Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08RABAT1134
2008-12-08 16:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rabat
Cable title:  

BOYCOTT LEADER PROPOSES NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH USG

Tags:  PHUM KPAO SCUL OIIP PGOV PREL PTER MO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1008
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHRB #1134/01 3431642
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 081642Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9410
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 3178
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 001134 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/PPD, NEA/PI, DRL/NESCA AND NEA/MAG
LONDON FOR MOC
LONDON, DUBAI AND BRUSSELS FOR MEDIA HUBS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2018
TAGS: PHUM KPAO SCUL OIIP PGOV PREL PTER MO
SUBJECT: BOYCOTT LEADER PROPOSES NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH USG

Classified By: DCM Robert P. Jackson for reason 1.4 (d).

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 001134 SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/PPD, NEA/PI, DRL/NESCA AND NEA/MAG LONDON FOR MOC LONDON, DUBAI AND BRUSSELS FOR MEDIA HUBS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2018 TAGS: PHUM KPAO SCUL OIIP PGOV PREL PTER MO SUBJECT: BOYCOTT LEADER PROPOSES NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH USG Classified By: DCM Robert P. Jackson for reason 1.4 (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Summary: Younes Mjahed, head of the Moroccan press union, told Information Attache (IO) that as a result of the recent U.S. election, he was prepared to rethink his organization's years-long boycott of USG activities. He reported that the Government of Morocco (GOM) had been stonewalling on a revised press code, but had reversed course recently and decided to recommit to its completion. Mjahed was outraged about the recent terrorist attacks in Mumbai, and hoped the Obama administration would focus its attention on a more fruitful, cooperative approach to combating this plague. Mjahed was cautiously optimistic about the prospects for a newly-formed national corruption commission, of which he was recently named a charter member. A member of the USFP (socialist party) national council, he was deeply disappointed by the recent party congress, stating that the party was going through a "dead period" and predicting "catastrophic" results for the party in local elections, scheduled for June 2009. End summary. -------------- Prior SNPM Boycott of USG Activities -------------- ¶2. (C) IO Ranz met on December 5, 2008 with Younes Mjahed, Secretary General of the Moroccan National Press Union (SNPM). SNPM is one of six prominent Moroccan NGOs that has been boycotting USG activities for the past several years in protest over USG policy in the Middle East, notably policy on Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Indeed, SNPM has been among the most vocal and active boycott supporters, organizing small but widely publicized demonstrations against activities such as Public Affairs Section- (PAS-) funded journalism training programs, and Ambassadorial and USAID outreach visits. As a result, although Embassy officials have met regularly, if infrequently, with Mjahed over the past several years, previous meetings had been held under the guise of informal discussions between individuals, not as representatives of the USG and SNPM. This distinction allowed the USG to preserve quiet relations with SNPM while helping Mjahed maintain the fiction that SNPM was formally boycotting the US
G. -------------- New Relations with USG -------------- ¶3. (C) In his meeting with IO, Mjahed said bluntly that, with the election of the new Obama administration, it was time to &reconsider our relationship with the Embassy.8 He expressed enthusiasm for working with the USG on journalist training, which he averred was the greatest challenge facing the Moroccan press today. IO briefed him on USG training plans for the coming year, and promised to keep him informed about future training sessions, so that he could encourage SNPM members to participate. At the conclusion of the meeting, Mjahed said that the next time he wanted to invite the IO for dinner &with us at the Syndicate.8 (Comment: This was intended as a signal that, as far as he was concerned, SNPM and the Embassy could now enjoy normal working relations. End comment.) -------------- New Momentum on Revising Press Code? -------------- ¶4. (C) Mjahed reported that the Consultative Council on Human Rights (CCDH) would be hosting a working session the following day to revive long-dormant talks on a revised press code. Mjahed had met earlier in the day with Communications Minister Khaled Naciri, who had told him in all honesty that the government's recent policy had been to put negotiations over the new press code on the back burner. Naciri told Mjahed that the winds had shifted, and CCDH head Ahmed Herzenni had been instructed to launch a new effort to bring all the stakeholders together and come up with a mutually-acceptable text. ¶5. (C) For his part, Herzenni had told Mjahed that he personally supported eliminating all prison sentences from the text (which has been the major stumbling block),although he could not say so publicly. Interestingly, Mjahed said, at RABAT 00001134 002 OF 003 the