SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF S/CT AMB. DAILEY AND

S E C R E T RABAT 000116 SIPDIS SIPDIS NOFORN DEPARTMENT FOR S/CT DAILEY AND NEA - DAS GRAY E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/6/18 TAGS: PTER ASEC PREL PGOV MO SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF S/CT AMB. DAILEY AND DELEGATION Classified by DCM Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Overview -------------- ¶1. (S/NF) The Moroccans are eager to share their assessment of domestic and regional terrorist threats, including joint efforts to shut down the foreign fighter pipeline. Your meetings with the Interior Minister, the Foreign Minister, and the Chief of Morocco's external intelligence service will be good opportunities to shore up our strong bilateral counterterrorism relationship. We enjoy excellent collaborative relationships with the Interior and Foreign Ministries, and our information exchange and technical cooperation with Morocco's intelligence service is first rate. ¶2. (C) Morocco's political scene is stable but evolving. Morocco is a country on the move and a good harvest this year should return it to high GDP growth. The stock market and much of the economy are booming, but large swaths of the population are still left behind. King Mohammed VI has made promotion of social development a cornerstone of his reign and is constantly traveling across the country to inaugurate new development projects. We assess public support for the person of the King as strong, though there is general dissatisfaction with the government's performance, mainly fueled by unemployment, chronic deficits in the housing and health care sectors, and a growing concern about corruption. ¶3. (C) Prime Minister Abbas El-Fassi's government, formed in the fall after the September legislative elections, is built on a minority coalition. Most observers believe it will not last for the full five year mandate of parliament, and see a growing role for Fouad Ali El Himma, an intimate of the King, newly named as head of the Parliament's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. Islamists, socially conservative but loyal to the King, won the popular vote in the fall elections, but lost the race for parliamentary seats and will remain in an opposition role. We currently see no prospect for a significant shift in Morocco's foreign and security policies. Neither parliament nor the PM have much say in these issues, which are managed by the Throne directly with concerned ministries. ¶4. (C) In addition to your meetings with the Government of Morocco (GOM),you will be able to discuss strategies for enhancing CT cooperation at the regional level in your meeting with the Secretary-General Benyahya of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). Benyahya, a former Tunisian Foreign and Defense Minister, is a capable diplomat respected across the region. But the AMU remains hobbled by political disputes among its five member states, especially the frosty relations between Algeria and Morocco, fueled by (or manifested in) the continuing Western Sahara dispute. By consensus, the Sahara question is excluded from AMU deliberations but it remains, just beneath the surface, a stubborn obstacle to closer regional cooperation. Benyahya has nonetheless been able to build a security dimension to the AMU process, sponsoring several meetings of AMU interior ministers aimed at enhancing technical cooperation and information exchange. We understand U.S. policy is to enhance Maghreb unity through the AMU, but the major obstacle, more even than the Western Sahara is the poor state of Moroccan-Algerian relations symbolized by the closed border. Morocco's highest foreign policy priority by far is the Western Sahara issue, and you may hear about the visit of UN negotiator Peter Van Walsum whose visit overlaps yours. -------------- Morocco's Domestic Terror Threat -------------- ¶5. (C) A relative lull since the 2003 Casablanca bombings, which targeted Jewish and Western interests and killed 45 people, was shattered when a series of suicide bombing attacks took place in Morocco in 2007. The spring 2007 violence again centered in the city of Casablanca, Morocco,s commercial capital, but the last attack occurred in August in the interior city of Meknes. ¶6. (C) Characteristics of the attacks support previous analysis that Morocco,s greatest terrorist threat stems from the existence of numerous small "grassroots" Salafi Jihadist groups in Morocco willing to commit violent acts against the state, foreigners, and innocent civilians. However, these groups, at least for the time being, remain small, disorganized, and without safe haven. ¶7. (C) The attacks in 2007, which appear to have been, at best, poorly coordinated events, contrast sharply with terrorist plots in 2006, which saw several much more elaborate plans, thwarted by the vigilance of Moroccan authorities. In