CZECHS AGREE TO TEXT OF DHS SECURITY MOU

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 000082 SIPDIS SIPDIS DHS FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY BARTH E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2018 TAGS: CVIS PREL CMGT EZ EUR SUBJECT: CZECHS AGREE TO TEXT OF DHS SECURITY MOU Classified By: ADCM Stuart Hatcher for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). (C) 1. SUMMARY -------------- Czech negotiators from the Ministries of Interior and Foreign Affairs reached tentative agreement February 6 with DHS negotiators on the language of a security memorandum of understanding. The MOU is required as part of the process for DHS to exercise its authority to waive the 3 percent refusal rate requirement for participation in the Visa Waiver Program. Both sides were hopeful the agreement would be ready to sign when Czech Prime Minister Topolanek visits Washington on February 26 - 27. During working-level meetings in the morning, as well as calls on the Foreign Minister, Interior Minister, and Deputy Prime Minister, the Czechs expressed their readiness to move forward on the MOU despite concerns raised by the EC. That said, they did request, in our press statement, a nod to Brussels as political cover. They were also eager for similar progress in Tallinn for the safety in numbers that would provide. See action request paragraph 3. End Summary. (SBU) 2. DHS AND CZECHS REACH AGREEMENT -------------- -------------- DHS Assistant Secretary for Policy Richard Barth and Visa Waiver Program Office Director Marc Frey visited Prague on February 6 to negotiate the terms of a security Memorandum of Understanding, and to have several political-level meetings to ensure political support for this project. They were accompanied by a representative from the DHS legal advisor,s office, and representatives from CA/VO and EUR/PGI. DHS shared the draft MOU with the Czechs prior to the visit, and the Czechs replied with a marked-up copy and a list of questions. (Note: This early leg work by both sides was crucial to the success of the February 6 negotiations. End note.) Czech negotiations were led by Ministry of the Interior Director for Asylum and Migration Policy Tomas Heisman and Foreign Ministry Director General for Consular and Legal Affairs Jaroslav Horak. During the morning, each side surprised the other with its flexibility in negotiations, with the result that by the end of the day the two sides had an agreed upon text we expect to be fully cleared within the next week. With regard to their motivation, the Czechs remarked that the U.S. and the Czech Republic had been working for a long time for Czech participation in the Visa Waiver Program. They also sensed a window of opportunity that could soon close if they did not take advantage of it. Finally, they were hopeful they could have a document to sign when Prime Minister Topolanek visits Washington. (SBU) 3. MOU Signing at the White House? Action Request -------------- -------------- During his visit to Washington, Prime Minister Topolanek is scheduled to meet with DHS Secretary Chertoff on February 26 and President Bush on February 27. The Czechs want to sign the MOU during this visit. The Czechs suggest that it would be appropriate for Minister of Interior Langer and Secretary Chertoff to sign the MOU, and that this might be done during the White House visit. Post requests desk, NSC and DHS to work together to form an appropriate ceremony to accomplish this signing during the prime minister,s visit, accompanied by suitable references to the MOU during public remarks at the White House. (C) 4. Implementing Arrangements -------------- At each meeting A/S Barth stressed that the MOU was only a first step, and that it would have to followed up by implementing arrangements. One example was the HSPD-6 agreement ) referred to with the Czechs as the Terrorist Screening Center agreement. The Ministry of the Interior noted that they viewed this agreement favorably. The MOI is trying to figure out how the agreeement could implemented, and hopes to present it to the cabinet for approval next month. A/S Barth also said that not all implementing arrangements need to be formal; pre-existing informal information-sharing arrangements may suffice, but this would have to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Additionally, not all information requested needs to be immediately available; it can be useful to start at a less than optimum level and move up incrementally. (U) 5. Barth and the Press -------------- A/S Barth did two press events involving live television. The visit was covered widely despite the looming February 8 presidential elections. A full transcript of his afternoon PRAGUE 00000082 002 OF 002 press event can be found on the Embassy,s public website (www.prague.usembassy.gov). The main points were: -- The United States and the Czech government made "excellent progress" on negotiations that hopefully will lead to visa waiver in 2008. -- Electronic Travel Authorization must be up and running before the Czech Republic can enter visa waiver. It has been fully funded and could be in effect in the August-September timeframe. -- The Czech Republic has indicated to us their need to maintain their obligations within the EU and we certainly respect that. We expect that all agreements will be consistent with existing obligations that the Czech Republic has to the EU. (C) 6. Ministerial Visits a Victory Lap -------------- A/S Barth called on Interior Minister Langer, Deputy Prime Minister Vondra and Foreign Minister Schwarzenberg after the morning session. In addition, during lunch, he met with new Deputy Foreign Minister Kohout and MFA Political Director Poveijsil. All interlocutors at the political level expressed a determination to make the process succeed. All also mentioned that a displeased EU was a significant hurdle they had overcome. They noted in particular that Justice and Home Affairs deputies had met on February 1, and the Czechs claimed to be the only ones to speak up in favor of negotiating bilaterally (they specifically said that the Greeks, Hungarians, and Estonians were silent). The Czechs said they were pulled in two directions, by their desire to reach agreement with the U.S. on the one hand, and their desire not to anger the EU on the other. They said they were "dancing on eggshells" with the EU, but in the end they were prepared to defy EU wishes in favor of the MOU. As the day wore on and it became clear that we would reach agreement on the MOU, and that we would make some public statement referencing the EU to give them "political cover", they became visibly more comfortable with their decision, and almost proud that they had decided to stand up to Brussels. They are also hopeful that things will go well in Tallinn so they are not alone. They don,t want to be "100% black sheep." As Interior Minister Langer put it, "once we make a hole in the dam, the rest of Europe will flow through. If bilateral agreements are signed, the shouting in Brussels will die down." A/S Barth assured them that DHS would work with current VWP members as well, and hoped to have MOUs signed in those countries by October 2009. Both Langer and Vondra said they might go to Brussels and Vondra would try to explain things to Commissioner Frattini. It was also important to explain that ETA was not a visa. (C) 7. Comment -------------- We attribute success in these negotiations to a number of facts that serendipitously came to bear at the same time: The Czechs are strongly motivated to do something on visa waiver when their Prime Minister visits Washington. The Czechs very much want to be in the VWP before beginning their first EU presidency in January 2009. We convinced the Czechs this was a window of opportunity that, if not taken now, could slam shut for a long time. DHS flexibility was a surprise to the Czechs. In light of Greek indecision the day before, and probable Estonian success next week, the Czechs saw an opportunity to move to the head of the queue. The ease of these negotiations and the Czech decision to defy Brussels have sent Czech expectations for Visa Waiver accession in 2008 into orbit. As difficult as it may be, it would be useful if Department and DHS developed a time-line for the various steps that need to be taken, so we can sustain the momentum and keep everyone moving in the right direction. End Comment. (U) 8. Assistant Secretary Barth did not have an opportunity to clear this cable before departing post. Graber