recent USFP party conference there was a lively debate over whether to formally adopt an absolutist position on prison sentences, or whether to make an exception and accept prison sentences only in cases involving speech that supported or apologized for terrorism. (Comment: CCDH did indeed meet on December 6 to discuss a revised press code, and in an interview with pro-Palace French-language daily "Le Matin" appearing on December 8, Naciri committed to finalizing the revised press code in 2009. It is unclear, however, that the GOM will be able to find the necessary consensus; it appears to be satisfied with its current policy of a de facto relaxation of restrictions, while keeping in hand the legal instruments of deterrence. End comment.) -------------- Combating Terrorism -------------- ¶6. (C) Mjahed was extremely exercised about the recent Mumbai attacks, and in particular about the attack on the Chabad (Jewish cultural) house. He felt the latter had been largely ignored by the international media, which focused almost exclusively on the attacks on the two luxury hotels. He hoped the new administration would make an international, cooperative fight against terrorism a top priority, but focused more broadly on addressing its cultural underpinnings, rather than only on the law enforcement battle. As a first step towards developing a &road-map,8 he felt it was critical to launch a formal discussion about the definition of terrorism, recognizing fully how difficult and fraught such a discussion would be. He was appalled at the lack of public outcry in Pakistan about the attacks. (Comment: He was silent about the similar lack of public condemnation in Morocco. End comment.) -------------- New Anti-Corruption Commission -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Mjahed was among those appointed as charter members of the freshly-minted National Commission for the Prevention of Corruption, launched last week. He was cautiously optimistic about the commission,s prospects for reducing corruption in Morocco, citing in particular its impressive and serious membership. His hope was that the commission would focus on systemic transparency; petty corruption was irrelevant, as far as he was concerned. He was particularly interested in promoting freedom of information legislation, believing that the government would never behave transparently without such a right enshrined in law. (Comment: Mjahed's observations square with other reports coming out of the new commission. Commission head Aboudrar has been particularly vocal lately, indicating in part that he hoped to use the commission's advisory mandate to recommend pursuit of egregious cases. Embassy will be reporting in more depth on this effort and how we might engage. End comment.) -------------- Disappointment with USFP Election -------------- ¶8. (C) A member of the USFP national council, Mjahed was deeply discouraged by the recent party elections. Structurally, there was no way for the next generation (of which he is a member) to force change on the old guard, as a result of which the party was getting older and older. Those in positions of influence were interested only in protecting their positions, not in reforming the party and making it relevant. As a result, it was increasingly out of touch with the masses. He stated that the party was now living through a &dead period,8 as all key figures were busy positioning themselves for the next USFP congress. ¶9. (C) When asked how this would affect USFP prospects in the 2009 local elections, he said the results would be &catastrophic8 for the party; either it would face embarrassingly poor results, or would resort to &dirty means8 to prevail. As a result of his feelings, he had fended off what he said were numerous requests for him to run for the USFP political bureau. (He also thought it was a conflict of interest to run a union and be a member of a party,s political bureau.) -------------- Comment -------------- RABAT 00001134 003 OF 003 ¶10. (C) Mjahed's new willingness to work with the USG is one tangible sign that we are witnessing a major political and public diplomacy opening in the Arab world with the incoming administration. It reflects what we are hearing from a number of interlocutors about their positive expectations for the new administration. Should other NGOs follow suit, we could find that our capacity to promote human rights and transparency in Morocco is also expanded, as major NGOs focused on these two subjects have also been boycotting us. In this case, however, we intend to proceed cautiously, because SNPM is a problematic partner at best. It is closely associated with the USFP as a result of Mjahed's political affiliation, and is not widely respected among journalists, the overwhelming majority of whom do not belong. It is also suspected of corrupt practices. For these reasons and others, its heretofore vocal opposition to cooperation with USG has had practically no impact on our programs; journalists have been enthusiastic about participating in training opportunities we have organized, whether locally or through exchange programs in the U.S. We are therefore not bullish on developing a close relationship with the SNPM. End comment. ***************************************** Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat ***************************************** Riley

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -