling, seemed to rise again during the recent flare ups in Gaza, although this appears to be ebbing. Islamist and Pan-Arabist groups have demonstrated over Gaza, but got little traction. The Moroccans insist to us they work hard behind the scenes to exert a moderating influence in inter-Arab fora, principally in coordination with the Saudis. In light of hard public attitudes, however, the GOM is loath to publicly break with Arab League consensus positions. -------------- Lebanon -------------- ¶10. (C) Morocco supports the Seniora government, the Sleiman presidency, and like other Sunni states is wary of Hizballah. In January, the Moroccans told us they were "fed up" with Syrian interference in the Lebanese presidential selection process and were working in tandem with the Saudis to press Damascus. Moroccan officials told us privately they were disappointed by the failure of the Arab League to put meaningful pressure on Syria, but argued to us that a public rupture within the League would have been counterproductive. They talked of supporting a boycott of the Damascus summit. -------------- Iran -------------- ¶11. (C) Morocco continues to generally support UNSC resolutions and sides with us in the IAEA, while maintaining proper relations with the Islamic Republic. The Iranians buy a lot of Moroccan phosphate, and sell oil here. The GOM is steadfastly opposed to Iranian policy on Israel and is relatively open about it. -------------- Sahara, Algeria, and the AMU -------------- ¶12. (C) The Western Sahara dispute remains Morocco's core foreign policy preoccupation, and GOM officials are sure to raise it during your visit. Moroccan confidence in UNSYG Special Rep. Van Walsum appears to have increased following his early February visit. However, Van Walsum's apparent failure to nudge the Algerians during his recent tour has reinforced their view that Algiers remains obstructionist and that no improvement is likely during Bouteflika's tenure. ¶13. (C) We see no greater prospect for progress in the upcoming March 11-13 Manhasset round of talks than in the previous three. While there is merit to the Moroccan critique that the Polisario is not the sole representative of the Sahrawis, undermining the Polisario often seems a greater GOM objective than good-faith negotiations. We hope they will not drag out CORCAS head Khalihenna during your visit. ¶14. (C) We urge you to note that Morocco can significantly improve its chances of achieving a Sahara settlement on its terms if it moves decisively to improve its human rights record and enhance freedom of expression in the territories and put an end to impunity for serial abusers in the local police force. You can argue that in so doing, Morocco will improve its chances of achieving an autonomy-based settlement, by building local confidence in Moroccan rule. ¶15. (C) At bottom, however, the Western Sahara dispute appears more a product of the Moroccan-Algerian rivalry than its cause, and agreement on Sahara not likely until bilateral issues are at least in process of resolution. In particular, the closed border is the greatest obstacle to enhanced relations and regional integration. While it is Algeria that keeps the border closed, Morocco has refrained from putting into effect the agreed demarcation. Ultimately, GOM recognition and demarcation in exchange for Algiers opening the frontier could enhance regional integration and frustrate terrorists. ¶16. (C) Although unable to attend, Under Secretary Burns had hoped last month to bring the Moroccan and Algerian Foreign Ministers together on the margin of AMU meetings. While the Moroccans say Algeria is not ready, now may be a good time to lay the groundwork for an initiative to bring them together. One way to begin might be to ask the King if we can convey a message at your next stop. Rapprochement will not be easy. We understand Chirac tried before leaving office, and even Putin, during his last visit to the region, got no traction in Algiers. Nevertheless, we hear that, if returned, a Zapatero government in Spain may try again, and U.S. engagement a joint effort by the "Friends." However low the prospects, we judge the risks even lower. ¶17. (C) There are some encouraging developments, particularly at the AMU level. Building on the growing bilateral security cooperation, we just learned the AMU security chiefs met recently in Algiers with European counterparts. The AMU has made some progress building economic contacts and interest in integration. Positive words about the AMU in any press comment could be helpful. -------------- Kosovo -------------- ¶18. (C) One oblique consequence of Morocco's situation in the Sahara is a reluctance to endorse the independence of Kosovo. You may wish to again raise this with the Foreign Minister, who told S/CT Dailey and DAS Gray that Morocco morally supported the Muslim Kosovars, but we counsel limited expectations. -------------- F-16's -------------- ¶19. (C) Morocco's decision, taken last October to purchase 24 F-16 fighters was a coup for the U.S. Morocco's plans to finance its roughly $2.1 billion purchase remains ambiguous, and a source of concern. This week, we presented to the GOM a draft LOA on the deal. If time allows, now would be a good time to ask how Morocco will pay for the fighters, starting with a roughly USD 50 million down payment due next month. -------------- School Taxes -------------- ¶20. (C) We hope you will follow up U/S Burns' comments in Washington on the need for an agreement with Morocco on the application of tax laws to American schools in the country. Moroccan tax authorities have been ratcheting up the pressure on schools in the past six months, including freezing the bank accounts of the Casablanca American School. Senior GOM interlocutors seem to understand they need to show some flexibility, but additional leverage is needed, including with the King. -------------- Economy and the Free Trade Agreement -------------- ¶21. (U) Although Morocco has recently experienced good growth with a large increase to its tourism industry and in urbanization, much of the country remains relatively underdeveloped with per capita GDP of less than USD 2,500. Since the Free Trade Agreement entered into force on January 1, 2006, U.S. exports to Morocco have seen a sharp increase, while Moroccan exports have shown smaller gains. Moroccan officials have been reluctant to sign onto this "good news" story, however, as their statistics show an even more unbalanced picture, an issue we are working with to reconcile. More generally, some Moroccans worry about the country's competitiveness, as its trade deficit has swelled, while others voice concern about increasing disparities of wealth. ***************************************** Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat ***************************************** Riley