KOSOVO: DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND UN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRISTINA 000393 SIPDIS DEPT FOR DRL, INL, EUR/SCE NSC FOR HELGERSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2018 TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL UNMIK PREF KV SUBJECT: KOSOVO: DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND UN AGENCIES OVER RETURNS POINTS TO NEED FOR CHANGED APPROACH Classified By: Ambassador Tina S. Kaidanow for Reasons 1.4 (b),(d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Due to many factors over the past several months, the pace of Serb returns to Kosovo has slowed. There have also been growing problems between Kosovo Minister of Returns Boban Stankovic, an ethnic Serb, and the UN agencies chiefly responsible for returns in Kosovo -- the UN Development Program (UNDP) and the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). The disputes stem from disagreements between Stankovic and UNDP over who should control the budget of the Ministry for Communities and Returns (MCR),in addition to UNDP allegations of corruption and inexperience at the Ministry. For his part, Stankovic alleges conflicts of interest at UNDP and charges the agency with "obstruction" of his policies at the ministry. Communication between Stankovic and UNDP has been strained over the past three weeks, and the controversy has, unfortunately, spilled into the press. Our assessment of the situation is that while Stankovic does not always exhibit the best behavior, some of the points he makes on returns policy and the role of UNDP are well-taken. We also believe that UNDP, which in turn has not behaved well towards Stankovic, should adjust to new realities on the ground in Kosovo and take on an advisory rather than a management role in dealing with returns. We are working to try to salvage the relationship between the Ministry and UNDP, but the personalities involved make this challenging. End Summary. Slow Progress on Returns ¶2. (SBU) UNHCR official statistics show 215 returnees (49 of them Serbs) to Kosovo as of May 2008. This is well behind the pace of 2007, when 1799 people returned (including 277 Serbs) over the entire year. Most observers consider Kosovo's independence on February 17 and the resulting political tension as one cause of this drop. Other, more long-standing factors continue to apply, such as overall security concerns (some germane and some more perceptual), decreased donor funding to supplement limited government resources for returns, and lack of economic opportunity for returnees once they have come back. While this year's slow progress on returns was widely expected in the international community, given the politically tumultuous situation, other problems have emerged. The strained relationship between the Kosovo Minister for Returns and the UN agencies in Kosovo chiefly responsible for oversight and implementation - the UN Development Program (UNDP) and UNCHR -- has further slowed approval and implementation of returns programs. ¶3. (C) A dispute between Stankovic and the UN agencies has been brewing for several months. Complaints of UNDP, UNHCR, and certain UNMIK officials center around the Kosovo government's adjustment of the pre-independence budgeting policy at the MCR - a system in which UNDP had a considerable amount of authority to direct policy and spending at the Ministry. They have also complained to us privately that Stankovic is "rude" to them, routinely declines to appear at working group meetings with them, and generally resists their attempts to advise him. UNDP sources, including Kosovo mission head Frode Mauring, have alleged that Stankovic's behavior is indicative of corruption, although they have not provided any compelling evidence of this. For his part, Stankovic has strongly denied allegations of corruption while frequently complaining to us (most recently on July 1) about UNDP's heavy-handed control of his ministry. The previous budgeting system at the MCR required UNDP and UNHCR approval of ministry spending. This meant that UNDP allocated funding and, in many cases, implemented projects as well. Stankovic and his advisors from the Kosovo Serb Independent Liberal Party (SLS) have been consistently unhappy with the UN-formulated rules and standards applying to return projects, rules that only UNDP- or UNHCR-linked projects were able to conform with, in most cases. Stankovic has termed this a "conflict of interest," an assessment with which many other observers agree. (Note: These rules on the MCR budget were put in place after the first head of the MCR, Slavisa Petkovic, was dismissed on corruption charges at the end of PRISTINA 00000393 002.2 OF 004 ¶2006. End Note.). ¶4. (C) Another complaint from UNDP has been about the minister's lack of "qualification and experience" for the job, which, in addition to concerns about corruption, in their view, necessitates close supervision and involvement from international agencies. UNDP has taken these views to the press in the past, contributing to the deterioration of their relationship with Stankovic. Stankovic maintains that his lack of experience is not necessarily a problem; he says that, as Kosovo Serbs, he and other SLS members are better-placed to determine the best interests of their community. He also alleges that as an "outsider" not dependent on the UN system, he is better able to both reduce the cost of MCR projects and avoid failed returns projects. Stankovic often refers to expensive organized return projects from recent years (in which entire villages returned en masse) which have not met with lasting success, as the returnees often failed to stay in their rebuilt homes. In his estimation, UNDP overspends on returns projects and should concentrate on (more sustainable) individual returns instead. Other observers, including UNDP official Kim Vetting, have told us and the ICO that UNDP operating costs are often well above what is necessary. Vetting also considers Stankovic to have "good ideas" about adjusting policy direction on returns. ¶5. (C) Even before the issue hit the press (see para 6), Stankovic had decided in mid-June to cut off communication with UNDP and UNHCR. When asked by poloff July 1 whether future communication with the UN agencies would be possible, Stankovic replied that he would be open to it, "as long as they understand their roles" (i.e., that he now controls his own budget). UNDP and UNHCR have told us they are particularly