KOSOVO SERBS: ISSUES OF CHURCH LAND, POLICE,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 PRISTINA 000435 SIPDIS DEPT FOR DRL, INL, EUR/SCE NSC FOR HELGERSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/19/2018 TAGS: PGOV PINR KV UNMIK SUBJECT: KOSOVO SERBS: ISSUES OF CHURCH LAND, POLICE, PARALLEL STRUCTURES, CORRUPTION CONTINUE TO SIMMER Classified By: CDA Tom Yazdgerdi for reasons 1.4 (b),(d). ¶1. (C) Summary. As the August vacation season draws to an end, several Kosovo Serb-related issues continue to simmer. In Decani, we now see a possible roadmap to a settlement of the land dispute between the monastery and the municipality. Our joint efforts with UNMIK to convince municipal officials to settle the case appear to be having some effect, and the Kosovo Trust Agency Special Chamber court may prove helpful in this case. In Gjakova/Djakovica, where the mayor has usurped another Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) site, we are working with the ICO to find a solution acceptable to both parties. In these and all SOC-related issues, we must still deal with hardline SOC Bishop Artemije Radosavljevic, who remains a factor despite his reportedly waning influence. In the Serb-majority enclave of Strpce, a parallel municipal government is keeping quiet (and avoiding provocation),even as it insists on its legitimacy. In the North, Serbs in the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) are not receiving consistent paychecks from either the Serbian government, which has reportedly stopped paying them, or the Kosovo government, which has promised them back pay but has not yet delivered. We are also informed that senior figures in the Serbian Interior Ministry (MUP) police, both inside and outside of the KPS, are still firmly in control of the security structures in the North, despite constant rumors of impending change. Finally, the Kosovo Serb Independent Liberal Party (SLS),which participates in Kosovo's Assembly and government, is embroiled in a corruption scandal at the Kosovo Ministry of Returns (MCR),led by SLS minister Boban Stankovic. KPS back pay and the MCR issues must be addressed swiftly in order to maintain the credibility of Kosovo institutions for Kosovo Serbs. We will follow up. End Summary. Church Land Issues: Decani... ¶2. (C) The Visoki Decani monastery's (Decani dQHhCh the monastery and the municipal government, which has assumed responsibility for the SOE claims, urging both sides to find a solution. Former Kosovo PM Ramush Haradinaj assured the Ambassador on July 30 that he would speak to Decani mayor Musa Berisha, a member of Haradinaj's AAK party, and ask him to find a solution to the problem. Since then, Berisha - who was publicly recalcitrant in late May, after UNMIK issued an executive decision restoring the monastery as the owner of the disputed land - has been more conciliatory. On August 13, the mayor repeatedly told poloff that "we must find a solution to this problem." Berisha, who had been the sole municipal official dealing with this issue, also invited several municipal employees and council members to the meeting in an effort to broaden their understanding of the issue. ¶3. (C) UNMIK Legal Advisor Ernst Tschoepke, who formerly worked for the KTA and who has followed this case for several years, joined poloff at the August 13 meeting to explain the legal issues in the case. His message to the municipal officials was that they should pursue a settlement out of court in lieu of trying to win a court judgment. The complexity of the claims involved make a predictable outcome uncertain, and the additional fact that the disputed land lies within the Decani monastery's Special Zoning Area (SZA) makes it virtually impossible that the SOEs could restart commercial functions, even if they were successful in court. In addition, Tschoepke joined poloff in urging the municipal government to maintain good relations with the monastery, keeping in mind the fact that the monastery's consent will be necessary for any kind of development or action within the SZA going forward. At the conclusion of the meeting, Mayor Berisha declared that he would meet the monastery leadership "but only with the U.S. Embassy present." PRISTINA 00000435 002 OF 005 ¶4. (C) The monastery is similarly ready to find a deal, although head monk Father Sava Janjic continues to abide by a Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) moratorium on contact with Kosovo government officials, at any level, and the ICO/EULEX missions. As Sava explained on August 13, "we (the SOC) absolutely cannot be seen having contact or making deals with any Albanians." Tschoepke, who also joined the meeting, advised Sava that a mediated settlement may still be possible in the context of the Special Chamber proceeding, during which the court would seek input from both sides and attempt to find a settlement. (Note: On August 15, Tschoepke told us that the Special Chamber judges had confirmed to him that they would be able to handle the case in that way. End Note). As things stand now, the monastery will present a settlement proposal to the Special Chamber when the court hears the case. This proposal involves the monastery securing uncontested ownership of the disputed land in question, which is adjacent to the monastery, and in return giving up undisputed parcels it owns in the middle of the town itself. ...and Gjakova ¶5. (C) We are also engaged in another church-related property