DEMARCHING MOROCCO ON KOSOVO

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000141

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE, NEA/RA AND NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2018
TAGS: PREL PBTS PGOV UNMIK UN YI MO
SUBJECT: DEMARCHING MOROCCO ON KOSOVO

REF: A. STATE 015111

B. STATE 013716

C. STATE 14285

Classified By: DCM Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: NEA DAS Gordon Gray urged support for the
upcoming independence for Kosovo February 8, during a meeting
with Moroccan Foreign Minister Fassi Fihri otherwise devoted
to S/CT Dailey's call for support on foreign fighters going
to Iraq (septel). FM Fassi Fihri declined to offer a firm
response, while outlining Morocco' conflicted views. The GOM
is sympathetic toward the Kosovars but apprehensive about
secession, he said. This is fueled by concern over Morocco's
most important issue: the Western Sahara. Embassy followed
up with ref A as received and has received no further
substantive response. It does not appear Morocco would act
in the near term, but an OIC consensus would positively
affect their calculations. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Gray, who in addition to Dailey was accompanied by
Ambassador and PolCouns, said that the USG expected a
declaration of independence soon, and that when it comes we
will recognize Kosovo. We understand the European Union will
do the same. The USG is asking our friends to join us in
this step, which will bring stability to the region.


3. (C) The Foreign Minister described the conflicted
Moroccan appreciation of the Kosovo situation. He personally
thought Kosovo needed independence. The former Yugoslavia
broke into many independent states, except for Kosovo, whose
entitlement is clear in principle. Why can a mini-State be
permitted in Montenegro and denied to the Muslims of Kosovo?


4. (C) There are problems, however, the Minister continued.
Many states could not support independence, citing Muslim
Indonesia, which feared a fait accompli and faced the threat
of being itself riven by seven thousand Kosovos. Morocco
itself feared Kosovo independence would be exploited by "our
neighbors," who continually cite the independence of East
Timor as a precedent for Sahara. (This was a clear reference
to Algeria and its backing for the independence for Western
Sahara.) He also peripherally noted Russian lobbying on the
issue. He understood the Netherlands also had reservations.
He understood that the question would be discussed at the
upcoming OIC meeting in Dakar on March 14, which could
provide hesitant states like Indonesia and Libya with an
umbrella.


5. (C) Gray responded directly to the Minister's
Sahara-based reservations. He pointed out that Kosovo will
be a viable state. The USG believes the Western Sahara could
never be viable and would never be a state.


6. (C) Embassy followed up on receipt of reftels and
conveyed detailed demarche to senior MFA officials.
Director-General for Bilateral Affairs Youssef Amrani
accepted the message, including ref C arguments on the sui
generis nature of Kosovo independence, but could provide no
further substantive response than that given by the Minister.


7. (C) COMMENT: Because of overwhelming importance of the
Sahara issue to Morocco, it is not likely that the GOM will
quickly recognize Kosovo. Out of respect for our close
bilateral relations, and reflecting their cultural norms, we
do not expect them to give us an explicit no. Perhaps in the
face of consensus Islamic states support this might change,
particularly over the long term, and we will continue to
pursue the issue. Despite the FM's mention, we do not
believe that Russian lobbying is a significant factor in
their consideration. END COMMENT.


8. (U) DAS Gray has cleared this message.


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Riley