KOSOVO: SERBS MOSTLY WANT TO STAY, BUT UNHCR HAS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000061 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR, EUR/SCE, DRL, INL, AND S/WCI, NSC FOR BRAUN, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER, OPDAT FOR ACKER E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2018 TAGS: PGOV PINR PREF PHUM SOCI KV UNMIK SUBJECT: KOSOVO: SERBS MOSTLY WANT TO STAY, BUT UNHCR HAS CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR POPULATION FLOWS Classified By: COM Tina S. Kaidanow for reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: From our contacts with Kosovo Serb leaders -- and barring the outbreak of violence -- it appears that most of Kosovo's Serbs will stay here after independence is declared. There are several factors influencing this: the lack of better options for Kosovo Serbs outside Kosovo, the international community's efforts to provide reassurance and security, and the Serbian Government's continued (and planned expansion of) financial support for Serb communities. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has long planned for potential population flows in the event of status determination. In the event of violence, UNHCR estimates that up to 86,000 Kosovo Serbs could leave their homes, most of whom would come from the southern enclaves. UNHCR has taken the lead among a number of organizations, including the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC),to coordinate refugee response plans, and has stockpiled food and non-food items, in addition to planning for shelter. UNHCR has also coordinated closely with KFOR, which, along with the Kosovo Police Service (KPS),is responsible for providing security in the event of a large-scale population movement. We are confident in UNHCR's planning, and we will continue to work with them to ensure that the international community is prepared to respond, if necessary, to any population flows. END SUMMARY. Serbs Likely to Stay ¶2. (C) All of the Kosovo Serb contacts with whom USOP has met in recent weeks have told us that they expect most of Kosovo's Serbs to remain in Kosovo when independence comes, regardless of the fact that no Kosovo Serb supports independence as a concept. More moderate or apolitical Serbs, such as Father Sava Janjic of the Visoki Decani monastery, tell us that a swift resolution of Kosovo's status, even if it will mean independence, is preferable to continued uncertainty. More hard-line Serbs, such Milan Ivanovic and Nebojsa Jovic of the hard-line Serb National Council in Mitrovica, also appear intent on staying, albeit with a different outlook. They expect the Serbian Government to provide assistance as they solidify a Kosovo Serb existence and set of institutions entirely separate from those of Kosovo Albanians. At a February meeting at the Serbian Ministry for Kosovo, State Secretary for Kosovo Dusan Prorokovic described to poloffs from Embassy Belgrade and USOP the Ministry's plans for enhancing the economic sustainability of Kosovo Serb enclaves south of the Ibar river. Prorokovic reiterated what Ministry officials have mentioned in public several times in recent months - namely, that funds will be spent to help Kosovo Serbs stay in place. (Note: Embassy Belgrade will report septel on recent Kosovo-related developments, including this meeting, in more detail. End Note.) Violence the Key Factor ¶3. (C) One critical factor that would change Serbs' determination to stay is violence. It is taken for granted among nearly all Kosovo Serbs that some level of violence will accompany independence. For most with whom we have spoken, the only question is about the degree of violence and the nature of the international response. Some Kosovo Serb political leaders, such as Strpce CEO Radica Grbic-Janicevic, have said they are determined to stay as long as the expected incidents are contained. For their part, KFOR and the PISG have engaged in fairly intensive public outreach efforts to reassure Kosovo Serbs that they will do their utmost to keep them safe regardless of upcoming political events. UNHCR Planning ¶4. (C) The Pristina office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) takes the lead in planning for any potential population flows. UNHCR's planning is close-hold; UNHCR Kosovo head Martin Loftus has emphasized to us that UNHCR is not in the business of predicting the political outcome of PRISTINA 00000061 002 OF 003 the status process. However, UNHCR did update its refugee contingency plan in December 2007 in response to the developing political situation. (Note: USOP has forwarded this plan to EUR/SCE and have followed up with UNHCR and other key actors to enhance our understanding of the international community's plans to handle any population movements resulting from Kosovo's independence. End Note.) Both UNHCR and the ICRC told us on February 5 that, based on their numerous contacts in the field, they concur that most Kosovo Serbs will try to stay after a declaration of independence. UNHCR planning ¶5. (C) UNHCR planning accounts for three possible final status outcomes - independence within current boundaries, independence with partition, and some form of "territorial autonomy" for Kosovo within Serbia. All three scenarios are expected to trigger at least some population movement. Although it will not make official judgments about the political situation, prudent planning means that UNHCR now considers the first scenario the most likely outcome, and has added a potential influx of Albanians from southern Serbia as part of its planning for this scenario. In this case, the maximum number of beneficiaries UNHCR anticipates inside Kosovo would number around 51,000. UNHCR tells us it is important to distinguish this number - beneficiaries requiring assistance - from the total number of those who might move, not all of whom would require or seek