Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08PRISTINA276
2008-06-02 12:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Pristina
Cable title:  

KOSOVO: SERBS CONTINUE TO LEAVE KOSOVO

Tags:  PGOV PINR PREL KV UNMIK 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000276 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DRL, INL, EUR/SCE
NSC FOR BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL KV UNMIK
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: SERBS CONTINUE TO LEAVE KOSOVO
INSTITUTIONS ON INSTRUCTION FROM BELGRADE

Classified By: Chief of Mission Tina S. Kaidanow for Reasons 1.4 (b),(
d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000276 SIPDIS DEPT FOR DRL, INL, EUR/SCE NSC FOR BRAUN E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2018 TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL KV UNMIK SUBJECT: KOSOVO: SERBS CONTINUE TO LEAVE KOSOVO INSTITUTIONS ON INSTRUCTION FROM BELGRADE Classified By: Chief of Mission Tina S. Kaidanow for Reasons 1.4 (b),( d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. As the political parties in Belgrade continue to maneuver to form the next government, Serbian Minister for Kosovo Slobodan Samardzic is still pursuing the twin goals of strengthening parallel institutions and compelling Serbs to leave Kosovo institutions. Regarding the first goal, on May 26, he announced that the May 11 parallel elections would yield local assemblies that would be constituted in the near future. He continues to meet with success on the second goal, as well; Serb municipal employees in Strpce, along with prison guards in Lipljan, recently resigned from their positions in the Kosovo system. The experience of a Kosovo Serb judge compelled to resign from her job in the Kosovo justice system provides a detailed illustration of how such hardline pressure works. While some moderate Serbs have voiced displeasure at Samardzic's policies, others admit that until or unless forces gathered around the Democratic Party (DS) form a government in Belgrade, they will have to remain silent to avoid being outflanked by hardline forces on the Kosovo issue. We will continue to ensure that the Kosovo government does not play into Samardzic's hands by, for example, firing outright the many Serbs in the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) who abandoned their jobs at Belgrade's behest. END SUMMARY. Samardzic pursues strategy of separation ¶2. (C) As the process of government formation in Belgrade continues, Serbian Minister for Kosovo Slobodan Samardzic continues to pursue a policy of strengthening parallel structures and compelling Serbs to leave Kosovo institutions. On May 26, Belgrade radio B92 and Tanjug reported Samardzic as saying that "local assemblies in Kosovo will be constituted within the legal limit of 15 days after publication of official election results." The minister also claimed that the Serbian electoral commission had already issued instructions for the formation of (parallel) local governments. His words were echoed by northern hardline leader Marko Jaksic. On May 28, Samardzic also announced that he had spoken with representatives of the Kosovo Serb police officers who abandoned their jobs (at his "order") after independence in Februar
y. He said that a "systematic solution" for their problems would be found "sometime in the beginning of June," which would involve putting them on the Serbian Ministry of Interior Affairs (MUP) payroll. ¶3. (C) Despite previously-reported problems in following up promises of aid with concrete results, Samardzic and the Ministry continue to be successful at compelling Kosovo Serbs to separate themselves from Kosovo institutions. On May 23, 40 municipal Serb workers in Strpce, led by CEO Radica Grbic, formally resigned from their jobs. Grbic -- known to us as a moderate -- told us May 26 that they would only continue working "under international control." On May 25, the same day that Samardzic made his latest visit to Kosovo, a group of 60 Serb guards at the Lipljan prison handed in their resignations, as well. The leader of the group, Boban Petrovic, told Radio KiM that the Serbian government had promised the group it would fund their salaries from the Serbian budget. (Note: Petrovic previously led the group on a multi-week set of demonstrations in Gracanica, protesting that the prison guards quit their jobs at the insistence of Samardzic but had not been paid.) One Serb judge's story of intimidation ¶4. (C) As an illustration of the pressure Serbs in Kosovo institutions have come under to comply with Samardzic's policy, we recently received an inside view of how a Kosovo Serb judge was forced to leave her job in the Kosovo judicial system. Judge Jelena Krivokapic from Mitrovica, who has worked closely with USAID over the past several years, described to us how, soon after Kosovo's independence on February 17, she was approached by Branka Semenov, a Serb judge in the parallel court system operating in northern PRISTINA 00000276 002 OF 003 Kosovo. Semenov implicitly threatened Krivokapic's safety and that of her child if she continued to work in the Kosovo judicial system. According to Krivokapic, Semenov was the official who ordered former employees of the (Serbian) court system to protest in front of the courthouse in northern Mitrovica. ¶5. (C) Krivokapic sought assistance from the Serbian Ministry of Justice, controlled by the DS party; she was told she did not have to