CZECH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: NO ONE WINS, AND NO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRAGUE 000088 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/NCE E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL EZ SUBJECT: CZECH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: NO ONE WINS, AND NO ONE COMES OUT LOOKING GOOD REF: PRAGUE 78 Classified By: POLEC COUNSELOR MICHAEL DODMAN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND ( D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Czech parliament failed on February 8-9 to elect a president. Both candidates, current Czech President Vaclav Klaus and Czech-American economist Jan Svejnar, did not have sufficient support to be elected in the three rounds of the election. The only party that can claim its strategy was successful were the Communists (KSCM),who succeeded in forcing a second election. The Czech parliament will meet again on Friday February 15 for another election. President Klaus will again be the nominee of the center-right Civic Democrats (ODS) and remains the favorite. Although Svejnar has declared he wants to run again, he continues to lack the support of the KSCM. The February 8-9 election was not the dignified event all POLITICAL leaders promised but a theater full of grandstanding, backstage dealing, and pressure tactics that resulted in as many as three parliamentarians' hospitalization. While we do not expect any immediate POLITICAL fallout from the election, the presidential contest is straining PM Topolanek's coalition and especially ODS-Green Party relations. END SUMMARY. THE FIGHT OVER PROCEDURES: KEEP THE LIGHTS ON -------------- - ¶2. (C) The February 8-9 election began tamely enough with each of the candidates delivering his address to the joint session of the parliament, assembled in the gilded Spanish Hall of the Prague Castle. FM Schwarzenberg, who was caught on camera napping during the speeches, stated that he fell asleep "with all due respect." The events that followed, however, were far from sleep inducing. Leaders of the political parties and other prominent members of parliament took to the podium to extol or criticize each of the candidates. Unfortunately for Svejnar, even those who were supposed to support his candidacy spent most of the time criticizing Klaus, rather than focusing on what Svejnar could do for the country. ¶3. (C) Then the time came for the parliament to vote on what would become the most contentious issue of the election: whether the vote would be secret or open. In an atmosphere where no one was quite certain of which parliamentary procedures should govern the joint session of the parliament, Chairman of the Lower Chamber Miloslav Vlcek (CSSD) quickly lost control of the proceedings. ODS was the only party opposed to an open vote because by its calculations Klaus had the best shot at reelection in a secret vote. ODS therefore looked for every possible way to preserve the secret vote, which has been the tradition of all Czech presidential elections since the first republic. Even though DPM Martin Bursik of the Green Party told us that he considered the secret vote as "more democratic," he nevertheless withstood SIPDIS the pressure from the ODS, his coalition partner, and continued to press for an open vote to "keep the lights on in the room" to lower the possibility of secret POLITICAL deals. After hours of delays, ODS relented and the parliament voted against a secret vote. By default the vote would be open, i.e. a show of hands. THREE ROUNDS OF VOTING ARE NOT ENOUGH -------------- ¶4. (C) Ten hours after the joint session convened, the voting began and moved very quickly. In the first round, Klaus received 47 votes in the Senate and 92 votes in the Chamber, for a total of 139. Svejnar received 32 votes in the Senate and 106 votes in the Chamber, for a total of 138. With no one candidate winning in both chambers, both candidates advanced into the second round. Although the second round voting took place before 9 PM of February 8, the official results were not announced because the parliament had voted earlier to break at 9 PM. According to unofficial results which were available almost immediately, Klaus won a total of 142 votes, which would have been sufficient for victory in the third round. ODS therefore pressed to continue beyond 9 PM and hold the third round, but CSSD, sensing that ODS was surging, resisted. ¶5. (C) The headlines on February 9 were already forecasting a Klaus win in the third round based on the unofficial results of the second round. When the joint session reconvened, the official results of the second round were announced: Klaus received 48 votes in the Senate and 94 in the Chamber, for a total of 142; Svejnar received 31 votes in the Senate and 104 in the Chamber, for a total of 135. Immediately following the announcement, a recess was PRAGUE 00000088 