PAHAD OUTLINES SAG CONCERNS ABOUT UNSC ZIMBABWE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRETORIA 001467

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2018
TAGS: PREL UNSC ZI SF
SUBJECT: PAHAD OUTLINES SAG CONCERNS ABOUT UNSC ZIMBABWE
RESOLUTION

REF: A. STATE 70882

B. BROWN-GOLDENBERG EMAIL OF 7/2/08

C. PRETORIA 1462

Classified By: Ambassador Eric M. Bost. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (SBU) At his July 4 public press conference, DepForMin
Aziz Pahad expressed opposition to the USG-proposed UNSC
resolution on Zimbabwe (refs A & B) and outlined current
South African Government (SAG) thinking on Zimbabwe policy.
Repeating familiar SAG arguments, Pahad:

-- claimed that the "hasty" UNSC resolution will not/not
assist the South African-led mediation in Zimbabwe, and in
fact could "jeopardize" the South African efforts at this
"very, very decisive moment;"

-- urged support for the African Union-passed resolution on
Zimbabwe, which called for a Government of National Unity in
Zimbabwe ("allow Africans to solve Africa's problems");

-- dismissed recognition of Mugabe as the legitimate
President of Zimbabwe as an "academic discussion," noting
that the inauguration had taken place and that the
international community should not "be diverted on discussion
of legitimacy or not;"

-- called on MDC leader Tsvangirai to engage the South
African facilitation and stop "wasting time," observing that
the MDC had "committed themselves to some form of a unity
structure" prior to the run-off elections;

-- suggested that Zimbabweans should not be bogged down in
"terminology" between a government of national unity,
transitional government, government of national
reconciliation, or other names;

-- called for the end of violence to create a "conducive
climate" for negotiations, although said any complaints about
violence should be made through the facilitation and said,
"It is no use harping on something (violence) that has been
going on for so long;" and

-- dismissed the proposed imposition of "smart sanctions" as
ineffective, noting that sanctions have been in place for
some time and the economy is already in a state of crisis.


2. (C) COMMENT: Pahad's comments reflect core SAG thinking
on the proposed UNSC resolution and, on nearly every key
point, run counter to USG objectives at the UNSC. South
Africa will strongly resist passage of a UNSC resolution on
Zimbabwe, and continued Western lobbying is unlikely to shift
the South African leadership. In addition to the opposition
to UNSC "meddling" in Zimbabwe at this "sensitive" time, the
SAG objects to most of the key elements of the resolution,
including: its Chapter VII status; the imposition of the arms
embargo and smart sanctions (viewing both as ineffective and
undermining prospects for dialogue); and the recognition of
the March 29 elections as "reflecting the will of the
Zimbabwean people." Not only will the SAG oppose the
resolution, we believe they will actively lobby China,
Russia, and other non-permanent UNSC members at the highest
level.


3. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: The SAG's position on Zimbabwe
reflects President Mbeki's general foreign policy outlook
that only dialogue, not pressure, can solve Africa's
conflicts -- this despite the ANC's own history of outside
support (and international sanctions) during the
anti-apartheid struggle. Mbeki is convinced that Western
involvement in Zimbabwe, including the UNSC resolution, will
only undermine his long-sought-after goal of a government of
national unity, which he views as the only solution to
Zimbabwe's crisis. The fact that Mugabe has continually
QZimbabwe's crisis. The fact that Mugabe has continually
promised such a compromise for nearly a decade -- outplaying
Mbeki at every turn -- appears to do little to undermine
Mbeki's faith in continued dialogue.


4. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: South Africa also believes
strongly that Africans should solve African problems. The
international community should only become involved when
requested by the AU or other African leaders. Mbeki views
outside engagement in Zimbabwe, particularly the perceived
defense of white farming interests, as racist and counter to
his own efforts. Mbeki likely believes that he could have
achieved a political solution in Zimbabwe by now, but for

PRETORIA 00001467 002 OF 002


Western "meddling."
BOST