KOSOVO: EULEX DEPLOYMENT GOING WELL ENOUGH, BUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000646 SIPDIS EPT FOR EUR, EUR/SCE, DRL, INL, AND S/WCI, NSC FOR HELGERSON, USUN FOR SGEE, USOSCE FOR AHYDE E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2018 TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL EAID KV UNMIK SUBJECT: KOSOVO: EULEX DEPLOYMENT GOING WELL ENOUGH, BUT MANDATE UNCLEAR Classified By: Charge Tom Yazdgerdi for Reasons 1.4 (b),(d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Since December 9, the beginning date of its mission, EULEX continues to deploy throughout Kosovo without meeting any significant protest or resistance. As of December 22, EULEX had 1,241 police officers on the ground, of which 23 were posted in north Mitrovica, plus two strengthening platoons of 30 to 35 officers each at Gates 1 and 31, on the problematic order with Serbia. EULEX Customs is proceeding with plans to increase staffing and will, through a series of careful steps, begin transforming these gates into fully functional border crossings. On December 20, EULEX Customs deployed the first six members of its Reinforcement Task Force to strengthen its presence on the Kosovo-Serbia border. The EULEX Justice Component has also deployed nine personnel to the north Mitrovica District Courthouse, the site of violence last March. While these are positive developments, our sources within EULEX and elsewhere tell us the organization has not yet come to grips with its mandate, particularly with regard to customs and justice issues. EULEX's clear preference appears to be a narrow technical role that seeks to avoid difficult political issues. We are encouraging EULEX to adopt a broader and more expansive understanding of its mission in Kosovo, since failure to do so - for example, with regard to the north Mitrovica courthouse - will only open the door for UNMIK to assume an unwanted and continuing role in rule-of-law activities. End Summary EULEX POLICE -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Three weeks after EULEX initially deployed its mission throughout Kosovo, the major part of which is police, the situation remains calm, with no physical hostility directed against its personnel. Of the three main components of the EULEX mission, police deployment has gone the smoothest and is the most advanced. Nevertheless, there has been some violence directed against EULEX (and UNMIK) property, mainly vehicles. The first incident occurred on December 13, in the town of Zvecan, in north Kosovo. The driver's side rear window was smashed, and there was a five millimeter puncture in the driver's door frame, possibly caused by a slingshot or airgun. Since then, 46 tires of 16 UNMIK and 10 EULEX vehicles in Pristina have been slashed. Additionally, on December 21 in Peja, two EULEX vehicles had their tires slashed, a mirror damaged, and anti-EULEX comments scrawled on them. All of the vehicles were empty, and there were no injuries. Rumors of possible protests by Kosovo Serbs at the problematic border crossings of Gates 1 and 31 on December 15 never came to pass, and we have not seen any protests directed at EULEX anywhere in Kosovo, since the deployment began. ¶3. (SBU) EULEX Police continue to add to their numbers: on December 15, EULEX received an additional 61 police officers, including the last of the U.S. contingent (80 police in all). They completed their orientation training on December 18, and everyone deployed throughout Kosovo on December 19. The 61 new officers mark the last increase in EULEX police numbers until January 12, when the next orientation class will take place. Of the projected 1,390 civilian police officers that will mark EULEX's full staffing, 1,241 are on the ground and working across Kosovo. This total includes 460 officers in four Formed Police Units (FPU),specialized units responsible for crowd and riot control, provided by Poland, France, Romania, and Italy. ¶4. (SBU) The French FPU is assigned to support EULEX operations in northern Kosovo and, while based in south Mitrovica, maintains support platoons of 30-35 officers each at Gates 1 and 31. EULEX currently staffs an additional 18 Police Officers throughout northern Kosovo as follows: - north Mitrovica 3 Officers - Zubin Potok 2 Officers - Leposavic 2 Officers PRISTINA 00000646 002 OF 003 - Zvecan 3 Officers - Gate 1 5 Officers - Gate 31 3 Officers EULEX Customs -------------- ¶5. (C) On December 18, Ambassador discussed EULEX's plans for Customs staffing and revenue collection at Gates 1 and 31 with Paul Acda, Head of the EULEX Customs Component (and former UNMIK Head of Customs). Ambassador urged him to use EULEX's mandate as a technical mission to engage Belgrade in solving the difficulties that would arise once revenue collection began. Ambassador noted that failure on EULEX's part to engage Belgrade would permit UNMIK to begin discussions with Belgrade on this subject, undermining EULEX's authority and possibly leading to an agreement that would be neither technically feasible nor politically appropriate. Acda agreed, but noted that he needed the support of EULEX Head of Mission Yves de Kermabon to function in this manner. ¶6. (C) In the shorter term, Acda said he saw a gradual evolution, as EULEX assumes responsibility for operating Gates 1 and 31 around the clock, beginning in January. Acda laid out what he saw as three initial phases that would be needed to get EULEX controlling commercial traffic: - Phase