nervous about a large amount of funding (3.7 million Euro, or approx. USD 5.8 million) allocated by the European Commission and UNDP for the Returns and Reintegration to Kosovo program in 2008, which will be spent through the MCR with its cooperation. Stankovic eventually signed the necessary MOU releasing these funds for use on July 7, although it is not clear he will agree to allow UNDP a high degree of control over them. The UNDP-sponsored "Spark PLUS" program also awaits Stankovic's approval; this would provide 1.8 million Euro (USD 2.8 million) for reconstruction of returnee homes. As of July 21, Stankovic had not signed the Spark PLUS MOU. Media Battles ¶6. (SBU) Further aggravating the situation, articles appeared July 13 in the Serbia-based dailies Blic and Kurir describing friction between Stankovic and the UN agencies. Under the headline "Kosovo government preventing return of the displaced," Blic quotes UNDP's Kim Vetting as saying that many factors - fear of independence, lack of funds, and "unpreparedness of those competent" for returns in the Kosovo government (i.e., MCR officials) - were contributing to the negligible number of Serbs returning to Kosovo in 2008. The Kurir article focused on Stankovic, under the headline "Thaci's Minister," a reference to the fact the Stankovic, a Serb, serves in the Kosovo government of PM Hashim Thaci. The minister openly discussed the fact that he had convinced Thaci to change MCR budget procedures and eliminate UNDP's role in controlling the budget, adding that UNDP had only "obstructed" his work with numerous rules and guidelines that the average returnee could not be expected to fulfill. Despite reacting angrily to the appearance of the media articles, Stankovic on July 16 accompanied UNDP and UNMIK to an event in Klina, and appeared ready to repair the frayed relationship. ¶7. (C) We asked Stankovic on July 14 what his plans were for the Ministry, excluding funds linked to cooperation with the UN agencies. He told us that the MCR's 2008 budget was 7.1 million Euro (USD 11.1 million). This, however, includes the 1.8 million devoted to Spark PLUS. Stankovic said the MCR would be able to support a total of 150 IDP families with the current PRISTINA 00000393 003.2 OF 004 budget. During a lengthier conversation on July 1, Stankovic described a 60-family returns project in the village of Laplje Selo near Pristina, which will cost approximately 2 million Euro (USD 3.1 million). He also discussed a 20-family project in Novo Brdo and another 18-family effort in Istog/Istok. Two million Euro of the MCR budget will be spent on community-related projects (vice being spent strictly on returnees). The MCR has received 330 applications for such projects from Kosovo municipalities and has selected 65 for implementation. Comment: New Approach Needed ¶8. (C) Despite his intentions, Minister Stankovic cannot hope to manage the MCR without assistance from the UN agencies, which possess the experience and technical knowledge necessary to pursue a successful returns policy. Improving on the disappointingly low number of Serb returns to Kosovo since 1999 requires cooperation with the UN and other international organizations. Although we have not seen evidence of corruption in the Ministry, Stankovic's sudden throwing off of international supervision is not reassuring to a donor community that watched the first two heads of the MCR - Slavisa Petkovic and Branislav Grbic - preside over an openly corrupt and ineffective institution. The Embassy, ICO, and others have urged Stankovic to use his ministerial position to help convince skeptical Kosovo Serbs that he and his SLS colleagues in the Kosovo government can help them. However, he has thus far not done so in any significant way. His decision to appear at the July 16 event in Klina with UNDP is a welcome step towards repairing that relationship. We will work to convince Stankovic to be more cooperative with his international partners, for the sake of Kosovo Serbs and for the benefit of his political party. ¶9. (C) The conduct of UNDP and other actors has also been far from exemplary. In speaking with the ICO, Department subject-matter experts in PRM, the NGO community, and others, we consistently hear that UNDP took the wrong approach with Stankovic from the start. There are few Kosovo Serbs who could walk into the complicated maze of international organizations, rules, and procedures surrounding returns in Kosovo and be expected to quickly understand them, or be truly effective without any significant control over the budget. UNDP's current plight (the delay and possible hiatus of the Spark PLUS program) is in part due to its early high-handedness with Stankovic and its assumption that it would continue to exercise control the MCR budget indefinitely. In our conversations with UNDP Kosovo head Frode Mauring, he has shown little inclination to adjust his approach, which essentially involves directing a government minister on how to spend his budget. UNDP's apparent proclivity towards using the media also inflames a sensitive (but vital) relationship it can ill-afford to lose. The UN agencies should adjust to a changing environment in which they no longer can play the lead role in the MCR. As donors, we will encourage them to modify their approach. ¶10. (C) Finally, some re-thinking of returns in general might benefit all stakeholders involved. Stankovic's point about the poor track record of organized returns is well-taken; USG assistance for Kosovo returns (through PRM) goes almost exclusively to individual returns, precisely because they have proven far more sustainable. Most observers we speak with outside UNDP and UNHCR agree that a change in focus might help make the limited funds available to help returns go farther and have a greater impact. We have found Stankovic to be knowledgeable about his ministry and project proposals, indicating that he has the potential to work fruitfully with international partners in reversing the negative trend in Serb returns. We are in close touch with both sides in this dispute and will continue to urge them to work together to find a new middle ground that would allow the returns process to move forward. We have also brought additional important stakeholders into the discussion, such as the ICO, OSCE, and other donor-country embassies, who concur with our conclusions on this issue and who are now working with us towards the same goal. PRISTINA 00000393 004.2 OF 004 KAIDANOW