KOSOVO: VISIT OF EUR A/S FRIED NOVEMBER 17-18

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRISTINA 000582 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, EUR/ACE, NSC FOR HELGERSON USUN FOR GEE E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV KV SUBJECT: KOSOVO: VISIT OF EUR A/S FRIED NOVEMBER 17-18 Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Tina S. Kaidanow for reasons 1. 4(b)(d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Over the course of two days in Pristina November 17-18, 2008, EUR A/S Daniel Fried engaged the Government of Kosovo (GOK) leadership on establishing conditions for the full deployment of the EU's rule of law mission in Kosovo (EULEX). Discussions were difficult and held in a tense political atmosphere, with the political opposition seeking opportunities to weaken the government and civil society poised to demonstrate widely in protest of the "six-point" paper negotiated between the UN and Serbia. A/S Fried's message to Kosovo leaders was blunt: EULEX deployment to all of Kosovo had to proceed promptly; whatever concerns the Kosovars had with the "six-points," they must commit to working with the U.S. and the EU in implementing EULEX arrangements, including elements of the "six-points"; and, if they agreed to work with us, we could in turn work with the UN and EU to give the Kosovars commitments that the process of UN "reconfiguration" to EULEX would proceed in close consultation and coordination with them. In line with an agreed approach worked out with A/S Fried, the GOK publicly committed to support EULEX deployment according to its EU mandate of February 4 and formally rejected the "six-points," but nevertheless agreed to cooperate with the UN and EU in the transition process and in implementing the EULEX mandate. End Summary. ¶2. (C) In his first meeting with President Sejdiu, Prime Minister Thaci, Foreign Minister Hyseni and Deputy Prime Minister Kuci, A/S Fried, joined by the Ambassasdor and Maj. General Paul Schafer (Director of Strategy, Policy, and Assessments, U.S. European Comman) laid down the clear marker that together we needed to find a way for the EU's rule of law mission (EULEX) to deploy throughout Kosovo, including -- signally -- in the north. A/S Fried emphasized that he was not in Kosovo to force the GOK to accept the "six-points," but he needed the GOK to trust the U.S., as they have in the past, on difficult compromises that would ultimately benefit Kosovo and its people. President Sejdiu and PM Thaci reiterated their firm commitment to the deployment of EULEX and their absolute rejection of the "six-points," arguing repeatedly that Kosovo had never been adequately consulted in the negotiation process, only presented with a "fait accomplis." Even two weeks ago, Thaci suggested, there was still room for discussion. Now, given the political climate in Kosovo, the public outcry against the "six-points," and the popular belief that the UN drafted this document deliberately to undermine Kosovo's sovereignty, the government had to remain firm in its repudiation. ¶3. (C) Explaining that there was no chance of opening the "six-points" to further negotiation because the Quint had agreed to them, A/S Fried presented the GOK with several formulations of language for possible inclusion in the UNSYG report. The language, he noted, would make clear Kosovo's rejection of the "six-points" and present the UN with the imperative of consulting closely with Kosovo authorities on their implementation. In essence, Fried explained, the "six-point" language would no longer be fully controlling but would be "filtered and bracketed," and ultimately interim in nature in any case. ¶4. (C) After more than an hour of discussion which included a 20 minute break for the GOK to consult privately, the GOK objections to the inclusion of the "six-points" in the UNSYG report remained unchanged. The bottom line for the GOK was its fear that the "six-points" represented a new mandate for EULEX, separate and distinct from what was described in the European Council's joint action of February 4, 2008, and that such a mandate would permit Belgrade a level of involvement in Kosovo's affairs that it had not enjoyed even prior to independence. Unless they could be assured that inclusion of the GOK's explicit rejection of the "six-points" negated their operative nature, the Kosovars noted, they could not allow even the suggestion that the GOK tacitly or otherwise accepted that language. PRISTINA 00000582 002 OF 004 ¶5. (C) Wanting desperately to avoid a scenario in front of the press in which President Sejdiu and Prime Minister Thaci would be seen as saying "no" to the U.S. and more importantly to Dan Fried personally, they agreed to meet with A/S Fried again the next morning to continue looking for a solution. In remarks to the press following the meeting, A/S Fried stressed that the U.S. continued its strong support for Kosovo as a sovereign nation; that as such, Kosovo had the right to its position on the "six-points," though the U.S. felt that the document had been misinterpreted and was not harmful to Kosovo; and that constructive discussions with the Kosovo government would continue in an effort to find a way forward. Meeting with Quint, EULEX and ICO -------------- ¶6. (C) Following the meeting, A/S Fried, Ambassador, ICO/EUSR Feith and British Ambassador Andy Sparkes discussed possible language for inclusion in the UNSYG report that would address Kosovo's concerns on sovereignty and its fear about the implementation of the six points. Feith also agreed to join A/S Fried and the Ambassador in the meeting the following day with Sejdiu and Thaci as a representative of the EU. The small group agreed that anything they would be able to get from the GOK would be taken directly by Fried to UN Under Secretary for Peacekeeping Alain Le Roy, who was outside Geneva at a retreat for UN officials. During a dinner session with the above participants as well as local Quint reps and EULEX Head of Mission Yves de Kermabon, de Kermabon told the group that he was against a partial deployment of EULEX, especially if there were any sort of continuing UNMIK presence which would confuse the lines of authority in police, justice and customs. He expressed his