SCENESETTER FOR SECDEF MEETING WITH ECUADORIAN MOD

C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000053 SIPDIS SIPDIS OSD / DAN MCDONALD E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2014 TAGS: PREL MASS MOPS SNAR PTER EC CO VE SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECDEF MEETING WITH ECUADORIAN MOD SANDOVAL REF: A. 07 QUITO... id: 137595 date: 1/16/2008 20:49 refid: 08QUITO53 origin: Embassy Quito classification: CONFIDENTIAL destination: 07QUITO2556|07QUITO2570|07QUITO2616|07QUITO953 header: VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHQT #0053/01 0162049 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 162049Z JAN 08 FM AMEMBASSY QUITO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8295 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE INFO RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 7245 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 2282 RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JAN BRASILIA 3832 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 2820 RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 3198 -------------- header ends -------------- C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000053 SIPDIS SIPDIS OSD / DAN MCDONALD E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2014 TAGS: PREL MASS MOPS SNAR PTER EC CO VE SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECDEF MEETING WITH ECUADORIAN MOD SANDOVAL REF: A. 07 QUITO 2570 ¶B. 07 QUITO 953 ¶C. 07 QUITO 2556 ¶D. 07 QUITO 2616 Classified By: Ambassador Linda Jewell, for Reasons 1.4 (b&d) ¶1. (C) Please accept my thanks for receiving Dr. Wellington Sandoval, the Ecuadorian Minister of Defense, during the Minister's January 23-26 visit to the U.S. Minister Sandoval's visit comes at a time of opportunities and risks as Ecuador carries out political and economic reforms through its Constituent Assembly. While the Correa government clearly presents some concerns and uncertainties, cooperation on counter-narcotics and Northern Border security has in fact been very good to date. Sandoval is pragmatic, positively inclined, and well-positioned to play a helpful role on these issues moving forward. I am convinced that dialogue with the MOD will maximize our prospects for continuing constructive bilateral military cooperation to our mutual benefit. Our goal during the Minister's visit is to demonstrate U.S. interest in advancing relations with the Correa government on issues of mutual concern. Fragile Democracy, Correa's Commitment to Change -------------- --- ¶2. (C) Our top goal in Ecuador is to promote and support democratic stability by strengthening democratic institutions. A critical component of this effort is limiting the corrosive effects of the regional drug trade on Ecuador, as well as the risks associated with Colombian guerrilla activity along Ecuador,s Northern border region. Ecuador is a fragile democracy caught in a cycle of political instability reflecting popular disillusionment with traditional institutions. Inaugurated in January 2007, Rafael Correa is the first president since the 1979 return to democracy to enjoy popularity in all regions of the country and among a broad array of class and demographic groups. ¶3. (C) Correa won election by successfully presenting himself as the "change" candidate to a population frustrated by the chaotic and corrupt governments of recent years. Thus far, Correa has proven adept at maintaining public support using a combination of confrontational tactics, pragmatic deal-making, and programs to assist the poor. He is seeking adoption of reforms through an unbounded Constituent Assembly, inaugurated on November 29. The Assembly is rewriting the constitution, which would be approved in a subsequent referendum, and adopting laws that take effect immediately. It has declared the Congress, elected in 2006, in indefinite recess. Our position is that constitutional reform is an internal Ecuadorian issue, but that it is essential that the reform process proceed in a manner consistent with the region's democratic values. ¶4. (C) While Correa is sympathetic to some of Chavez's ideas, Correa's policies reflect primarily Ecuadorian realities and dynamics. He is a nationalist first, and a leftist second. He chafes at Ecuador,s traditional dependency on the U.S., but is not avowedly anti-American (he and other close family members have lived in the U.S. and he expresses a genuine affinity for many aspects of U.S. society). He does not want to be seen as following anyone,s example, but rather charting his own course. Northern Border -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Ecuador shares a 400-mile border with Colombia in areas of heavy narco-terrorist activity. USG efforts in the area aim to prevent spillover of drug cultivation and illegal armed group activity into