REPRESENTATIVE WEXLER'S MEETINGS IN PRAGUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 000803 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2018 TAGS: MARR PREL PGOV EZ SUBJECT: REPRESENTATIVE WEXLER'S MEETINGS IN PRAGUE Classified By: CDA Mary Thompson-Jones, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: During a December 4 trip to Prague, Representative Robert Wexler (D-FL) met with DFM Tomas Pojar, DPM Alexandr Vondra, and opposition MP Jan Hamacek. Pojar and Vondra urged continued Congressional support for missile defense (MD). Representative Wexler expressed appreciation for Czech political efforts invested in MD and agreed that the U.S. could not dismiss the political ramifications of halting MD. Pojar and Vondra expressed wariness about Russia; Pojar was skeptical that Russia would fulfill a &grand bargain8 trading MD for Russian cooperation on Iran. Vondra highlighted Czech efforts to upgrade EU relations with Israel. Opposition MP Hamacek outlined his party,s objections to MD and said, contrary to the government's view, Czechs would welcome halting the system. End Comment. DFM Pojar -------------- ¶2. (C) Representative Wexler briefed DFM Pojar on his recent trip to Israel, including the state of the Palestinian Authority (PA) security forces, the internal Israeli political situation, and possible ways forward on Middle East peace. ¶3. (C) Wexler and Pojar discussed in the incoming Obama administration. According to Pojar, the government is comfortable with the incoming foreign policy team. Pojar expressed concern that Russia would attempt to divide NATO and the EU; he hoped that, on transatlantic relations, Washington would not deal only with Germany and France, but with a broader Europe. Wexler predicted the next administration would challenge Germany and France to use the changeover in Washington as an opportunity to consider more contributions on dealing with Afghanistan and Iran. ¶4. (C) Pojar agreed, emphasizing that Europe needs to have realistic expectations about the incoming administration. On Guantanamo, he said the Czech Republic had asked European countries critical of the Guantanamo facility to help close it by taking detainees. ¶5. (C) Pojar strongly urged an Obama visit to Prague to meet with the EU 27 in April; this would be a good signal for relations with central Europe. ¶6. (C) Wexler predicted that the incoming administration would focus both on more diplomacy but also robust economic sanctions with Iran; he worried about European support for sanctions. Pojar agreed European economic interests would hinder consensus on sanctions. Pojar said the Czechs, as EU president, could not push their own views. Russia/MD -------------- ¶7. (C) On relations with Russia, Pojar said &being nice does not work.8 The West should not isolate Russia, but it should be firm. On the Medvedev security architecture proposal, Pojar advised that the Allies should discuss it among themselves before discussing it with Russia. Pojar said that the West can work with the Russian business elite, but not the political elite, who he characterized as anti-West. ¶8. (C) Pojar said Russian opposition to MD in Europe is geopolitical: &they do not want the U.S. in central Europe.8 MD is therefore also about U.S. standing in central Europe. Failure to put MD in central Europe would open up space for Russia and would give Russia a veto over a defensive system, which is the heart of the NATO philosophy. Pojar was skeptical Russia would help the U.S. on Iran if the U.S. abandoned MD. ¶9. (C) Pojar said the Czech government can accept the need for more testing of MD, but strongly urged the U.S. not to make a &grand bargain8 trading MD for Russian promises of cooperation on Iran. Geopolitically, for the sake of central Europe, &we should not be failed by the U.S.8 on MD. ¶10. (C) Wexler agreed it would be irresponsible to dismiss the political ramifications of MD to a good ally. However, that does not mean the U.S. would not explore alternate ways to implement MD. DPM Vondra -------------- ¶11. (C) Deputy Prime Minister Vondra discussed two key topics with Representative Wexler ) MD and the link with PRAGUE 00000803 002 OF 002 Russia, as well as Czech EU Presidency priorities with respect to Israel. Missile Defense -------------- ¶12. (C) (C) DPM Vondra started by acknowledging he was aware of Representative Wexler,s views on MD. He pointed out that the Czechs have done a lot of work to &NATOize8 missile defense and that we should continue this important work. Vondra also emphasized, using strong language, that he did not want to see MD unraveled by the incoming Congress. Vondra anticipates that MD will not be taken up in the lower house of parliament this year, but as soon as possible next year. He also noted that the opposition Social Democrats (CSSD) are focused on the Lisbon Treaty, while the leading coalition ODS party is championing passage of MD. ¶13. (C) Representative Wexler stated that he and his fellow congressional members were aware of the Czech political efforts invested so far on MD and that the U.S. Congress would not treat the efforts of a close ally cavalierly. Wexler did state that the orientation of the new Congress will be &a bit different8 than in the past, since he expects this incoming congress will want to do a cost/benefit analysis of how the MD program fits with other USG interests. He also raised the question with the DPM of why, if this is so important to Europe, the USG is picking up the entire tab of the program and why there is not greater support with the European public. ¶14. (C) The DPM also flagged that while the Czechs are willing to offer assurances and keep the Russians informed about the Missile Defense program, there are limits. In the views of the Czechs, the problem is with Russia trying to dictate conditions. The Czechs have no intention of allowing the Russians to have a say in their national security policy decisions. In response to Wexler,s query as to how can we achieve better cooperation with Russia, Vondra responded by emphasizing that the West must show determination in this particular area, but openly discuss all issues of the relationship. Czech EU Efforts on Israel -------------- ¶15. (C) On Israel, the Deputy Prime Minister noted that the Czech Republic is one of the most pro-Israeli countries in Europe. He commented that the Czechs are working to raise the level of relations between Israel and the EU and that they hope to put the final touches on the EU action plan for EU-Israeli relations during their EU Presidency. Vondra noted that Germany and the Netherlands have been good friends on this issue, but that Spain and Ireland (a surprise for the Czechs) have not. Opposition MP Jan Hamacek -------------- ¶16. (C) Wexler also met with main opposition Social Democrat (CSSD) MP Jan Hamacek, who heads parliament,s foreign affairs committee. Hamacek explained his and CSSD,s opposition to MD: there is no clear threat that warrants it; it is not part of a NATO system; it is not popular; it may not work. Hamacek dismissed the idea that having MD would make Europeans feel less vulnerable to Iran and more likely to support Israel. ¶17. (C) Wexler pointed out that many, but not all, in the U.S. Congress support MD. He asked Hamacek what would happen in central Europe if MD were halted. Hamacek replied Czechs view MD as a product of the Bush administration and would welcome halting it. However, Hamacek conceded halting MD could create a problem with NATO Allies, and Russia would perceive it as a victory. Hamacek suggested halting MD should be traded for Russian concessions in other areas, such as Iran. ¶18. (U) Representative Wexler did not havQthe opportunity to clear this message before departing post. Thompson-Jones