CZECH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: PROFESSOR VERSUS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRAGUE 000078 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/NCE E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL EZ SUBJECT: CZECH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: PROFESSOR VERSUS PROFESSOR REF: PRAGUE 46 Classified By: POLEC COUNSELOR MICHAEL DODMAN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND ( D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Current Czech President Vaclav Klaus remains the favorite to win the February 8 presidential election in the parliament. However, the success of his challenger, Czech-American economics professor Jan Svejnar, in attracting public attention has shaken the Czech political scene. While the parliamentary leaders continue to haggle over the minutest detail of the election, the "vote hunters" for each of the two candidates are working behind the scenes to secure the necessary support. In light of the current political alignment in the parliament, a political deal or deals will have to be struck for either candidate to be elected. As in the previous election in 2003, the Communists (KSCM) could be the kingmakers. While on surface the election of either Klaus or Svejnar should not significantly impact U.S. interests given the similarity of their views, a Klaus loss would weaken PM Topolanek. An undecided election could also be problematic. END SUMMARY. THE TWO PROFESSORS: THE PAST VERSUS THE FUTURE? -------------- --- ¶2. (C) Only a few months ago, the current Czech President Klaus seemed to be a shoo-in to be reelected for another five year term. The main opposition party, the Social Democrats (CSSD),seemed singularly incapable of finding a viable candidate to challenge Klaus. After months of floating and then discarding various names, the CSSD threw its support behind Jan Svejnar, a Czech-American economics professor from Michigan who was recruited by the Green Party. The CSSD conditioned its support on Svejnar's ability to gain backing from other parties. Rather than focus solely on other political parties and members of parliament, Svejnar embarked in December on what was being described by Czech media as an "American-style campaign" of traveling around the country and engaging the Czech public in town-hall discussions. Although many observers doubted the utility of such a campaign since Czech presidents are elected indirectly by the parliament (see below),Svejnar managed to transform himself from a relative unknown to a credible presidential candidate thanks to the increased media and public attention his campaign generated. He succeeded to such an extent that Klaus and his main base of support in the ruling Civic Democratic Party (ODS) have been showing increasing signs of nervousness and stress. Recently, a Czech ODS parliamentarian told us that Klaus -- and probably others in the ODS -- had seriously underestimated the race and should have begun the outreach to other parties long ago. ¶3. (C) With only two candidates in the race, the Czech media has devoted a great deal of time and ink to parsing their statements and views on everything from the Czech economic transformation of the 1990s, to the EU, to climate change. On these three issues, at least, the two candidates differ. On almost everything else, including trans-Atlantic relations and missile defense, the two share essentially the same positions. While Svejnar has tried to paint Klaus as the candidate of the past, and himself as the candidate of the future, this dichotomy has not gained much traction because Svejnar's statements about the Czech Republic's future have been too general and vague. With so little disagreement between the candidates, the media has also focused on the more peripheral issues such as Svejnar's American citizenship and questions about who is a better economics professor. Note: Svejar announced recently that he will relinquish his U.S. citizenship if elected president. End Note. What has made this election interesting for the media -- and disappointing for the public -- are the rumors and speculations about how the two candidates will fare under the complex Czech presidential election rules. THE CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAL -------------- ¶4. (U) The Czech tradition of indirect presidential elections dates back to the first republic. According to the current constitution, the president is elected in a joint session of both chambers of the parliament. Note: the Czech Senate has 81 seats, and the Lower Chamber has 200 seats. End Note. In each election, three rounds are possible. Although the constitution allows each round to take place up to two weeks apart, in the upcoming election, most expect that all three election rounds will take place on February 8. To be elected, a candidate must: -- First round: Secure the majority of votes of all deputies PRAGUE 00000078 002 OF 003 (101) plus a majority of votes of all senators (41). -- Second round: If no candidate acquires the necessary number of votes in the first round, the candidate(s) with the highest vote count in the Lower Chamber and the Senate advances into the second round; to win in the second round, a candidate must secure a majority of votes of the deputies present plus a majority of votes of the senators present. -- Third Round: If no candidate is elected in the second round, the candidate(s) from the second round advances into the third round; to win in the third round, a candidate must secure the majority of votes of present deputies and senators combined. This intricate voting system is designed to make it easier with each successive round for a candidate to get elected. Since all deputies and senators are expected to be present on February 8, the first and second rounds will essentially be the same in terms of votes needed to win the eletion. In the third round, with all deputies and senators present, the winning candidate would need the votes of 141 deputies and senators combined. If no candidate is elected in the three rounds, a new election is