KOSOVO: DEMARCHE TO KOSOVO LEADERSHIP DELIVERED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000056 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR, EUR/SCE, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL UNMIK KV SUBJECT: KOSOVO: DEMARCHE TO KOSOVO LEADERSHIP DELIVERED REF: A. STATE 6162 ¶B. PRISTINA 24 ¶C. PRISTINA 28 ¶D. PRISTINA 34 ¶E. PRISTINA 36 ¶F. PRISTINA 37 ¶G. PRISTINA 38 ¶H. PRISTINA 40 ¶I. PRISTINA 55 Classified By: COM TINA KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) COM delivered reftel A points in a series of meetings with President Sejdiu, Prime Minister Thaci, Finance Minister Ahmet Shala, and other Kosovo interlocutors, including opposition figures, Kosovo Protection Corps leaders, and minority (Serb as well as non-Serb) representatives, as appropriate. ¶2. (C) In repeated meetings with the President and PM, COM stressed the urgent need for outreach to Serb communities, including visible and active measures to improve the lives of Serb community members, with real budgetary support. Both the President and the PM have made several stops in Serb enclaves, the latest being a February 5 visit by PM Thaci to a Serb returnee family in Ljipjan (central Kosovo). PM Thaci conducted a press conference in the Serb-majority village of Caglavica shortly after his government was formed; despite a curious and occasionally hostile Serb press reaction, the message was one of regard for Serb concerns. ¶3. (C) USOP is working with the government to finalize a set of Serb-oriented proposals that can be unveiled quickly, and Finance Minister Shala has indicated to COM and to USAID director that a budget line in the newly reconfigured 2008 budget will be devoted to such projects. One factor that must be taken into account in such planning is increased pressure from Belgrade on local Serb officials to sever all contacts with the Kosovo government; this makes it necessary to find third party intermediaries, possibly including USAID and other donors, to deliver programs and assistance funded by the government. Initial contacts with Serb NGOs has indicated that some number of them might be willing to accept such assistance, provided the Kosovo government did not seek too overt a role. The PM is also discussing with USOP his ideas regarding the establishment of an Office for Communities, which would likely have both programmatic responsibilities and an advocacy role for Serbs and other �A;communities. ¶4. (C) Messages on the need for restraint and preventing all violence directed against minority communities have been delivered continuously by COM and other USOP officers to the PM, President, KPC leadership, war veterans, and opposition party representatives. COM has emphasized repeatedly that whatever provocations emanate from Serbia or from hardline Serb local officials, no/no retaliatory action or violence against Serb communities in Kosovo will be tolerated. In addition, USOP has been actively working through its Strategic Communications Group (reftels D and I) to ensure these messages reach the broadest possible spectrum of Kosovo citizens via local officials, the police, the KPC, KFOR liaison teams, NGOs and other networks. We have received unequivocal understanding of this message across the board; though no one precludes the possibility of incidents directed at minorities, there is an active commitment on the part of key Kosovar interlocutors to try and prevent or isolate such incidents should they occur. The fruits of this outreach are already visible in joint public appearances by mayors and local police station commanders urging public responsibility during the coming weeks. Kosovo Protection Corps leaders were especially vehement with COM that they understand their role in encouraging restraint; KFOR has recently been working with KPC in Albanian-majority areas near Serb enclaves to ensure that KPC -- with the wide respect it enjoys among Albanians -- is proactively getting out the message of restraint. COM has also held a number of off-the-record sessions (two to three hours long each) with Kosovo print and PRISTINA 00000056 002 OF 002 broadcast editors to underscore their responsibility in maintaining a secure environment. ¶5. (C) USOP has been working quietly with the President and PM to help craft appropriate Declaration Day messages and ceremonial events that will reflect Kosovo's intention to look toward the future and to preserve its multi-ethnic character. These discussions will be ongoing in the next days. While Kosovo's new flag will not be officially chosen by the Assembly until Declaration Day or shortly thereafter, there are efforts underway to unofficially pre-select an appropriate flag and use these in government-sponsored celebrations on the day (assuming enough time is available), though private citizens are unlikely to be dissuaded from bringing out the ethnic Albanian flag and -- very likely -- the U.S. flag. Pictures of such flags or the euphoric and emotional reaction Kosovars will display upon the day of independence (which will undoubtedly be featured by some of the international media poised to descend upon Kosovo) should not take away from the determined effort being made by Kosovo's leadership to say and do the right things at this crucial moment in their history. They have shown fairly remarkable patience and restraint to this point, and we are encouraging them to show the same maturity as Kosovo enters a new and very challenging phase. KAIDANOW