own concerns about the "six-points," wondering whether a sunset clause would be built in, and he said he planned to visit UN DPKO the following week to lay down his conditions for EULEX deployment. Second Round with GOK -------------- ¶7. (C) In the second meeting with the GOK on November 18, A/S Fried was joined by ICR/EUSR Pieter Feith for the EU. The meeting, scheduled for one hour, lasted for over three. Picking up where they left off the day before, A/S Fried told the GOK that a stalemate was not an acceptable outcome for these talks. Stalemate would ensure the failure of the EULEX mission and would lead to Kosovo's isolation from the EU and the U.S. He reiterated that he needed to have an agreement for deployment of EULEX throughout Kosovo. Making it clear that he could not control the contents of the UNSYG's Report, he laid out the elements that would make the report workable for all parties: Kosovo's explicit acceptance of EULEX; the "six-points" in some form; Kosovo's explicit rejection of the "six-points"; language acceptable to both the EU and UN which would indicate implementation of the "six-points" would be on the basis of consultation and coordination with Kosovo. ¶8. (C) Feith supported A/S Fried's position, saying the GOK needed to shift the focus of its discussion away from the "six-points" to the common interest of full deployment of EULEX. He assured the GOK that the mandate of EULEX was based on the February 4, 2008 joint action by the European Council, and that it could not change without another such agreement. Feith also confirmed that part of the EULEX mandate was to implement the Ahtisaari Plan, despite the lack of overt reference to the Plan in the Council's Joint Action. ¶9. (C) After nearly three hours of discussion, A/S Fried told Sejdiu and Thaci that continuing to say "no" was not an acceptable response to the favorable language and many assurances offered by the U.S. and EU on the "six-points" and deployment of EULEX. The GOK had to give the U.S. and EU something to work with when talking to the UN. Again, the PRISTINA 00000582 003 OF 004 fear of angering the U.S. and the risk of isolation from the EU forced the GOK to lean forward. After reiterating their concern that the "six-points" opened a door for future interference in Kosovo's sovereign issues by Belgrade, and worrying about how they would present the outcome of the report to the Kosovo public in a way that does not end in a political firestorm or worse, Sejdiu and Thaci asked whether Kosovo would be permitted to insert its position into the report. After a 15 minute consultation, the GOK came back with four points representing its position on EULEX deployment. Before facing the press, Thaci asked whether there were any way to remove the "six-points" entirely from the text of the UNSYG report, which would be their strong preference, though he did not propose to say this publicly. A/S Fried said he would faithfully convey the request to the UN, though he could not make assurances in this regard. After expressing the Kosovars' continuing deep confidence in U.S. support for Kosovo, Thaci reiterated his support for EULEX and commitment to doing what was necessary to get it deployed throughout Kosovo. ¶10. (C) A/S Fried promised to take the results of these discussion directly to UN U/S Alain Le Roy in Montreux that day and work to have the report reflect unambiguously Kosovo's position and the fact that any implementation of the "six-points" would happen only with close and continuous cooperation and consultation with the GOK. The Four Points -------------- ¶11. The four points offered by the Government of Kosovo in the press statement following their meeting with A/S Fried on November 17: -- 1)The GOK supports the early deployment of EULEX throughout the entire territory of Kosovo based on the mandate as stipulated by: ---the European Council Joint Action of February 4, 2008 ---the Ahtisaari Plan ---the Declaration of Independence ---invitations signed by the President on February 17, 2008 and August 8, 2008 for EULEX to deploy ---the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo ---laws of the Republic of Kosovo -- 2) Institutions of the Republic of Kosovo refuse in its entirety the "six-points" document. -- 3) Institutions of the Republic of Kosovo will cooperate with EULEX in its deployment throughout the territory of Kosovo based on the mandate as outlined in point 1 above, while respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Kosovo. -- 4)Institutions of the Republic of Kosovo, as always, will continue close cooperation with the US, EU and NATO. Meeting with Political Leaders -------------- ¶12. (C) Following the final press statement with the President and Prime Minister, A/S Fried met briefly with 15 leaders of the political parties represented in the Assembly. Included in the meeting were Assembly President Jacob Krasniqi, Bajram Rexhepi, Enver Hohxaj (all PDK),Lutfi Haziri, Eqrem Kreziu, Sabri Hamiti (all LDK),Ibrahim Makolli, Ibrahim Gashi (both AKR),Nexhat Daci, Lulzim Zeneli, Besa Gaxherri (all LDD),and Ramush Haradinaj, Ardian Gjini, Ahmet Isufi, Gylnaze Syla (all AAK). ¶13. (C) A/S Fried appealed to the assembled leaders for support in the deployment of EULEX and to help calm the tensions which have risen recently over the "six-points." He reiterrated the U.S.'s support for Kosovo, which has been unwavering, respect for Kosovo's sovereignty, and PRISTINA 00000582 004 OF 004 acknowledgement of Kosovo's rejection of the "six-points." He asked them to have confidence in the U.S. and EU's support for Kosovo's sovereignty and territorial integrity. ¶14. (C) PDK and LDK representatives both expressed their support for the deployment of EULEX while maintaining their staunch rejection of the "six-points." Ramush Haradinaj (AAK) asked pointedly whether the "six-points" would be included in the UNSYG Report and if there was a timetable for their implementation. In response, A/S Fried reiterated that the "six-points" would not be a new mandate for EULEX and that Kosovo's rejection of the points would also be part of the record. As for a timeline, Fried said the sooner EULEX deployed, the sooner the "six-points" would disappear. ¶15. (U) A/S Fried cleared this cable. KAIDANOW