Ecuador. They include development assistance to improve the quality of life and spur licit economic growth; counter-narcotics aid to curb smuggling of precursor chemicals, cocaine, and heroin; and military-to-military assistance to strengthen Ecuador's ability to secure its Northern Border and control its territorial waters. ¶6. (C) The Ecuadorian Army's Fourth Division has engaged the FARC in a series of operations along the border with Colombia since last November (Ref A). These operations demonstrate previously uncharacteristic resolve and coordination by the Ecuadorian military to press the attack and to continue surveillance and patrolling its border to engage additional FARC camps. ¶7. (C) The GOE's political will to control its Northern Border and to remove incursions of armed insurgents within its territory appear to have increased after Minister Sandoval's fact-finding trip to the Northern Border last November. The MOD was surprised to find a heavier than expected FARC presence and a local population unwilling to reveal this presence. Ecuadorian policy under this and previous governments is to refrain from labeling the FARC as terrorists and to maintain a neutral position on Colombia,s internal conflict, not just for ideological reasons but to avoid becoming a target of FARC attacks (especially the strategic oil infrastructure located near the Northern Border). Yet Sandoval has been unusually outspoken about how FARC incursions represent a threat to Ecuador's sovereignty. I recommend that you praise GOE efforts along the Northern Border and assure the Minister of our continued assistance. Counter-Narcotics Cooperation -------------- ¶8. (C) Ecuadorian leaders have identified narcotraffickers and other criminal organizations as a threat to national sovereignty, and are focusing the police, military, judiciary and others on disrupting and dismantling these organizations. Since 2001, the Embassy's Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) has provided almost $94 million to enhance the capacity of the anti-narcotics police throughout Ecuador, to assist the military in providing security for citizens and protecting Ecuador's sovereignty on the northern and maritime borders, and improve the criminal justice system. However, the GOE has been critical of the cuts in NAS funding, down to just over $7 million in 2008 from nearly $20 million in 2004, in light of the GOE,s continued anti-narcotics efforts. It would be helpful for you to explain that these cuts are due to worldwide budgetary pressures, and do not reflect Ecuador,s efforts or cooperation, which has been excellent. Plan Ecuador -------------- ¶9. (SBU) We understand that Minister Sandoval will raise Plan Ecuador, which was unveiled by President Correa in April 2007 as a guide to GOE and international donor development activity in the Northern Border region thru 2018. Long on general themes and short on specifics, the Plan lists seven goals in development activity (Ref B). If the Minister asks for USG support, your response could be that we appreciate the importance of integrating developmental and security efforts. Improved coordination by the GOE of both national and donor community programs is useful. USAID has focused on development support in the region for several years, providing over $78 million in assistance since 2001. Manta FOL -------------- ¶10. (C) The U.S. military presence in Manta remains controversial, and President Correa has repeatedly vowed that he will not renew the agreement when it expires in November ¶2009. We regard this as a sovereignty-based position linked to domestic politics, rather than an indicator of weakening GOE commitment to broader CN efforts or bilateral military cooperation. Prior to an intensive Embassy public affairs effort over the past year, most Ecuadorians had a limited or misinformed perception about the FOL. Polls in 2006 showed that a strong majority of Ecuadorians opposed "foreign troops" on national soil. Attitudes have softened thanks to our efforts to create a more informed public. In an August 2007 poll, 75 percent of respondents agreed that Ecuador should collaborate with the U.S. in the fight against narcotrafficking, and the positive answers to FOL-specific questions hovered around 50 percent, and higher in Manta itself. Correa is mindful of the FOL,s relative popularity in Manta based on economic benefits and is seeking to fill that gap post-2009. He is pursuing a plan to make Manta the "gateway for trade" between East Asia and South America, taking advantage of the excellent deep water port and the potential offered by the airport (Refs C and D). You will want to emphasize that FOL operations are producing important results in the fight against transnational crime, benefiting both countries. JEWELL =======================CABLE ENDS============================