KOSOVO: HANDOVER PLANNING FOR THE POLICE MISSION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000348 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR INL, EUR/SCE, S/CRS, EUR/ACE E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2018 TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL EAID KV UNMIK SUBJECT: KOSOVO: HANDOVER PLANNING FOR THE POLICE MISSION PROGRESSING, BUT THE NORTH REMAINS A CONCERN PRISTINA 00000348 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Chief of Mission Tina S. Kaidanow for Reasons 1.4 (b),( d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: CDA met with European Union Planning Team (EUPT) Head Roy Reeve on June 27 to discuss the evolution of plans for UNMIK's handover to the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX). Reeve noted that the UN's instruction cable of June 24 to UNMIK enabled handover planning to move forward. He said UNMIK and EULEX officials held an initial strategic planning meeting a day later and are close to signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the transfer of assets and equipment. Reeve shared the EU's projected handover date of October 15, 2008, and the latest numbers for its mission. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY (cont'd): Reeve maintained that the EU is actively planning for deployment in northern Kosovo, albeit as unobtrusively as possible prior to its assumption of executive authority, and he noted that at least a handful of EU officers in plainclothes were already shadowing their UNMIK counterparts in the north. He acknowledged, however, that it will be a challenge for the EU to deploy fully in the north, given continuing Kosovo Serb and Belgrade resistance to the mission. Reeve and the Charge also discussed UNMIK's assertion that notwithstanding the order to "reconfigure," the UN planned to retain unspecified executive authorities, possibly on the assumption that EULEX would fail to deploy and that UNMIK would continue to play a law enforcement role in the north and in Serb-majority areas beyond the projected October handover date. CDA urged that EULEX deploy Kosovo-wide as quickly and efficiently as possible, cautioning that Kosovars would view a failure of EULEX to deploy in the north as the road to partition, putting at risk the overall success of the EULEX mission. END SUMMARY. ¶3. (C) CDA met with European Union Planning Team (EUPT) Head Roy Reeve on June 27 to discuss plans for UNMIK's handover to the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX). Reeve noted that the UN's June 24 instruction cable to UNMIK enabled UNMIK officials to go forward with handover planning and that cooperation had been good so far. Reeve also mentioned that EULEX Head Yves de Kermabon, new SRSG Lamberto Zannier, and other key UNMIK and EULEX officials held an initial strategic planning meeting on June 25, and plan to hold another soon. According to Reeve, planning for the transfer of assets and operational aspects is proceeding and EULEX and UNMIK are likely to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on these matters soon. General EULEX Plans ¶4. (C) Reeve said the EU hopes to be fully operational and assume executive authority on or about October 15, 2008. The mission currently plans to have about 1,800 internationals throughout Kosovo; roughly 1,400 will be police and 400 will be customs, administrative and justice employees. Reeve also noted that the EU is likely to authorize an additional short-term contingency force of 350 international police officers (IPOs) this week (see para six below). (Note: By comparison, UNMIK maintains a force of roughly 2,035 police officers throughout Kosovo, though many of these have moved to exclusively monitoring and mentoring roles.) Reeve said 368 European UNMIK officers will transfer to EULEX upon the official date of the handover. EULEX in northern Kosovo ¶5. (C) Reeve maintained that EULEX is actively planning for full deployment in the north, but will gradually build up its presence as unobtrusively as possible, thus not carrying weapons or wearing uniforms until EULEX becomes fully operational and assumes executive authority. He noted that a handful of EU police officers were already in the north shadowing their UNMIK counterparts, with thus far good cooperation from the UN. Reeve also told the CDA that EULEX planned to utilize the former UN Pillar IV building in Mitrovica north, which would become vacant upon closure of Pillar IV by the EU in early July. (Note: This building is PRISTINA 00000348 002.2 OF 003 in the courthouse complex, which KFOR has been guarding since March 17, when northern Serb hardliners violently attacked UNMIK and KFOR troops. Charge urged Reeve to ensure that any occupancy of this building be fully coordinated with KFOR, and he agreed. End Note.) ¶6. (C) EULEX planning calls for 54 EULEX IPOs in the north, not counting border police and integrated police units (IPUs),which are primarily responsible for crowd and riot control (CRC). This is smaller than UNMIK's current force of roughly 170 regular police officers, i.e., 37 IPOs and 133 enhancement force officers (taken on a rotational basis from elsewhere in Kosovo) who may operate in Mitrovica north or south depending on the UNMIK Police regional commanders' needs. (Note: Prior to the pre-independence surge in IPOs in northern Kosovo, UNMIK had only six IPOs in Mitrovica North Station and two each in Zvecan, Zubin Potok and Leposavic stations.) In addition to the 54 IPOs, Reeve said EULEX plans to have two IPUs of roughly 110 to 112 officers each on Gates 1 and 31 (on Kosovo's northern border with Serbia) to replace the UNMIK Police IPUs currently stationed there. EULEX also plans to have two IPUs of the same size based out of Pristina which can be deployed in the north or elsewhere, as needed. Reeve also informed us that the EU's PSC was expected to authorize a short-term additional force of 350 IPOs, which could be used to further bolster the contingent in the north if necessary. However, he acknowledged that it would be difficult for the EU to recruit and deploy the additional officers by October 15 and that there was the possibility of member states placing caveats on their use. ¶7. (C) Reeve and the Charge discussed UNMIK's approach and its apparent orders from New York, despite the instruction to "reconfigure" and downsize its presence in Kosovo, to retain certain executive authorities of an unspecified nature, likely on the assumption that EULEX will be unable to deploy effectively in the north and thus de facto responsibility for law enforcement and justice might remain entirely with UNMIK. UNMIK post-transition plans for its own police (a draft copy obtained confidentially and provided to EUR/SCE) call for the retention of 150 officers in the north and 20 in the south, positing an arrangement in which the UN continues to exercise law enforcement authority north of the Ibar. CDA noted that Kosovars would view a failure of EULEX to deploy fully in the north as tantamount to partition, putting at risk the overall success of the EULEX mission and Kosovo's willingness to maintain such an arrangement. She urged Reeve to ensure that plans for deployment to the north were kept on track and that operational plans were sufficiently robust to ensure success from the outset. ¶8. (C) Comment: We are pleased to see that discussions appear to be proceeding between UNMIK and EULEX on the handover of assets and the details of deployment between now and the time that the EU assumes full executive authority for law enforcement and justice, hopefully no later than October. Kosovars will be watching carefully to see that the EU meets its commitments, most particularly with regard to deployment in the north. ¶9. (C) Comment, cont. We see two things that concern us, however: one, UNMIK actions under instructions from DPKO to retain certain unspecified authorities and review/reassess plans crafted under the previous Ruecker/Rossin leadership which brought the UN presence in Kosovo down to negligible numbers in support of severely limited residual responsibilities; and two, the possibility that some nervous Europeans will back away from their commitment to deploy throughout Kosovo should the obstacles and particularly the signals from Serb hardliners and Belgrade prove too ominous. Failing to meet the EU's commitment in Kosovo would spark anxiety and tension among ethnic Albanians as the first step in a partition scenario. Strong coordination between NATO/KFOR and EU/EULEX, as well as cooperation from the UN, would help to plan for a robust response should the Serbs prove initially recalcitrant; continued stability in Kosovo PRISTINA 00000348 003.3 OF 003 -- of interest and concern to all relevant security actors -- will rest on the visible deployment of EU in the north, supported by KFOR. End comment. KAIDANOW