HARSTON ASSESSES MINURSO AND THE WESTERN SAHARA

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 001154 SIPDIS STATE FOR IO/PSC, IO/UNP, DRL/NESCA AND NEA/MAG E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2018 TAGS: PREL KPKO PHUM PBTS UN WI MO SUBJECT: HARSTON ASSESSES MINURSO AND THE WESTERN SAHARA NEGOTIATIONS Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: MINURSO Head of Mission Julian Harston briefed the P-5 plus Spain on December 12. Harston believed that Morocco is finally ready to assent to Ambassador Christopher Ross' appointment as the UN Secretary General's (UNSYG's) Personal Envoy for Western Sahara. Harston believes that little progress can be made in Manhasset over the next year, but Ross could still set the stage for progress in the future. Harston declared that an alliance between the Polisario and Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is unthinkable. Harston dismissed the 500 Polisario fighters as no match for Morocco's 80,000 troops in Western Sahara, but he opined that the Polisario is outmaneuvering Morocco politically and diplomatically. Finally, he said he failed to understand why Morocco, which has a good human rights record -- including in Western Sahara -- opposes a human rights mandate for MINURSO. End summary. ¶2. (C) On December 12, British Ambassador Timothy Morris hosted a MINURSO briefing for the U.S., Chinese and Russian Ambassadors, the Spanish DCM, and the French Political Counselor. DCM and British Political Officer also participated. Characterizing himself as a "friend and a critic" of Morocco, the UNSYG's Special Representative for Western Sahara and MINURSO Head of Mission Harston said he had also met with the South African Ambassador and unofficially with the Moroccan Coordinator at the Ministry of Interior during this visit to Rabat. ¶3. (C) Making it clear that this would probably be his last briefing for the P-5 plus Spain, Harston said MINURSO is working well. (Note: He indicated that he had heard from the Moroccans -- but not from the UN -- that he is being sent by the UN to Belgrade in January. End note.) Harston thought MINURSO's force structure could be re-examined with a view toward cutting 20 personnel and reducing the USD 45 million annual budget. He quickly added that MINURSO is nonetheless "cheap and effective." ¶4. (C) Noting that Moroccan relations with the UN Secretariat were not "terribly good," Harston said he understood that Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Taieb Fassi Fihri's December 14 and 15 visit to New York was designed to pave the way for UN Secretary General Ban-ki Moon to announce Ambassador Christopher Ross' appointment as his new Personal Envoy for the Western Sahara. ¶5. (C) Ambassador Riley asked what Moroccans were looking for in his replacement, and Harston replied what he really thought they wanted was no successor, i.e., no MINURSO Head of Mission or Special Representative for Western Sahara. Morocco would like MINURSO to be a peacekeeping operation with no political component. Harston also underscored Moroccan unhappiness over the handling of previous Personal Envoy Peter Van Walsum's departure and the Moroccan view that it represented a political victory for the Polisario. In fact, Harston said, in his view Polisario diplomacy is more effective than Moroccan diplomacy. ¶6. (C) In response to French Political Counselor Frederic Clavier's question about inducing Algeria to help reach a settlement, Harston opined that nothing will happen before Algeria's presidential election -- partially because international interest in Western Sahara is lacking. ¶7. (C) When the British Ambassador asked about wider security issues in the Trans-Saharan region, Harston observed that the essentially ungoverned Western Sahara is problematic. However, he declared, an alliance between the Polisario and AQIM is unthinkable because the organizations have totally different objectives. Harston assessed that in the territory the Polisario has no more than 500 fighters armed with Soviet equipment from the 1960s facing 80,000 Moroccan soldiers. As for suggestions that the Polisario is building a capital in Tifarity, Harston said five buildings and an empty school in a town without water hardly make a capital ¶8. (C) Chinese Ambassador Yuanxing Gong asked about the future of the Manhasset talks. Harston replied that he saw little likelihood of progress in the near term. However, Harston still felt that Ross should look for openings that might be possible a year from now. Spanish DCM Alfonso Portables observed that Morocco is very good at procrastinating, and Harston agreed citing the slowness of Ross' appointment. He observed that the UN was in no hurry either though since the Secretary General was still smarting from the verbal mauling that the former Moroccan PermRep had given him in October. ¶9. (C) Harston's closing comments were on human rights. He declared that Morocco has a good story to tell on human rights, including in Western Sahara. Therefore, he failed to understand why Morocco opposed a human rights mandate for MINURSO, which Harston himself neither sought nor supports, and why Morocco had sent former MFA Secretary General Omar Hilale back to Geneva as Ambassador to oppose any human rights initiatives on Western Sahara there. ¶10. (C) Comment: Although the Moroccans have not liked any recent MINURSO representatives and Harston has made some missteps, we share his perception that MINURSO is working well. The Mission also agrees with his observations that the Polisario and AQIM have very different objectives and there that has been some progress on human rights on this side of the berm. In addition to its small force in the territory, the Polisario may have up to a few thousand "troops" in Algeria, but they are still no match for the Moroccans. Given the standing GOM request for his ouster, the Moroccans did not offer and Harston did not request any formal meetings. Even if Harston is correct that the Manhasset talks are not likely to make much progress in the next 12 months, they remain the principal formal vehicle for resolving the 33-year-old Western Sahara dispute. End comment. ***************************************** Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat ***************************************** Riley