PRESIDENT'S POLICY UNIT DEALS WITH FUTURE, PAST

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 PRETORIA 002773

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2018
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SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S POLICY UNIT DEALS WITH FUTURE, PAST
POLITICAL AGENDAS

REF: PRETORIA 2607

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Classified By: DEPUTY POLITICAL COUNSELOR MADELINE Q. SEIDENSTRICKER FO
R REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

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Summary
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1. (S//NF) Policy analysts in the Presidency's Policy Unit
are working on a host of projects that offer insight into the
clash of ideas the South African Government is currently
dealing with. The President's Policy Unit, which is the most
prestigious and important decision-making body for the
government, is currently focused on preparing President
Kgalema Motlanthe's presidential address for the opening of
Parliament in early February and on drafting papers on the
future of the country's domestic and foreign policies. The
crux of Motlanthe's address most likely will reflect what the
African National Congress (ANC) hopes to achieve under the
presidency of Jacob Zuma. The work on the future of the
country's domestic and foreign policies, at least in a few
instances, reflects what former President Thabo Mbeki hoped
to achieve during his time in office. The tension of ideas
at the highest level of government underscores the difficulty
in transitioning from the Mbeki administration to the
Motlanthe, and most likely, the Zuma administration. End
Summary.

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Some of Zuma's ANC Interests . . .
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2. (S//NF) Policy unit analyst Thabileng Mothabi, one of
several drafters for Motlanthe's state of the nation address,
told Poloff in a meeting on December 11 the speech would
focus on the core of the campaign agenda as per instruction
from the ANC and from Zuma. The Unit's analysts have been
told to draft language that underscores the progress the
government has made in health, education, crime, and job
creation -- all of which have been key ANC themes in recent
months. Mothabi said the speech would be "what the ANC wants
us to tell the government." He complained, "I have been so
busy getting the data for that speech." (Note: He also
noted that, more than likely, Motlanthe would not read the
speech ahead of address. Mothabi said, "Motlanthe's style
when we give him speeches is just to read what is in front of
him." End Note.) He said the ultimate purpose of the speech
is to set up Zuma so his mandate for governing will be clear
to the people. In a meeting on December 29, Mothabi told
PolCouns and Poloff that the Unit is working on the ANC's
policy manifesto. He cautioned that the manifesto, scheduled
to be revealed next week, would be "full of promises" that
will be hard for the ruling party to meet. (Note: The fact
the Unit, still dominated by Mbeki allies, is helping to
draft the manifesto raises questions about whether the ANC is
driving policy or the Union Buildings is driving policy.
Many commentators have assumed the ANC is driving policy, but
if the Unit is helping craft the manifesto it would call such
assumptions into question. End Note.)

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. . . Some of Mbeki's Interests
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3. (S//NF) At a meeting on December 22, Mothabi shared with
Poloff a copy of a paper he is working on for Deputy Director
General of Policy Coordination and Advisory Services for the
Presidency Vusi Gumede. The paper, which is still in draft
form, focuses on the importance of continuing the "African
Renaissance" concepts of domestic and foreign policy promoted
QRenaissance" concepts of domestic and foreign policy promoted
by Mbeki beginning in the late 1990s. (Note: "African
Renaissance" is an ideology that promotes social cohesion,
democracy, economic development, and the establishment of
Africa as a world leader in global affairs. End Note.) The
draft reportedly was requested by Director of the Unit, Joel
Netshitenzhe. The paper highlights what the "African
Renaissance" has achieved for South Africa and for the
continent both in theoretical and quantitative terms. Some
critics have argued that "African Renaissance" is a cover for
South African neo-colonialism on the continent. Mothabi has
admitted that such a vision may underpin South African
Government policies. In past meetings, Mothabi has said the

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Unit shares a vision of "South African nationalism" that on
the face of it could override the push for greater dialogue
and cooperation among liberation movements, which so far has
been the foreign policy posture of the Zuma-led ANC. (See
Reftel). Mothabi noted that behind much of what is written
on the "African Renaissance" is the idea that "South African
policies first and foremost should benefit South Africa."
(Note: To illustrate this point Mothabi asked Poloff who
Mbeki represented in Zimbabwe. He asked, rhetorically, "If
he doesn't represent the South African Government, if he
doesn't represent the ANC, who does he represent? He
represents South African business." End Note.) Mothabi said
those in the Unit now, probably because they are Mbeki
allies, want the "African Renaissance" concepts to continue
even though "there may not be those in the ANC now interested
in continuing them."

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Comment
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4. (S//NF) Comments from analysts in the Presidency's Policy
Unit show how the South African Government is dealing with a
tension of ideas. On the one hand, the Unit is crafting a
speech for Motlanthe that reflects the future goals of the
Zuma-led ANC. On the other, the Unit is drafting work that
reflects the past ideals of Mbeki. Despite the Unit's
interest in highlighting the importance of continuing the
"African Renaissance" concepts of domestic and foreign
policy, there are few signs Zuma and the ANC have interest in
doing so. Zuma's perspective is much more centered on
domestic concerns ahead of the election, and his actions so
far have not deviated much from the Mbeki line. Yet, there
is clear interest from Zuma and from the ANC that they want
Motlanthe to set up the new administration so it can
successfully govern after the election next year. Some
pundits and political analysts have characterized the tension
of ideas, or the "two centers of power," that emerged after
Polokwane as having paralyzed the government. The Unit's
work demonstrates that the government is not paralyzed,
rather evolving slowly. This tension of ideas probably is
more healthy than not for the Unit, and for the country, as
in recent years the government's policy wonks served mainly
as mouthpieces for Mbeki.
BOST