problem in Gjakova/Djakovica. The property in question is the site of a Milosevic-era church partially destroyed in 1999 and then completely razed during the March 2004 riots, making it one of 35 SOC properties slated to be rebuilt under the rubric of the Council of Europe-led Reconstruction Implementation Commission (RIC). In recent months, Gjakova mayor Pal Lekaj (AAK) - without consulting the SOC or the RIC - ordered the site cleared and had a park constructed on it, covering up the foundation of the church building. This has provoked a continuing strong reaction from the Serbian government and hard-line elements in the SOC. In concert with the ICO, we have discussed the issue with Lekaj several times. As with the Decani case, we have asked for and obtained the intervention of Haradinaj as a means of convincing the mayor to reach a settlement. At our most recent meeting on August 7, Lekaj appeared willing to find a solution, and accepted the fact that the property belongs to the church. Working with Father Sava, we have informed the mayor that he must uncover the church's foundations and fence the property, albeit in a way that would preserve as much of the park as possible and allow continued access to it. ICO will work with the RIC to develop a detailed plan for the site, and expects to be in position to present it to the mayor in the next 2-3 weeks. Artemije Waning, But Still Dangerous ¶6. (C) During our August 13 conversation, Sava described continuing Kosovo-linked tensions within the SOC. Kosovo's head bishop, Artemije Radosvljevic, continues to be a hard-line opponent of Kosovo independence, the RIC, and inter-ethnic reconciliation in general. On August 19, Artemije's diocesan website published a condemnation of the situation in Gjakova/Djakovica, attacking the RIC and Bishop Teodosije Sibalic, who serves as SOC representative to the RIC and Abbott of Visoki Decani monastery. However, Sava reported that the SOC has decided that the "Kosovo Council," a group of bishops dealing with Kosovo-related matters, which includes Teodosije, will now deal with all SOC questions in Kosovo. Sava noted that this is a significant moderating change to the prior practice that allowed Artemije to deal with matters without significant involvement from the SOC's governing Synod. ¶7. (C) In a sign of what Sava considers Artemije's "waning influence," the Synod recently decided that Teodosije will be able to assign priests and monks to reoccupy RIC-rebuilt sites; Artemije has nominal authority in this matter and will be consulted first, but has refused to even consider reoccupying these churches, which he considers tainted by Kosovo government involvement. Handover of the keys to several RIC sites, including St. George's in Prizren, is PRISTINA 00000435 003 OF 005 anticipated at the end of August. According to Sava, the church hierarchy has little faith in Artemije's ability to safeguard SOC interests in Kosovo and has already decided on working through Teodosije to "bypass" Artemije. In Sava's opinion, Artemije's decision to condemn Serbian President Boris Tadic and his Democratic Party (DS) during the campaign before the May 11 Serbian parliamentary elections has damaged his standing with the Serbian government as well. Nonetheless, Sava warned that he and Teodosije remain vulnerable to Artemije's wrath if they are seen communicating with forbidden interlocutors. Stprce Still Quiet - For Now ¶8. (C) The situation in the Serb-majority enclave of Stprce remains stable for the time being. The decision of parallel mayor Zvonko Mihajlovic to re-open a checkpoint for construction materials outside the "weekend zone" near the ski resort of Brezovica caused a stir, but on August 4, USKFOR reported that conversations with Strpce's Albanian minority, including former Kosovo Liberation Army war veterans, revealed that the illegal construction in the weekend zone is as unpopular among Strpce's Albanians as it is with the municipality's Serbs. According to USKFOR, Strpce Albanians report that the Serb parallel government has to date done nothing to antagonize or provoke them, although they are dissatisfied that a parallel government is operating in their municipality. USKFOR also reports that senior Kosovo Police Service (KPS) officers in Pristina - all Kosovo Albanians - have sent messages to the parallel government via the Stprce KPS - composed largely of Serbs - that continued operation of the checkpoint, provided it does not involve passenger vehicle searches or other police activity, would not provoke a response from KPS. In a meeting with UK Ambassador on August 17, Strpce (parallel) deputy mayor Slavisa Staletovic, who served as deputy mayor in the previous (legal) municipal government, reportedly insisted that the parallel government did not want trouble but would continue to administer affairs to the extent possible. North: Where's The Money? ¶9. (C) Along with their colleagues in Strpce, Kosovo Serb KPS officers in the North have remained on the job, but they are having difficulties in receiving regular salaries from any source. At the order of the previous Serbian Minister for Kosovo Slobodan Samardzic, along with Dragan Delibasic, senior Serbian Interior Ministry (MUP) commander in the North, most of the northern Serb KPS closed their Kosovo-based bank accounts in the wake of independence on February 17. According to KPS Captain Ergin Medic (protect), the Serbian government MUP paid these