KOSOVO: EULEX DEPLOYMENT GOING WELL ENOUGH, BUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000646

SIPDIS

EPT FOR EUR, EUR/SCE, DRL, INL, AND S/WCI, NSC FOR
HELGERSON, USUN FOR SGEE, USOSCE FOR AHYDE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL EAID KV UNMIK
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: EULEX DEPLOYMENT GOING WELL ENOUGH, BUT
MANDATE UNCLEAR

Classified By: Charge Tom Yazdgerdi for Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).


1. (C) Summary: Since December 9, the beginning date of its
mission, EULEX continues to deploy throughout Kosovo without
meeting any significant protest or resistance. As of
December 22, EULEX had 1,241 police officers on the ground,
of which 23 were posted in north Mitrovica, plus two
strengthening platoons of 30 to 35 officers each at Gates 1
and 31, on the problematic order with Serbia. EULEX Customs
is proceeding with plans to increase staffing and will,
through a series of careful steps, begin transforming these
gates into fully functional border crossings. On December
20, EULEX Customs deployed the first six members of its
Reinforcement Task Force to strengthen its presence on the
Kosovo-Serbia border. The EULEX Justice Component has also
deployed nine personnel to the north Mitrovica District
Courthouse, the site of violence last March. While these are
positive developments, our sources within EULEX and elsewhere
tell us the organization has not yet come to grips with its
mandate, particularly with regard to customs and justice
issues. EULEX's clear preference appears to be a narrow
technical role that seeks to avoid difficult political
issues. We are encouraging EULEX to adopt a broader and more
expansive understanding of its mission in Kosovo, since
failure to do so - for example, with regard to the north
Mitrovica courthouse - will only open the door for UNMIK to
assume an unwanted and continuing role in rule-of-law
activities. End Summary

EULEX POLICE
--------------


2. (SBU) Three weeks after EULEX initially deployed its
mission throughout Kosovo, the major part of which is police,
the situation remains calm, with no physical hostility
directed against its personnel. Of the three main components
of the EULEX mission, police deployment has gone the
smoothest and is the most advanced. Nevertheless, there has
been some violence directed against EULEX (and UNMIK)
property, mainly vehicles. The first incident occurred on
December 13, in the town of Zvecan, in north Kosovo. The
driver's side rear window was smashed, and there was a five
millimeter puncture in the driver's door frame, possibly
caused by a slingshot or airgun. Since then, 46 tires of 16
UNMIK and 10 EULEX vehicles in Pristina have been slashed.
Additionally, on December 21 in Peja, two EULEX vehicles had
their tires slashed, a mirror damaged, and anti-EULEX
comments scrawled on them. All of the vehicles were empty,
and there were no injuries. Rumors of possible protests by
Kosovo Serbs at the problematic border crossings of Gates 1
and 31 on December 15 never came to pass, and we have not
seen any protests directed at EULEX anywhere in Kosovo, since
the deployment began.


3. (SBU) EULEX Police continue to add to their numbers: on
December 15, EULEX received an additional 61 police officers,
including the last of the U.S. contingent (80 police in all).
They completed their orientation training on December 18,
and everyone deployed throughout Kosovo on December 19. The
61 new officers mark the last increase in EULEX police
numbers until January 12, when the next orientation class
will take place. Of the projected 1,390 civilian police
officers that will mark EULEX's full staffing, 1,241 are on
the ground and working across Kosovo. This total includes
460 officers in four Formed Police Units (FPU),specialized
units responsible for crowd and riot control, provided by
Poland, France, Romania, and Italy.


4. (SBU) The French FPU is assigned to support EULEX
operations in northern Kosovo and, while based in south
Mitrovica, maintains support platoons of 30-35 officers each
at Gates 1 and 31. EULEX currently staffs an additional 18
Police Officers throughout northern Kosovo as follows:

- north Mitrovica 3 Officers
- Zubin Potok 2 Officers
- Leposavic 2 Officers

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- Zvecan 3 Officers
- Gate 1 5 Officers
- Gate 31 3 Officers

EULEX Customs
--------------


5. (C) On December 18, Ambassador discussed EULEX's plans for
Customs staffing and revenue collection at Gates 1 and 31
with Paul Acda, Head of the EULEX Customs Component (and
former UNMIK Head of Customs). Ambassador urged him to use
EULEX's mandate as a technical mission to engage Belgrade in
solving the difficulties that would arise once revenue
collection began. Ambassador noted that failure on EULEX's
part to engage Belgrade would permit UNMIK to begin
discussions with Belgrade on this subject, undermining
EULEX's authority and possibly leading to an agreement that
would be neither technically feasible nor politically
appropriate. Acda agreed, but noted that he needed the
support of EULEX Head of Mission Yves de Kermabon to function
in this manner.