assistance. ¶6. (C) The UNHCR Contingency Plan envisions three different types of population movement under the first scenario described above. All three types could happen simultaneously. The first type involves movement of a large number of at-risk minorities, particularly Kosovo Serbs, to Serbia proper and, to a lesser extent, toward the borders of Montenegro and Macedonia. UNHCR estimates the maximum number of people involved in this type of movement at 86,000. The second type - internal movements within Kosovo's boundaries to other minority enclaves - is estimated to involve around 31,000 people. The third type is a new addition: a movement of up to 20,000 ethnic Albanians from the Presevo Valley area of southern Serbia into Kosovo. In all three cases, maximum numbers would be reached only with an outbreak of widespread violence. These estimates are based on UNHCR's field presence, which keeps track of attitudes among populations it deems vulnerable to displacement. Planning for Shelter ¶7. (C) Based on past experience with Kosovo population movements, UNHCR estimates that 10 percent of the displaced population in any scenario will require shelter in temporary and collective centers, while an additional 40 percent will require accommodation with a host family (friends or relatives). UNHCR Kosovo head Loftus assured us in several recent meetings that current stocks of food, non-food items (firewood, etc.),and emergency funding are more than adequate for UNHCR to meet this anticipated demand for assistance. Planning for Food ¶8. (C) UNHCR anticipates that 50 percent of persons displaced under scenario one will also require food assistance. To this end, it has amassed emergency food stocks which can feed 5,000 people for 30 days, and has the capacity to provide greater assistance if there is additional need. It has also coordinated its plans with other actors, all of whom have their own contingency plans for feeding refugees. The United Nations World Food Program (WFP) is one such actor, and is prepared to provide assistance from its warehouse in Italy in case of longer-term population displacement. UNHCR reported to us on February 5 that in addition to its field offices in vulnerable areas, it plans to use mobile teams which can serve as reinforcements, where necessary. PRISTINA 00000061 003 OF 003 ICRC Preparations ¶9. (C) In addition, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has pre-positioned food parcels for 5,970 people (along with non-food items),in coordination with UNHCR. The ICRC has told us that it will work through its local affiliate organizations - both the Serbian and Albanian Red Cross - to assist Serbs and Albanians in their respective areas. ICRC is also prepared to send in additional staff to assist its Kosovo office, if necessary. On and around the actual day of independence, ICRC plans to deploy field teams to every enclave and settlement where it has pre-positioned materials in order to keep a close watch on any population movements. Loftus told us that he considers ICRC a critical partner, saying that ICRC planning complements UNHCR efforts since ICRC is not limited in planning only for those on the move, but can assist people who choose to stay in their homes, but require assistance. Protection ¶10. (C) The question of protecting refugees on the move is also of high importance. While KFOR emphasizes that the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) has primary responsibility in this area, our interlocutors have stressed that KFOR will react in swift fashion to any obstruction of the freedom of movement, with the goal of allowing UNHCR, ICRC, and other actors to help refugees. KFOR's focus in this regard would be on Kosovo's main roads, on which any larger-scale population movements would take place. KFOR emphasizes that any threat of violence against vulnerable populations will be dealt with. UNHCR reports that it stays in constant communication with KFOR on both the central and local levels to make certain KFOR is aware of its plans. ¶11. (C) COMKFOR POLAD Romuald Pichard has explained to us the thinking that informs KFOR's position. In the event of larger-scale population movements, KFOR does not wish to be seen in the media as escorting Serbs out of Kosovo and thus appearing to compel or expedite their departure. He described an "over-the-hill" stance, by which KFOR forces would shadow groups of displaced persons, ready to intervene as soon as needed in the case of a security threat. COMMENT ¶12. (C) Although it is impossible to predict whether or how many Kosovo Serbs will depart Kosovo after independence, it has been our consistent take that most Kosovo Serbs will remain. In addition, the effect of the international community's efforts to reassure Kosovo Serbs that they can stay and live safely in an Ahtisaari Plan-supervised Kosovo appears to overlap with the financial support from the Serbian government. While no one should mistake the true motivation of this support as simple altruism -- indeed, it is meant more to isolate Kosovo Serbs and keep them from integrating into Kosovo's economy and society -- this combination of factors makes a mass departure of Kosovo Serbs unlikely. ¶13. (C) Despite its low likelihood, it should be emphasized that any large outflow of Kosovo Serbs is certain to be the result of violence, which would challenge the resources of KFOR and the KPS. In the event that such an outflow does occur, UNHCR's extensive experience in Kosovo and its close cooperation with partner organizations lend strong credibility to its contingency planning. We will continue to work with UNHCR and ICRC to ensure that they have the support they need, not only to handle potential population flows, but to assist in their coordination with KFOR and KPS regarding security matters. END COMMENT. ¶14. (C) Regional Refugee Coordinator reviewed and concurred with this cable. KAIDANOW