one, or initial deployment, saw EULEX personnel staff Gates 1 and 31 from 0800 to 2000 and perform limited activity, such as logging vehicles that entered during those hours. They did not inspect documents or control the entry of commercial traffic. - Phase two, which commenced on December 20, had EULEX deploy the first six members of its Reinforcement Task Force (RTF) to the border. At full strength - expected in January - the RTF will consist of 33 EULEX international customs officers who will perform the same limited activity described above. As more RTF officers enter rotation, EULEX will start 24-hour monitoring at the border crossings. - During Phase three, tentatively scheduled for mid-January, the RTF would begin controlling commercial traffic, including logging relevant documents and driver license data as vehicles crossed the border. Officers would also inform drivers to proceed to the Trepca Customs Terminal located in south Mitrovica. Failure to follow the instructions, they would be warned, could result in punitive legal action. The notification on the border would also warn drivers that Kosovo reserves the right to assess appropriate fees at a later date. ¶7. (C) Acda added that hopes to begin collecting revenue by mid-February 2009, though he cautioned that this will require both permission from de Kermabon and an assessment of the overall security environment. He said he recognized that the issue of revenue collection and distribution is a delicate issue and would involve at least an understanding with Belgrade on where the revenues would go. By January 2009, he went on, Acda hoped to see Kosovo Serbs working alongside EULEX in manning the gates. In 2010, in a final stage, Acda expected to see Kosovo Serbs, with international supervision, staffing the gates and working within a Kosovo institutional framework. EULEX Justice Component -------------- ¶8. (C) EULEX's justice component is still evolving, and the mission is facing its most troublesome task confronting what to do with regard to the courthouse in north Mitrovica, the site of violent protest last March. In the mission's first week, EULEX deployed nine personnel to the courthouse, who have been focusing on organizing records. They are not involved in any legal activity, as Bob Dean (protect), outgoing head of UNMIK's Department of Justice, told us in a PRISTINA 00000646 003 OF 003 December 24 meeting. He noted that UNMIK does not want overlapping authority, and it would only handover cases to EULEX when it actually vacates the building. ¶9. (SBU) Our sources tell us that UNMIK wants to wrap up its responsibilities at the north Mitrovica courthouse on January 15, but the UNMIK-to-EULEX transfer is the topic of ongoing discussion. Riccardo Maia, EULEX advisor to the Minister of Justice, told us December 23 that EULEX is reluctant to take control of the courthouse, arguing that it has neither UNMIK's mandate nor its staffing levels. As an alternative, EULEX raised with Minister of Justice Kelmendi the possibility of the MOJ or the Kosovo Judicial Council (KJC) directing the court's operations. Kelmendi was agitated that EULEX, after months of planning, only now approached the MOJ with such a plan, and she responded that the MOJ is not ready to assume such a responsibility. (Comment: Formal responsibility for the courts lies with the KJC, which does not report to the Minister. In the past, the KJC has expressed its interest in asserting authority over the courthouse even though conditions, on our view, are definitely not yet acceptable for a Kosovo government institution to operate freely. End Comment.) ¶10. (C) Dean, who in February will move over to EULEX as War Crimes Prosecutor, agreed with Kelmendi's contention and was highly critical of EULEX's effort to sidestep the issue. He outlined a plan to us on December 24 where EULEX would take control of the courthouse on January 15 and start transporting KJC employees to run day-to-day operations under EULEX authority and protection. He noted that this would mitigate EULEX's staffing concerns and allow the Kosovo authorities to grow into the job alongside EULEX personnel. Later, after Kosovo judges and prosecutors start taking the lead, EULEX could retreat to its more preferred monitoring, mentoring, and advising role. Dean made clear that EULEX has not yet signed on to this plan and is still looking for alternatives. COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) EULEX's initial deployment has been successful, particularly the police component, with neither large-scale protests nor significant resistance. We now need to see EULEX focus on how it intends to operate, and thus are pushing EULEX to interpret its mandate as broadly as possible. Failure to do so will open the door for UNMIK to return to the scene - or for the Kosovo government prematurely to take on duties and responsibilities that conditions on the ground in the north and in the Serb enclaves at this time do not support. If, as with the case of the north Mitrovica courthouse, EULEX interprets its mandate as both narrow and technical, we will face problems in returning judicial institutions there. As EULEX ponders its role, Belgrade is already testing its resolve, for example, by forwarding requests for visits by Serbian officials to Kosovo only to UNMIK. We can expect further probes and tests in the coming weeks and months, especially as Belgrade insists on the implementation of the so-called Six Points. YAZDGERDI