002 OF 004 announced. As we found out later, CSSD Chairman presented evidence challenging the results of the second round. Although officially, the results remained as they were announced, one ODS deputy who serves on the election conference committee confirmed that two pro-Klaus votes in the Chamber were in question. Since the voting was by a show of hands, it was apparently as chaotic as it appeared. For the third round of voting, the election conference committee had on hand additional vote certifiers from each of the parties to ensure no further challenges. ¶6. (C) Since neither candidate received the sufficient number of votes to win in the second round, both advanced into the third round. With the results of the second round challenged, Klaus' victory was no longer certain. A number of deputies and senators told us that Klaus was short one vote. Despite ODS' furious efforts and less than admirable tactics, the party was unable to find that one vote. With 139 votes, Klaus fell one vote short of the 140 needed. Note: By the time the third round was held, three parliamentarians had left -- some were hospitalized -- so the quorum was 278, rather than 281. End Note. Svejnar gained a total of 113 votes in the third round, losing the support of the KSCM. The KSCM, as it had announced late on February 7, succeeded in its strategy to help Svejnar into the third round so that Klaus would not be running unopposed, but then vote for neither candidate and force another election. ROUND TWO: KLAUS VS. ??? -------------- ¶7. (C) The parliamentary parties agreed to hold another election on Friday, February 15. All candidates must be officially nominated by midnight of February 12. It is clear that Klaus will again be nominated by ODS. The Greens continue to back Svejnar, but clearly Svejnar will need much more than the 6 Green votes. Paroubek has stated in the press that he was 99 percent certain his party would also support Svejnar. That one percent of uncertainty is due to the KSCM, which must support Svejnar in order for him to have a chance, but which has already announced its own list of potential nominees about whom the party wants to negotiate with Paroubek. The list may simply be a negotiating tactic of the KSCM to make further gains in its quest for POLITICAL power. The tactic is already working. Paroubek announced that if the KSCM supports Svejnar, the CSSD would consider KSCM as a viable coalition partner in regional governments following the upcoming fall elections. This is a significant concession on the part of CSSD, which until now has adhered to the party's policy of not forming coalitions with KSCM on regional and national levels. Some KSCM-CSSD deal is likely, as it would ensure that the left would not be split by multiple candidates who would be not be able to advance into the second and third round of the election, which would give undue advantage to Klaus. ¶8. (C) Another matter that will be subject to intense negotiation this week is whether the second election will again proceed as an open vote or in secret. The February 8-9 election showed that no one was fully prepared for an open vote and its consequences. A top lawyer for the Lower Chamber told us that the presidential election procedures are written with the presumption that the voting will be secret. Although open voting is not precluded by the procedures, the process is not clearly developed. For example, in an open, show-of-hands vote, it is possible for the senators and deputies to vote for both candidates. It could therefore be theoretically possible for the parliament to elect two presidents, if both received the same number of votes and the minimum number of votes needed in a particular round. ODS will continue to push for a secret vote to maximize Klaus' chances at reelection. Paroubek, who views the open vote not only as a victory against PM Topolanek but also as a useful way to police the CSSD rank and file, will likely continue to press for an open vote. The position of the Greens and KSCM will again be decisive. The Christian-Democrats (KDU-CSL) are said to be leaning toward a secret vote. A DIFFERENT LIGHT IS NEEDED -------------- ¶9. (C) The tide may be turning in the secret vs. open ballot fight because the process was far from transparent in spite of the open balloting on February 8-9. While the lights were kept on in the Spanish Hall where the voting took place, rumors of secret deals, threats, and pressure tactics abounded. Ironically, the open voting may have contributed to these shenanigans. As one deputy told us, those who abstained in the first or second round revealed they were undecided and were subsequently exposed to even more pressure PRAGUE 00000088 003 OF 004 than would have otherwise been the case. Apparently, one favored tactic by the two major parties, ODS and CSSD, was to promise senators running for reelection in the fall not to field a