the most prominent of these, Moroccan authorities arrested 51 members of the so-called Ansar al-Mahdi cell*five of whom were Moroccan soldiers*in early August 2006, disrupting their plans to attack the U.S. Embassy in Rabat and tourist sites, and to kidnap several Moroccan ministers. (Fifty defendants in this case were convicted in January 2008 and received sentences of 2 - 25 years.) ¶8. (C) Throughout 2007, the GOM continued to aggressively target and dismantle terrorist cells within the Kingdom by leveraging policing techniques, coordinating the security services, and expanding regional CT partnerships. The GOM disrupted numerous cells in 2007 dedicated to sending jihadi fighters to Iraq, including one based in the northern Moroccan city of Tetouan linked to the Algeria-based al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). -------------- External Threats -------------- ¶9. (C) Morocco has several external terrorist threats including AQIM, the Pakistan-based al-Qa'ida, and jihad veterans returning from Iraq. The principle menace from AQIM remains the knowledge transfer of AQIM operational capabilities to Morocco,s committed, but relatively inexperienced, Salafi Jihadist adherents. To date, however, AQIM has not been able to facilitate a successful attack in Morocco but credible reports warn us of "considerable numbers" of Moroccans training with AQIM in northern Mali and Algeria and returning to Morocco. ¶10. (SBU) The main threat posed by the Pakistan-based al-Qa'ida network is its information operations, which could have inspired the 2003 and 2007 bombings in Casablanca and may inspire future attacks. Al-Qa'ida number two Ayman al-Zawahiri implicitly called for attacks on the two Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in 2006 and 2007. -------------- Returning Iraqi Fighters -------------- ¶11. (SBU) The GOM is concerned about Moroccan veteran jihadists eventually returning from Iraq to propagate jihadist activity at home. While overall numbers of Moroccans fighting in Iraq are difficult to estimate, some press reporting puts the number at several hundred. -------------- Morocco's CT Approach -------------- ¶12. (SBU) A key to the GOM CT strategy has been a comprehensive approach which not only emphasizes neutralizing existing terrorist threats through traditional law enforcement and security measures, but also engages in preventative measures to discourage terrorist recruitment through political reform and policy measures and by taking advantage of the Islamic "high ground" through the King, as religious leader, and the religious establishment. As a religious and political leader for all Moroccans, King Mohamed VI has led this effort by unambiguously condemning terrorism and those who espouse or conduct terrorism. ¶13. (SBU) In 2007, the GOM continued to implement internal reforms aimed at ameliorating socio-economic factors that create conditions conducive to extremism. The National Initiative for Human Development, launched by King Mohamed VI in 2005, is a $1.2 billion program designed to generate employment, combat poverty, and improve infrastructure, with a special focus on rural areas. The embassy is chipping in with programs targeted at vulnerable youth and we have a proposal for FY 09 funding to sponsor prison reform and deradicalisation. -------------- Counterextremism -------------- ¶14. (SBU) Morocco's Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs (MOIA) also continues reforms launched in 2004 to counter extremist ideology and promote religious moderation and tolerance. In 2006, 30 imams were dismissed in favor of those preaching a government-sanctioned message. MOIA also supervised revisions to the country's religious curriculum, broke with the precedent by appointing 50 women as spiritual guides at mosques, and installed a closed circuit television network which broadcasts moderate religious sermons to 2,000 mosques each day. ¶15. (SBU) The GOM also emphasized adherence to human rights standards in the pursuit of terrorist suspects and increased law enforcement and justice transparency as part of its CT program. The GOM this year provided NGOs unprecedented access to prisons and demonstrated unprecedented frankness in presenting to the public candid assessments of the terrorism threat. -------------- Legal Reform -------------- ¶16. (SBU) Following the suicide bombings in Casablanca in May 2003, Morocco passed laws to broaden the definition of terrorism, proposed heavy sentences for inciting terrorism, and increased investigative authorities, powers against suspected terrorists. In an effort to combat terrorist financial transactions, the new laws also allowed for freezing of suspect accounts, and permitted the prosecution of terrorist finance related crimes. ***************************************** Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat ***************************************** Riley