SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF KOSOVO PRESIDENT AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L PRISTINA 000360 SIPDIS DEPT FOR S, P, EUR (FRIED, DICARLO) DEPT PLEASE PASS TO NSC (HELGERSON) FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY FROM THE CHIEF OF MISSION E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNMIK KV SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF KOSOVO PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER TO WASHINGTON JULY 18-21 Classified By: CDA TINA KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) Mr. President, Madame Secretary: It has been a difficult but in many ways successful five months since Kosovo declared its independence on February 17. Though we spent much time planning for the possibility of large-scale population flows after the declaration and took precautions lest the independence move sparked outright conflict between Kosovo and Serbia, none of this has taken place. Instead, with our strong support and encouragement, Kosovo has weathered a series of provocative and sometimes violent actions taken by Serb hardliners, demonstrating through patience and restraint that it is a responsible member of the international community and an eager aspirant for eventual inclusion in Euro-Atlantic institutions. Acknowledging Kosovo's achievements, 43 of the most important countries in Europe and elsewhere have recognized Kosovo, at a pace that is thus far satisfactory in comparison with other countries born under similar circumstances, but would undoubtedly benefit from continued pressure on allies and friends in the Middle East, Latin America and Asia. ¶2. (C) Kosovo's temperate line is in many ways due to the leadership of President Sejdiu and Prime Minister Thaci, two men of very different backgrounds and political sentiment who have chosen to make common cause at a critical time for Kosovo. The two formed a coalition government just prior to independence, an arrangement that has held steady despite historical animosities and lingering mistrust between their two parties. This visit and your visible endorsement of Kosovo's moderate approach will help fend off growing domestic criticism -- from dissatisfied members of their own governing coalition and from the vocal opposition -- that Kosovo leaders have not been assertive enough in establishing control over Kosovo's rebellious Serb-majority north or fending off Serbian encroachments on Kosovo sovereignty. ¶3. (C) And those encroachments may well persist, even under what we hope will be a new, pro-European government in Belgrade. The outgoing Serbian government under Prime Minister Kostunica has underwritten a policy of full ethnic separation in Kosovo, physically intimidating local Serbs into abandoning jobs in Kosovo's once multi-ethnic police force and municipal administrations. Serbia held its own illegal municipal elections in Kosovo despite warnings from the UN that such a move violated UNSCR 1244 and has moved rapidly to emplace parallel institutions in Serb-majority areas throughout Kosovo. Serbia has also backed open violence by the thuggish and criminalized Serb leadership in Kosovo's north, which ordered the destruction of two northern border gates and the subsequent March 17 attack on UN and KFOR peacekeepers. ¶4. (C) It is unclear to what extent a Tadic-led democratic government in Serbia will be able or even willing to walk back some of these measures, but we and the Kosovo government are prepared to engage in quiet diplomacy should the opportunity present itself. Kosovo has held open those positions in the police and public sector that were once occupied by local Serbs in anticipation of any signal from Belgrade to the Kosovo Serb community that they are free to resume a more collaborative approach. You should impress upon Sejdiu and Thaci the imperative to maintain outreach to their minority communities and implement fully those obligations they undertook to the Serb population under the plan developed by UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari. ¶5. (C) Kosovo's challenges are not limited to the political and security realm, of course. Sejdiu and Thaci are anxious that the July 11 Donors' Conference, at which donors are expected to pledge over a billion dollars worth of assistance, demonstrate to their people that Kosovo's restraint has measurable benefits. But the momentum of Kosovo's economic development and its attractiveness to international investors -- particularly in the energy field, where Kosovo's huge lignite coal deposits can be transformed over the next decade into a reliable domestic supply of electricity as well as an export commodity -- will ultimately depend not on the largesse of donors but on the government's own intelligent pursuit of its economic objectives, something you can stress in your discussions with them. They will also need to avoid the serious pitfalls of cronyism, corruption and political patronage in appointments to key public institutions (including the heads of the new intelligence agency and Kosovo Security Force ministry) and the boards of major public companies, thereby raising the level of accountability and transparency in government action. ¶6. (C) Mr. President, Madame Secretary, you will hardly find a more grateful and pro-American set of interlocutors anywhere in the world than these two men. Sejdiu and Thaci will listen intently for your guidance and they will express to you their belief that only the United States can provide the kind of lasting leadership in Kosovo and the region that is necessary for prolonged stability. Frankly, we agree. While many in the EU and most notably the "Quint" countries have been active and vigorous in pushing through Kosovo's independence, the intensified problems we predict over the next few months -- especially those surrounding Kosovo's north, where Serb extremists could try to block the deployment of EU police scheduled for this fall -- may easily lead some queasy Europeans to back away from their commitments and settle for a partition-like outcome that has been adamantly opposed by Kosovars of all political persuasions. The United Nations, as well, though agreeing to "reconfigure" and downsize its presence here, has shown a negative tendency to retain certain important authorities, under severe pressure from the Russians in support of Belgrade. If Kosovo is to succeed as a long-term proposition -- and it most certainly can -- our sustained engagement is necessary to bolster European resolve and take a firm line with the UN on reducing its presence in Kosovo. These meetings with you will help reinforce the sense that Kosovo is moving forward and imbue Kosovo's leadership with a renewed sense of confidence as they prepare to face the many challenges ahead. KAIDANOW