officers 400 euro-per-month until June, but this was stopped after the new government was formed in Belgrade. Medic reports that the Serbian Government is considering paying these officers 150 euro per month in unemployment compensation instead, but this has yet to materialize. Since June, many of the same officers reopened their Kosovo-based accounts and have sought back pay from KPS headquarters in Pristina for the March through June period when they were on the job without accounts to receive their official KPS salaries. The KPS removed the "Republic of Kosovo" logo, which the Serbs found offensive, from the forms required to receive back pay. According to Medic, despite promises from KPS headquarters to do so, the back pay has yet to be disbursed. MUP Still Active, No Changes Yet ¶10. (C) During his conversation with poloff on August 12, Medic also reported that frequently-rumored changes to the MUP command structure in the North are slow to be realized. Delibasic, while slated for removal, continues to enjoy bureaucratic support within the Serbian Ministry of Interior, although he will apparently reach mandatory retirement age in December. According to Medic, northern Mitrovica's KPS station commander Milija "Piksi" Milosevic, also a MUP officer, continues to work to undermine the KPS, part of the PRISTINA 00000435 004 OF 005 overall Serbian strategy to undermine the rule of law and respect for the KPS in the North. This is aimed at creating an environment in which UNMIK would be more willing to accept the open return of Serbian MUP to the north. Medic also reports that he joined UNMIK recently in approaching the (parallel) municipal governments of Zubin Potok and Leposavic to propose setting up remote cameras at Gates 1 and 31 with video feeds to Kosovo Customs. The parallel authorities proposed that "municipal security officials" in the North have exclusive access to the camera feeds, which they also insisted not be sent to the KPS, the Kosovo Ministry of Interior, or anyone in Pristina. MCR Corruption Case ¶11. (C) The Serbs in the Independent Liberal Party (SLS), who have remained in the Kosovo Assembly and head two ministries in PM Thaci's cabinet, have been rocked in recent days by allegations of corruption at the Ministry of Communities and Returns (MCR). Minister Boban Stankovic (SLS) has become the subject of a government investigation into allegations of corruption at the MCR during his tenure (see Pristina Bullets from August 9 and 14 on this subject). SLS President Slobodan Petrovic, a member of the Assembly Presidency, along with Caucus Leader Bojan Stojanovic, told us on August 15 that they were seriously contemplating Stankovic's removal. They repeated their earlier assertions that they did not believe he was corrupt but were unsatisfied with his handling of the MCR, which they consider a key tool in their effort to convince Kosovo Serbs of the benefits of participation in Kosovo institutions. On August 18, Petrovic assured PM Thaci of the SLS's intent to deal with the allegations, and reported that Thaci told him in return that any action should await the release of a final audit report, expected the week ending of August 22. Petrovic told us August 19 that given the MCR's importance to his party, the SLS presidency will "collectively" manage the MCR going forward, regardless of who the minister is. Comment ¶12. (C) The SOC-related land issues must be resolved in order to clear the air of problems and generate some breathing room for church moderates to function in Kosovo. Solving them without the possibility of direct communication between Orthodox clerics and municipal officials has not and will not be easy, although we are guardedly optimistic that we at least have a way forward in the Decani case, by far the more complicated of the two. Although Sava and other moderate SOC clergy have continually resisted meeting the ICO out of fear of hard-line condemnation, there are signs that Serbian government officials may meet ICO officials. Deputy ICR Fletcher Burton told us August 18 that Serbian State Secretary for Kosovo Oliver Ivanovic told him that he would meet Burton in Mitrovica the week ending August 24. We have encouraged Ivanovic to do so. The situations in Strpce and the North remain stable, if unsatisfactory. In Strpce, we will try to engage parallel officials to resolve practical problems without recognizing their claims to legitimacy. Regarding the KPS, we have and will continue to strongly encourage the Kosovo Ministry of Interior to quickly resolve the back-pay issue, keeping in mind that the northern Serb KPS now appear to be off the Belgrade payroll. ¶13. (C) (cont'd). As previously reported, the situation at the MCR has been problematic for some time. The ministry has been plagued by corruption since its inception, and we have continually told the SLS that the MCR needs to be handled well. In our opinion, it is the main tool by which the Kosovo Serbs in the government can convince their brethren of the benefits of that participation. SLS leadership understands this and is cognizant of the need for effective action, whatever the outcome of the government investigation. However, Minister Stankovic's poor showing at the MCR over the last eight months has taken up valuable time that the hard-pressed SLS Serbs do not necessarily have. Going forward, we will refocus our efforts to assist them in making PRISTINA 00000435 005 OF 005 up this lost ground. YAZDGERDI