6. (C) In the shorter term, Acda said he saw a gradual
evolution, as EULEX assumes responsibility for operating
Gates 1 and 31 around the clock, beginning in January. Acda
laid out what he saw as three initial phases that would be
needed to get EULEX controlling commercial traffic:

- Phase one, or initial deployment, saw EULEX personnel
staff Gates 1 and 31 from 0800 to 2000 and perform limited
activity, such as logging vehicles that entered during those
hours. They did not inspect documents or control the entry
of commercial traffic.

- Phase two, which commenced on December 20, had EULEX
deploy the first six members of its Reinforcement Task Force
(RTF) to the border. At full strength - expected in January
- the RTF will consist of 33 EULEX international customs
officers who will perform the same limited activity described
above. As more RTF officers enter rotation, EULEX will start
24-hour monitoring at the border crossings.

- During Phase three, tentatively scheduled for mid-January,
the RTF would begin controlling commercial traffic, including
logging relevant documents and driver license data as
vehicles crossed the border. Officers would also inform
drivers to proceed to the Trepca Customs Terminal located in
south Mitrovica. Failure to follow the instructions, they
would be warned, could result in punitive legal action. The
notification on the border would also warn drivers that
Kosovo reserves the right to assess appropriate fees at a
later date.


7. (C) Acda added that hopes to begin collecting revenue by
mid-February 2009, though he cautioned that this will require
both permission from de Kermabon and an assessment of the
overall security environment. He said he recognized that the
issue of revenue collection and distribution is a delicate
issue and would involve at least an understanding with
Belgrade on where the revenues would go. By January 2009, he
went on, Acda hoped to see Kosovo Serbs working alongside
EULEX in manning the gates. In 2010, in a final stage, Acda
expected to see Kosovo Serbs, with international supervision,
staffing the gates and working within a Kosovo institutional
framework.

EULEX Justice Component
--------------


8. (C) EULEX's justice component is still evolving, and the
mission is facing its most troublesome task confronting what
to do with regard to the courthouse in north Mitrovica, the
site of violent protest last March. In the mission's first
week, EULEX deployed nine personnel to the courthouse, who
have been focusing on organizing records. They are not
involved in any legal activity, as Bob Dean (protect),
outgoing head of UNMIK's Department of Justice, told us in a

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December 24 meeting. He noted that UNMIK does not want
overlapping authority, and it would only handover cases to
EULEX when it actually vacates the building.


9. (SBU) Our sources tell us that UNMIK wants to wrap up its
responsibilities at the north Mitrovica courthouse on January
15, but the UNMIK-to-EULEX transfer is the topic of ongoing
discussion. Riccardo Maia, EULEX advisor to the Minister of
Justice, told us December 23 that EULEX is reluctant to take
control of the courthouse, arguing that it has neither
UNMIK's mandate nor its staffing levels. As an alternative,
EULEX raised with Minister of Justice Kelmendi the
possibility of the MOJ or the Kosovo Judicial Council (KJC)
directing the court's operations. Kelmendi was agitated that
EULEX, after months of planning, only now approached the MOJ
with such a plan, and she responded that the MOJ is not ready
to assume such a responsibility. (Comment: Formal
responsibility for the courts lies with the KJC, which does
not report to the Minister. In the past, the KJC has
expressed its interest in asserting authority over the
courthouse even though conditions, on our view, are
definitely not yet acceptable for a Kosovo government
institution to operate freely. End Comment.)


10. (C) Dean, who in February will move over to EULEX as War
Crimes Prosecutor, agreed with Kelmendi's contention and was
highly critical of EULEX's effort to sidestep the issue. He
outlined a plan to us on December 24 where EULEX would take
control of the courthouse on January 15 and start
transporting KJC employees to run day-to-day operations under
EULEX authority and protection. He noted that this would
mitigate EULEX's staffing concerns and allow the Kosovo
authorities to grow into the job alongside EULEX personnel.
Later, after Kosovo judges and prosecutors start taking the
lead, EULEX could retreat to its more preferred monitoring,
mentoring, and advising role. Dean made clear that EULEX has
not yet signed on to this plan and is still looking for
alternatives.

COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) EULEX's initial deployment has been successful,
particularly the police component, with neither large-scale
protests nor significant resistance. We now need to see
EULEX focus on how it intends to operate, and thus are
pushing EULEX to interpret its mandate as broadly as
possible. Failure to do so will open the door for UNMIK to
return to the scene - or for the Kosovo government
prematurely to take on duties and responsibilities that
conditions on the ground in the north and in the Serb
enclaves at this time do not support. If, as with the case
of the north Mitrovica courthouse, EULEX interprets its
mandate as both narrow and technical, we will face problems
in returning judicial institutions there. As EULEX ponders
its role, Belgrade is already testing its resolve, for
example, by forwarding requests for visits by Serbian
officials to Kosovo only to UNMIK. We can expect further
probes and tests in the coming weeks and months, especially
as Belgrade insists on the implementation of the so-called
Six Points.

YAZDGERDI