KOSOVO: SOUTHERN SERBS ANGRY, APPREHENSIVE, AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRISTINA 000081 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR DRL, INL, EUR/SCE NSC FOR BRAUN E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL KV UNMIK SUBJECT: KOSOVO: SOUTHERN SERBS ANGRY, APPREHENSIVE, AND TIGHT-LIPPED AFTER INDEPENDENCE, BUT LIFE GOES ON IN THE ENCLAVES Classified By: Chief of Mission Tina S. Kaidanow for reasons 1.4 (b),( d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. In an effort to maintain relationships and relieve anxiety in the wake of Kosovo's February 17 declaration of independence, we met with several moderate Kosovo Serb contacts from south of the Ibar during the week of February 18-22. We were not surprised to find them angry and nervous. Our contacts are, to a person, under considerable pressure from the Serbian government and their own communities not to speak with the Kosovo government or the international community. While there is no expectation life will be disrupted, there is universal agreement that the Ahtisaari Plan will not be implemented and that the ICO/EULEX missions will not be welcome. They do not expect much cooperation with the Kosovo government on the part of Serbs. With regard to the Serbian government, we ran into a noticeable wall with several of our contacts who are privy to at least some of its forthcoming plans. While nothing we found is surprising, the challenges the international community and the Kosovo government will face in working with Kosovo's Serb community in the coming months will be considerable. END SUMMARY. Predictable Anger ¶2. (C) Serb reaction to Kosovo's February 17 declaration of independence has been predictable and foreseeable - in large part angry, tinged with disappointment and sadness. The reception we got from Ljubomir Stanojkovic on February 19, a moderate former Kosovo MP, International Visitor Program participant, and current village leader from Silovo (Gjilan/Gnjilane municipality) was typical of what we found with many of our contacts this week. He first compared Kosovo's independence with his father's death, saying "I knew it was coming, but the moment itself was still hard to bear." Stanojkovic and others expressed anger at the United States, though they were careful to separate their feelings towards the U.S. government from their personal relationships with Americans. Dragan Velic, a leader of the Serb National Council (SNC) in the Serb enclave of Gracanica, told us February 19 that he only agreed to meet an American official because of his preexisting relationship with us. Vesna Jovanovic, a former Kosovo MP from the Serb village of Partesh (Gjilan/Gnjilane municipality),who continues to be constructive and open, told us that Partesh residents were in such a foul mood towards America in particular that she could not remind them of the community center built for them recently by USKFOR and USAID without getting an unpleasant response. Fear, Rumors Still Prevalent ¶3. (C) Besides anger, there is an high degree of fear among Kosovo Serbs in the wake of Kosovo's independence, despite the total lack of any significant security incidents south of the Ibar river since the February 17 declaration. On February 19, an article appeared in Serbia's Beta News, claiming that a woman from Gornje Livoc village (Gjilan/Gnjilane municipality) had been beaten in her home by masked Albanians. This article received widespread attention, with villagers in the wider region (all inside the USKFOR AOR) telling KFOR contacts they had heard of a "slaughter" in Gornje Livoc. After considerable effort from USKFOR, assisted by Jovanovic and USOP, accurate information was disseminated, quelling the rumor and calming nerves. Actual KPS reports show that the woman's home suffered a minor burglary, and that she fell down during the theft but suffered no injuries. Though eventually contained, the fast-spreading and inflated rumors coming from this incident illustrate the level of anxiety among the Serbs in the south. Keeping a Low Profile ¶4. (C) That anxiety is also fueled by fears emanating from PRISTINA 00000081 002 OF 004 within the Serb community itself, particularly the fear that hardline Serb actions in northern Kosovo will have a negative impact on Serb communities in the south by provoking a reaction from local Albanians. In addition, Serbian government interlocutors have clearly been putting pressure on Serb community members to avoid "outsiders"; as one sign of this, some of our contacts wanted to meet us either outside their normal offices (away from neighbors and locals who would notice them talking to Americans) or in the presence of others, so as to avoid accusations of treason. Jovanovic told us she could not be seen with Americans in Partesh, and asked for a meeting in Vrbovac (Viti/Vitina municipality) on February 21, at which we were joined by regional CCK coordinator Zoran Krcmarevic. When we met Stanojkovic, he asked two colleagues to join us, in an apparent attempt to avoid being seen alone with Americans. Bojan Stojanovic, leader of the Kosovo Serb Independent Liberal Party (SLS) caucus in the Kosovo Assembly, met us outside his office, insisting on an isolated table in the back of a local restaurant. Life Goes On...To a Point ¶5. (C) Several of our contacts indicated that they expect life for Serbs to continue as before, to the extent possible. Randjel Nojkic, another moderate former Kosovo MP who heads the Gracanica office of Post, Telegraph, and Telecom (PTT) of Serbia, told us February 20 that he would continue to cooperate with Kosovo Customs to ensure PTT would receive necessary shipments, but that he had informed Customs officials "I will do what is necessary to keep PTT operating - if you make a decision against PTT's interests, I'll do what I have to in order to keep things going." Zivojin Rakocevic, manager of the moderate Serbian-language