abandon her job, but she did not draw any comfort from this because the ministry could not protect her from Semenov's threats. Eventually, Semenov came to her and insisted that she formally resign from her job in the Kosovo system via a letter to SRSG Ruecker, in addition to closing the bank account by which she received her salary from the Kosovo Ministry of Justice. Krivokapic did so, but then secretly opened another account so she could continue to receive her Kosovo salary. Her letter to the SRSG noted that she could not continue to work under current circumstances, but did not articulate a formal resignation. By our informal count, of 13 Serb judges and 2 prosecutors appointed by the SRSG to work in the UNMIK/Kosovo system, none currently remain on the job, although only one has submitted a formal letter of resignation. USAID has learned that 6 of the judges have been transferred to the Serb parallel court system in the north without being asked. ¶6. (C) Some Serbs from the Democratic Party (DS) continue to insist that Samardzic cannot back his words with action, but they acknowledge that he is pursuing his objectives with greater focus and clarity than the central DS party hierarchy. The Ministry for Kosovo's Coordinator for the Pristina region (central Kosovo),Goran Arsic (a DS member), told us May 28 that Samardzic, during his recent visit, largely ignored DS complaints that the Ministry should refrain from forming local governments in Kosovo and wait until a new government is formed in Belgrade. Arsic also reported that the Government of Serbia issued a decision on April 17 assigning former Serb employees of Kosovo institutions to various Serbian government ministries, which would then be responsible for paying their salaries. To date, however, only the Serbian Ministry of Justice, responsible for prisons, has fulfilled its obligations under this decision, paying the Lipljan prison guards. DS and other moderate Serbs sidelined for the time being ¶7. (C) Dragan Mikic, deputy mayor of Kamenica municipality, who has remained in the legal municipal government, told us May 29 that, in his opinion, Samardzic is simply "doing all he can until his time runs out." Mikic, a member of former Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Draskovic's Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) party, said that Draskovic has continually given him support for his decision to stay in Kosovo institutions. Mikic claimed that the promises of Belgrade-based officials in the Ministry for Kosovo are not taken seriously by Serbs in the enclaves, who are well aware that any parallel municipal governments will not be able to function properly or provide for them. ¶8. (C) While figures such as Arsic and Mikic have been vocal in their criticism of Samardzic, others in the DS coalition have admitted that until (or unless) their party forms the next Serbian government, they will have to refrain from appearing "soft" on Kosovo, and from overt cooperation with the international community. Vesna Jovanovic, a member of the G17 Plus party who ran successfully in the local elections in Gnjilane/Gjilan municipality, told us May 28 that she had to delay a decision to meet with ICR Peter Feith after being "politely asked" by influential local Serbs not to do so. "We don't know what the Radical party and (Serbian Prime Minister Kostunica's) DSS will use against us in this post-election period," Jovanovic concluded. Comment ¶9. (C) Samardzic's strategy has - in some respects - been PRISTINA 00000276 003 OF 003 successful. The vast majority of Serbs in Kosovo institutions have left their jobs and not returned, and we now see an increasing number of formal resignations, closing off the possibility of an eventual rapprochement. One outcome of this strategy has been the increase of tension in the enclaves, where, in the absence of Serb policemen, routine interactions between Serbs and Albanian policemen have the potential to become violent. We are engaging with UN CIVPOL and the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) to ensure that extra care is taken in these sensitive cases. We have also encouraged the efforts of the KPS and the Kosovo Ministry of Justice to bring back some Serbs to the force. Notwithstanding some confusion on May 29 about the suspension of Serb KPS officers, we have been reassured by UNMIK, the KPS, and the Ministry of the Interior that all decisions will be vetted with us and, most critically, that the door will be left open for Serbs to return to the force. The relevant actors in Pristina understand that firing Serb KPS officers merely plays into Samardzic's hands and invites the introduction of the MUP in Serb-majority areas, especially in the north. ¶10. (C) (comment, cont'd). It is not surprising that Kosovo Serb moderates in the DS are privately professing a softer approach but keeping a low profile in public. Their opponents in the DSS are very influential in Kosovo Serb politics, especially in the Serb-majority north, and will continue to use every bit of leverage they can find to maintain control over affairs here for as long as they can. While we (and the moderates) hope for a new approach to Kosovo from a DS-led government in Belgrade, the current maneuvering by the Ministry for Kosovo may leave structures and commitments in place that the incoming Serbian government will not easily be able to change. END COMMENT. KAIDANOW

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