challenger against them. A senator, who has been a good contact of the embassy, confirmed to us that the ODS made such an offer to him. We also heard rumors of promised ambassadorships and witnessed Senator Jana Jurencakova being cornered by three Klaus "vote hunters," including the current Mayor of Prague, Pavel Bem, and the disgraced former Minister of Justice, Pavel Nemec. Note: Nemec has been rumored to have engineered the questionable end of the corruption case against former DPM Jiri Cunek. End Note. This ODS posse refused to leave her side, and Svejnar at one point complained to us that he could not even speak with her. In the end, Jurencakova voted for Klaus. Some reports of strong arming are even more troubling. Three parliamentarians (two senators and one deputy) eventually left the castle and were hospitalized. All three claimed their health problems were induced by the pressure and threats to which they were subject. IMPACT ON THE COALITION -------------- ¶10. (C) The election appears to have frayed the coalition, especially the RELATIONS between ODS and the Greens. Although the KDU-CSL were by no means united in their support of Klaus and some opposed the secret ballot, the ODS is primarily blaming the Greens for the failed presidential election and for going too far in their opposition to Klaus. In ODS' eyes, the Greens' transgressions are threefold: 1) The Greens recruited Svejnar to run against Klaus. 2) Last week, the Greens unexpectedly changed their stance and threw their support behind an open voting system. As a result, ODS was the only party supporting a secret ballot. 3) During the election, DPM Bursik and Katerina Jacques, the Greens' parliamentary caucus chair, sharply criticized Klaus in their speeches. A number of ODS deputies took offense at these personal attacks. ¶11. (C) The Greens have defended themselves by arguing that the coalition agreement does not cover the presidential election, but ODS rank and file are becoming less and less receptive to these arguments. Should Klaus get reelected in the next election, Topolanek would probably be able to calm the situation both within his party and within the coalition. If the election impasse continues, Topolanek will be under increasing pressure from within the ODS to assert control over his smaller coalition partners. Minister Cyril Svoboda (KDU-CSL) told Ambassador Graber that the ODS would try to force the Greens to support a secret vote in the February 15 election by making it a condition for the Greens to stay in the coalition. If Topolanek really goes so far as to make such a demand, it is unclear how the Greens would react. The open voting they supported showed itself to be an inadequate guard against the strong-arming and secret deals they had hoped to expose, but an about-face at this stage would raise questions about their commitment to a transparent process. COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (C) The inconclusive election must have reminded many of the previous presidential vote in 2003, when Klaus was finally elected in the third round of the third election. This time, no one but the KSCM thought a second election would be necessary, given Klaus' favorite status. KSCM and CSSD used the uncertainty regarding the parliamentary procedures to their maximum advantage and by forcing through the open balot, embarrassed Klaus, Topolanek, and the ODS. Before the election, DPM Alexandr Vondra told Ambassador Graber that for CSSD, this election was not about the candidates, but about humiliating the coalition and Topolanek. In that, they succeeded. For KSCM, the election was also not about the candidates, both of whom are too far to the right in their views, but about gaining as many concessions as possible. In that, they too may succeed if they reach an agreement with CSSD about increased cooperation, especially on the regional level. ¶13. (C) While the Topolanek coalition has been shaken up, we do not think it has been irretrievably damaged. The three coalition parties have shown in their first year that they could work well together even on the most politically sensitive matters. The coalition has also survived its share of challenges, including the Cunek corruption scandal and the firing of former Minister of Education Dana Kuchtova. The current situation is certainly more acrimonious. Topolanek, Bursik, Schwarzenberg, Vondra, and some of the other more level-headed coalition leaders should be able to seal the PRAGUE 00000088 004 OF 004 cracks that have appeared over the past few weeks, but only if Topolanek is able to rein in the anti-Green sentiments within the ODS. For many in the ODS and for Klaus, this fight has become personal. In a January interview, Topolanek predicted that the coalition would not be destroyed by disputes among the three parties. It remains to be seen whether disputes within his own ODS could be the culprit. Graber