(S) IRANIAN COMPANY INTEREST IN PROCURING VACUUM

S E C R E T PRETORIA 001122


DEPT FOR AF/S, ISN/MTR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/26/2018
TAGS: PARM PREL MTCRE SF IR

SUBJECT: (S) IRANIAN COMPANY INTEREST IN PROCURING VACUUM
FURNACE FROM POSSIBLE SOUTH AFRICAN PROVIDER

REF: A. SECSTATE 053303

B. PRETORIA 0275

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Don Teitelbaum. Reasons 1.4(b)
and (d).


1. (S) DepPolCouns presented Ref A points to DFA Deputy
Director: Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Michiel
Combrink on 27 May. Combrink expressed appreciation for the
information and pledged to act on it "immediately". He
agreed to provide informal feedback to DepPolCouns, if at all
possible, acknowledging that it took a long time to gain
approvals to prepare and transmit a formal response.


2. (S) Recently returned from the NSG plenary in Berlin,
Combrink asked how old Ref A information was, commenting that
in his experience it was best to act on such items "as
quickly as possible". A/PolCouns noted that the item had
come in the previous week, while Combrink and other SAG
nuclear proliferation experts were in Berlin. Combrink
(strictly protect) regretted the delay, but explained that it
was necessary. He admitted that, by the direction of NPC
Chair Abdul Minty, only he and Department of Trade and
Industry NPC rep Daan van Beek were authorized to act on
"sensitive" cases such as the one detailed Ref A. Combrink
and van Beek meet personally, on behalf of the NPC, with
companies to discuss potential transactions of proliferation
concern, as they did in the case of Ref B. Providing Ref A
information through any other SAG channel would "limit" SAG
flexibility in cases where there was no clear legal grounds
for license denial, because if the information is shared more
broadly the NPC response must be executed "by the book".


3. (S) Combrink (strictly protect) expressed appreciation
for the specific link (NOTE: in bullet #4 of Ref A nonpaper)
to a UNSCR 1737 designated entity, commenting that this would
give them clear legal grounds for acting on the information.
Speaking informally, he revealed that "while this makes
things a lot easier", the SAG continued to have no qualms
about quietly leaning on companies who were considering
entering into transactions of real concern even when those
transactions cannot legally be prevented. When he and van
Beek visit a company that falls into such a category, they
make clear they know what is being contemplated; they review
in detail the company's obligations under domestic and
international law, South African obligations under UN
Security Council resolutions, and even the provisions of
"extraterritorial executive orders -- which we don't like";
and, they emphasize the risks the company could be
undertaking in pursuing the transaction. In the end, if they
have no legal grounds on which to act, they cannot prevent
the company from going ahead with the deal. However, they
make sure the company is aware of the SAG's views.


4. (S) Combrink (strictly protect) revealed that there has
been more than one occasion on which he and van Beek had had
such a talk with a South African company "which we have not
discussed with your government and which we are unlikely to
discuss with you in the future." While he was unwilling to
share any details, he did report that to date he was not
aware of any transaction of proliferation concern that had
gone forward.

BOST


NNNN




End Cable Text