radio station Radio KiM, told us, also on February 20, that he expected the Serbian government-sponsored institutions already in place to continue functioning without interruption. ...But Ahtisaari is Not Likely ¶6. (C) This group of moderate Serb contacts, some of whom have expressed guarded support for the general goals of the Ahtisaari Plan in the past, are now unanimous that the plan cannot now be implemented, at least as it relates to Serbs. Jovanovic emphasized that the ICO will not be able to find any, let alone a sufficient number of Serbs to participate in the decentralization provisions of Ahtisaari. Krcmarevic and other moderates, such as Father Sava Janjic of the Visoki Decani monastery, expressed doubts that there are any real guarantees for Serbs under the plan. When they are again assured of legal protections afforded by Ahtisaari, such as the guaranteed existence of 10 set-aside seats for Serbs in the Kosovo Assembly, a typical response, as voiced by Krcmarevic, has been "this is all well-conceived, but you can't expect that this will really work." ...And Forget the ICO ¶7. (C) Our contacts are unanimous that Serbs will not work with the ICO or EULEX. For some, like Velic and Krcmarevic, the deployment of these missions means the violation of UNSC 1244, making any cooperation impossible. As Velic put it "we (Serbs) will fight the illegitimate (independence) with the legitimate." Others, such as Jovanovic and Nojkic, think that the ICO will have such a hard time operating in the changed environment after independence that it will not be able to find effective ways to cooperate with Serbs. When we asked about the practical necessity of dealing with the ICO in lieu of any other interlocutors, we got no definite answers from any of our contacts. Some voiced the hope that UNMIK would stay in Kosovo, if only to enable contact between Serbs and the Kosovo government. None had any answer when we pointed out that UNMIK would soon begin winding down during the coming transition period. ...Or Kosovo Institutions PRISTINA 00000081 003 OF 004 ¶8. (C) Finally, our contacts made it clear that Serbs may break relations with the Pristina government or local municipal governments run by Albanians. Leaders from five villages in Viti/Vitina municipality (Mogila, Grncar, Binac, Klokot, and Vrbovac) signed a declaration on February 20, later sent to SRSG Ruecker, that due to Kosovo's independence, they would not respect any decision of either the central or local government. The declaration did state that they would continue to work with KFOR, UNMIK, and the OSCE; our contact Krcmarevic added that relationships with liaison offices and embassies would also continue. Serbia's Role: Serbs Keep Mum ¶9. (C) One pattern we noticed throughout all our meetings in the past week was a purposeful deflection of any questions about the Serbian government's plans for Kosovo Serbs after independence. Several of our contacts - none of whom has ever been closely tied to Belgrade politics or the Serbian government - attended a meeting in Belgrade on Saturday, February 16, at which we believe aspects of Serbia's Kosovo policy were discussed. When we asked about this meeting or the Serbian government's upcoming plans, we received vague, noncommittal answers. Krcmarevic, who was only recently appointed to his CCK position, claimed that he now had "certain guidelines" to follow, which he would not reveal. Some of our long-standing contacts, such as Velic and Nojkic, lost their usual loquaciousness and openness when asked about these plans, with Nojkic even breaking eye contact, dropping his voice, and looking at the floor. Still Fissures in the CCK ¶10. (C) As he has in the recent past, Krcmarevic, a member of Serbian President Boris Tadic's Democratic Serbia (DS) party who was recently appointed to his job as regional CCK coordinator for Viti/Vitina, complained that the real authority inside the CCK is still held by members of Prime Minister Kostunica's Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) party. Krcmarevic said that Serbian companies associated with the DSS continued to get the lion's share of funds and contracts from the Serbian Ministry for Kosovo, headed by DSS's Slobodan Samardzic. Comment: Tough Going ¶11. (C) There is good news in the enclaves, despite everything relayed above: Serb and Albanian police continue to work together in KPS uniforms, and for now at least, institutional contacts remain with Serbs in most communities. There are not many surprises in what we heard from our moderate Serb contacts this week: they are unhappy with Kosovo's independence, unhappy with the United States for sponsoring it, and are under ever-increasing pressure from the Serbian government not to meet with us. The lack of any real acceptance of the Ahtisaari Plan on their part will make the international community's work in the coming months that much harder. The Kosovo government will face serious challenges in dealing with an alienated Serb community under pressure from within not to cooperate with Kosovo or even international institutions. ¶12. (C) COMMENT (cont'd): The tight-lipped responses we received to any questions about the Serbian government's forthcoming plans are also disturbing, though we see plenty of evidence as well that Serbs in the south are aware of the serious downsides of a policy of strict isolation. This lack of response from contacts that are usually open indicates widespread - and effective - pressure from Belgrade. We do not face significant security threats in the south; it should be noted that all the pressure and fear we saw among our contacts this week is happening in a safe and calm environment. As tension mounts in the Serb-majority north, however, it may become harder for Serbs in the south to hold out against the Belgrade line, even if their inclinations run in the other direction. End comment. PRISTINA 00000081 004 OF 004 KAIDANOW