ECUADOR: 2008 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM

UNCLAS QUITO 001179 SIPDIS S/CT (RHONDA SHORE),NCTC E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PTER ASEC PGOV PREL EC CO SUBJECT: ECUADOR: 2008 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM REF: A. STATE 124815 ¶B. STATE 120019 ¶1. (U) Embassy submits the narrative in paragraphs 2-7 for the 2008 Country Report on Terrorism: ¶2. (U) Ecuador's greatest counterterrorism and security challenge remained the presence of Colombian narcotics and insurgent/terrorist groups in the northern border region. In order to evade Colombian military operations, these groups, principally the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),regularly used Ecuadorian territory for rest, recuperation, resupply, and training, as well as coca processing and limited planting and production, thereby involving significant numbers of Ecuadorians in direct or indirect ways. The porous 450-mile border and the lack of adequate licit employment opportunities for Ecuadorians in the region have made the area vulnerable to narcoterrorist influence and created a contraband economy. Ecuadorian officials along the border believed the FARC,s economic impact allowed it to buy silence and compliance. ¶3. (U) Ecuador stepped up its response to this threat, although it continued to face constraints on resources and limited capabilities. The Correa Administration, while maintaining the country's traditional neutrality with respect to the Colombian conflict, has stated it opposed armed encroachments of any kind across its borders. A Colombian attack in Ecuadorian territory on March 1 caused the destruction of a FARC camp and the death of FARC Secretariat member Raul Reyes. Colombian analysis of documents contained within laptops recovered at the camp suggested elements within the Ecuadorian government had connections to the FARC. The Correa administration strongly denied ties to the FARC, claiming that the only GOE contacts with the FARC were to negotiate the release of hostages. The GOE has publicly expressed its desire to eliminate FARC presence within Ecuadorian territory. The government shifted troops in 2008 to the border region and continued to promote a domestic northern border development agenda in concert with international donors to spur economic development in the area. ¶4. (U) Ecuador's security forces conducted operations against FARC training and logistical resupply camps along the northern border. The Ecuadorian military significantly increased the number of operations in Ecuador's northern border region. The operational tempo, which in early 2008 was already higher than in previous years, increased even further after the March 1 attack. A total of over 100 battalion-level operations along the northern border led to the discovery and destruction of 11 cocaine producing laboratories, over 130 FARC facilities (bases, houses, and resupply camps),the eradication of nine hectares of coca, and the confiscation of weapons, communications equipment and other support equipment. These operations also netted valuable information on FARC activities and infrastructure in and outside of Ecuador, and resulted in the detention of 20 FARC members and the killing of one FARC member during the year. Despite increasing successes in this effort, insufficient resources and the challenging border region terrain made it difficult to thwart cross-border incursions. ¶5. (U) Ecuadorian police suspected several small and relatively minor Ecuadorian groups of domestic subversion and involvement in terrorism. A handful of small radical Ecuadorian groups, including a self-proclaimed vestigial faction of the Alfaro Vive Carajo! organization, are reputed to have ties with and received support from Colombian narcoterrorists. In 2007, Ecuadorian security forces conducted operations against this faction of the Alfaro Vive Carajo! organization in an attempt to minimize its capacity to conduct subversive, disruptive, or terrorist activities. In 2008, there emerged small but effective criminal units whose focus is on various stages of narcotics production and trafficking from within Colombia and through Esmeraldas, Ecuador. Some elements of the FARC, National Liberation Army (ELN) and United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) paramilitaries, among others, have transitioned into pursuing purely criminal gang activity, including in Ecuador. Other groups, although less active in the last couple of years, include the Popular Combatants Group (GCP),the Revolutionary Militia of the People (MRP),the Marxist-Leninist Party of Ecuador (PCMLE),and the Alfarista Liberation Army (ELA). ¶6. (U) The Ecuadorian government continued to strengthen controls over money laundering through the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU),which was established under a 2005 Money Laundering Law. The FIU is cooperating closely with the Anti-Narcotics Police Directorate, the Superintendent of Banks, the courts and the private banker association to identify suspicious transactions and develop information for the prosecution of cases. ¶7. (U) Ecuador's judicial institutions remained weak, susceptible to corruption, and heavily backlogged with pending cases. While the military and police have made numerous arrests, the judicial system had a poor record of achieving convictions. HODGES