KOSOVO BIO: PRIME MINISTER HASHIM THACI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000013 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR, EUR/SCE, DRL, INL, AND S/WCI, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER, OPDAT FOR ACKER E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2017 TAGS: PGOV UNMIK KV SUBJECT: KOSOVO BIO: PRIME MINISTER HASHIM THACI Classified By: COM TINA KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) chairman Hashim Thaci is Kosovo's new prime minister after his party's victory in the November 17 elections and Assembly approval on January 9. PDK's electoral success crowned a long and sustained campaign by Thaci to become prime minister, after being thwarted in successive elections since ¶1999. A former student and Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) leader, the 39-year old Thaci will preside over the government through likely the most challenging period in Kosovo's history, while engaging in difficult accommodation with PDK's traditional arch-rival, but now coalition partner, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). Though Thaci can be an unpredictable and occasionally unreliable interlocutor, USOP has cultivated strong relations with him and his key staff; Thaci has pledged to consult closely with USG and EU representatives on all major policy fronts. END SUMMARY. STUDENT LEADER TURNED REBEL ¶2. (C) Thaci started his political activity while a student of history at the University of Pristina in the politically turbulent late 1980s. As one of the most prominent student leaders, he served as the university's student vice-rector from 1990-1991. In parallel, he became involved with the People's Movement of Kosovo (LPK),a longtime clandestine organization which decided in 1991 to pursue armed struggle against Serbian rule. Thaci's family relation to LPK heavyweight Azem Syla brought him to the forefront of preparations for an armed uprising which began to materialize with the formation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in ¶1993. He continued with clandestine activity until late 1993 when, fearing arrest, he fled first to Austria and then Switzerland. While resuming his activities within the LPK/KLA structures there, he enrolled in graduate studies of history and international relations at the University of Zurich. In 1997, the Serbian-run District Court of Pristina convicted him in absentia to ten years of imprisonment on terrorism charges related to his KLA activity. ¶3. (C) Thaci returned to Kosovo with the escalation of conflict in spring of 1998 and quickly rose to prominence under his nom de guerre, "The Snake." He solidified his dominance in the KLA General Staff after being named to the newly-established post of KLA political director in August ¶1998. In February 1999, the KLA General Staff appointed Thaci to lead its delegation to the Rambouillet talks in France, which were aimed at producing a political settlement to the Kosovo crisis. Rambouillet proved to be the decisive moment in Thaci's political career. At its outset, he attempted to sideline the beleaguered Kosovo Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova by asserting himself as leader of the Kosovo Albanian delegation. However, he faced serious difficulties in delivering his support for the agreement because of the KLA's internal dissenting views towards the Rambouillet process. After initial vacillation, which threatened to derail the process and undermine the threat of NATO's intervention against Serbia, Thaci eventually signed the agreement after canvassing first with the KLA leadership in Kosovo. ¶4. (C) While in Rambouillet, Thaci pressured Rugova to agree on the formation of a broad-based Provisional Government of Kosovo (PGOK) with a KLA-appointed prime minister. While Rugova backed out of the agreement shortly thereafter, Thaci secured the KLA's nomination for PM and on April 2, 1999, established the PGOK, which operated in Albania and areas under KLA control. After the end of conflict, Thaci and his self-styled government defied for six months UNMIK's authority in contravention of UNSCR 1244. He, however, agreed to demilitarize the KLA and, in exchange, helped establish the Kosovo Protection Corps. THWARTED POLITICAL AMBITIONS ¶5. (C) Thaci transformed the KLA political directorate into a PRISTINA 00000013 002 OF 002 political party, the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK),in October 1999 after overcoming a political challenge posed by several dissatisfied KLA leaders, including current PDK presidency members Jakup Krasniqi and Azem Syla. While he prevailed in the internal political battle, he lost his external political dominance after a crushing defeat at the hands of Rugova's Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) in the 2000 municipal elections. The result was partly attributed to the PGOK's reign, which had become synonymous with postwar political and social turmoil in Kosovo. Following the 2001 central elections, Thaci failed to wrest the post of PM for himself in exchange for PDK support for Rugova's presidency. Eventually, he forwarded former (and newly-elected) mayor of Mitrovica Bajram Rexhepi as a compromise candidate, but constrained the actions of the new PM. Since another defeat in the 2004 central elections, Thaci has had an uncomfortable time in the opposition, engaging in blistering attacks against the previous governing LDK-AAK coalition. He has felt equally uncomfortable as part of Kosovo's Unity Team, comprised of the government and the main opposition parties, but has maintained a generally constructive attitude throughout the final status process. ¶6. (C) Confirmed as party president three times, Thaci is the dominant but not the sole powerhouse in the PDK. PDK Presidency members Jakup Krasniqi and Xhavit Haliti also retain clout born out of their clandestine and wartime activities and have occasionally challenged his primacy in the party. Thaci's key lieutenants are party vice presidents Hajredin Kuci and Fatmir Limaj, but Thaci has been consistently wary of Limaj,s popularity within the PDK and generally, especially after Limaj's acquittal from ICTY charges in 2005. Thaci also relies on several low-profile influential members such as presidency member Azem Syla, the troublesome newly-elected mayor of Skenderaj, Sami Lushtaku, and Kadri Veseli, director of the PDK-affiliated unofficial intelligence service. Respected as a national hero by his supporters, Thaci has long elicited unprecedented animosity from the arch-rival LDK, which had vilified him as an instigator of politically-motivated violence. That animosity presented an obstacle to the formation of the current PDK-LDK coalition arrangement, but months of prior interaction between Thaci and President Sejdiu in the Unity Team helped overcome the obstacles. However, the Assembly vote on President Sejdiu's re-election (reported septel) demonstrates there may still be some lingering unhappiness within PDK on the coalition agreement with LDK, and vice versa. ¶7. (SBU) Thaci was born on April 24, 1968, in the village of Buroje near Skenderaj/Srbica in the Drenica region. He is married to Lumnije Thaci and has a seven-year-old son. He speaks German and passable English. ¶8. (C) Comment: Thaci can be a canny political operative, though he has bouts of stubborness and is often resistant to advice when he perceives a threat to his political interests. In the past, he has manifested a degree of insecurity which leads him to keep a relatively tight and discreet set of trusted advisors, some of whom are unused to the political limelight and may provide him with less than helpful input in the initial days of his government mandate. Still, Thaci has shown remarkable resilience in resurrecting his political career and bringing the PDK to an electoral victory; he has been able to overcome past rivalry with the LDK for the good of a future Kosovo state; he has evinced a desire to make positive policy changes and chosen a slate of ministers who are not party hacks but subject matter experts; and he has taken both rhetorical and concrete steps to reach out to minorities, voluntarily (and with much grumbling from war veterans, his main constituency) handing over to a Serb the Ministry for Labor and Social Welfare, as well as the Ministry for Refugees. USOP has painstakingly cultivated a relationship with Thaci and other PDK interlocutors, and while we will undoubtedly have challenges with a party unaccustomed to the public spotlight or governance, we believe there is considerable room for progress. End comment. KAIDANOW