held, i.e., a new slate of candidates is nominated and the three-round process begins anew. In the last election cycle in 2003, Vaclav Klaus was elected in the third round of the third election. ¶5. (C) In recent presidential elections, the parliamentary vote has been secret. Although some in the CSSD have been pushing for an open vote, their efforts will almost certainly be unsuccessful. These efforts are generally perceived as being motivated by CSSD leaders' obsession to control how the party's members vote in the presidential election. In the 2003 election, a number of CSSD parliamentarians "defected" and voted for Klaus. To avoid a repeat of the 2003 events, several members of CSSD leadership offered various ideas of how to check up on their deputies and senators. Some of these, like the idea of requiring each parliamentarian to photograph his or her ballot with a cell phone, were simply silly and were shot down as intrusions that would detract from the dignity of the election. Consequently, when the joint session of the parliament convenes on February 8, most observers expect that the voting will be secret. THE POLITICAL REALITY: WHEELING AND DEALING -------------- ¶6. (C) From a more cynical standpoint, however, only a secret vote will allow the parliamentarians to strike the SIPDIS sort of deals that will get one or the other candidate elected. While the Czech presidential election system functioned relatively smoothly during the eight decades between Presidents Tomas Masaryk and Vaclav Havel, the reason was that in each of these elections there was essentially only one candidate who could win either because of his moral authority (Masaryk, Benes, Havel) or by communist fiat (Gottwald through Husak). This is no longer the case in the post-Havel era. Given the current political alignment in the Czech parliament -- and if one takes the public statements by the five parliamentary parties at face value -- it would be impossible for either Klaus or Svejnar to gain the necessary number of votes to win the election. ¶7. (C) Even if ODS stands united behind Klaus, he will still need a minimum of 19 votes from other parties to win in the third round. He has been able to win public pledges of support from some members of KDU-CSL, a smaller party in the governing coalition, and a few independent senators, but he has not yet reached the magic 19. Svejnar trails Klaus by over 20 votes, according to one Czech daily that polled all parliamentarians last week. These public declarations of support, however, are a poor measure of the candidates' true standing. As in 2003, the election will likely be decided by "defectors" and the KSCM. In recent weeks, lists of party defectors whose votes have been secured by the other side have surfaced within both CSSD and ODS. Reports of "vote hunters," usually the unsavory figures affiliated with -- and funding -- Czech political parties, are the daily fare of newspaper headlines. We have heard from one CSSD parliamentarian, who was listed as a possible defector, that he is afraid even to talk with his ODS colleagues in the parliament because any such conversation could be interpreted as a sign of disloyalty. At the same time, the KSCM leadership alternatively claims that it will support neither candidate but help Svejnar into the second election round or that it will make its final decision shortly before February ¶8. BEYOND FEBRUARY 8 PRAGUE 00000078 003 OF 003 -------------- ¶8. (C) Although Klaus remains the favorite, the uncertainty and nervousness of this elections seems to surpass even that of the 2003 election. For ODS, Klaus' reelection has become almost an existential issue. As we reported in reftel, Klaus' failure would almost certainly have repercussions for the Topolanek coalition and Topolanek himself. If Klaus is not elected on February 8, the ODS will continue to nominate him as its candidate in any subsequent elections. For most ODS members, any other candidate would be unthinkable. Svejnar's political future beyond February 8 is less clear. Although the Greens have pledged that he will be their candidate in subsequent elections, the CSSD will almost certainly look for someone else, possibly in coordination with the KSCM. Rumors have surfaced that Svejnar could remain in the Czech Republic and either start a new party or be nominated for a ministerial portfolio by the Greens in an eventual cabinet reshuffle. Svejnar has so far refused to speculate on what he might do if he were to lose the election. COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) Whether Klaus or Svejnar win the February 8 election should have little impact on U.S.-Czech relations, given their similar views on key U.S. foreign policy priorities like missile defense. Nevertheless, a Svejnar upset victory would undermine PM Topolanek and his coalition. Another worrisome outcome would be an undecided election, followed by a protracted period of repeated elections, as was the case in ¶2003. In such a scenario, the Czech legislative calendar would be disrupted. If the political stalemate extends over several months, it could conceivably have an impact on the Czech timeline for parliamentary ratification of the missile defense agreements. The resulting political turbulence would also weaken Topolanek and further strain his coalition. ¶10. (C) The February 8 election and the less than transparent competition for parliamentarians' votes that preceded it will add further pressure on Czech political leaders to amend the Czech constitution and institute direct presidential elections. With the exception of the ODS, all other parties represented in the parliament have pledged their support for direct presidential elections. For ODS, any change to the election rules that would have endangered Klaus' chances at reelection would have been unacceptable. However, Topolanek agreed in a recent interview that his party would work for a direct vote in advance of the next presidential election in 2013. This is certainly what the Czech public wants, have been repeatedly disappointed with the way politics are done in the Czech Republic. Graber