CZECH PM TOPOLANEK REELECTED CIVIC DEMOCRATIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRAGUE 000758

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/FO, EUR/CE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV EZ
SUBJECT: CZECH PM TOPOLANEK REELECTED CIVIC DEMOCRATIC
PARTY CHAIRMAN, WHILE PRESIDENT KLAUS SEVERS TIES WITH THE
PARTY

REF: PRAGUE 737

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Classified By: DCM MARY THOMPSON-JONES FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The December 5-7 Civic Democratic Party
(ODS) congress reelected PM Mirek Topolanek as chairman, but
with less than overwhelming support. Topolanek's victory was
overshadowed by President Vaclav Klaus, the party's founder,
who formally relinquished his title of ODS honorary chairman.
While not completely unexpected, Klaus' decision to sever
his ties with the party cast a shadow over the congress
proceedings. With the exception of the election of David
Vodrazka as the first deputy chairman, ODS delegates elected
no new faces to the party's key leadership posts, thus
signaling their preference for continuity in the government
and party despite the sweeping October defeats in the
regional and senate elections. The congress also adopted a
strongly worded resolution calling for the speedy
ratification of the missile defense (MD) agreements and
recommending that the MD agreements be approved before the
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. A victory at the ODS
congress was PM Topolanek's first necessary step toward
stabilizing his position and that of his government following
the October electoral debacle. He must now reach an
agreement with the opposition on a political cease-fire
during the EU presidency. Simultaneously, Topolanek will
have to engineer a cabinet reshuffle and reach a deal on MD
and the Lisbon Treaty within his coalition and possibly with
the opposition. Many within ODS doubt whether this
jam-packed "to-do" list will allow Topolanek to carry out the
changes within his party required in order to prepare ODS for
the 2009 European Parliament elections and the 2010
parliamentary elections. END SUMMARY.

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PM TOPOLANEK EMERGES VICTORIOUS, BUT WITHOUT A STRONG MANDATE
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2. (C) Even before the December 5-7 congress began it was
clear that PM Topolanek's reelection as party chairman was
almost assured. He had received nominations from nearly all
regional party organizations, while his challenger, Prague
mayor Pavel Bem had the support of only Prague's ODS. PM
Topolanek delivered two speeches to the congress, both of
which were candid and serious assessments of the party's --
and the government's -- failures over the past two years. He
accepted full responsibility for these failures and,
uncharacteristically for Topolanek, even apologized for them.
He promised to learn from his mistakes and sought to portray
himself as the leader who could keep ODS united in this
difficult period. Bem's two speeches were described by many
observers as decidedly not his best. They failed to generate
the kind of excitement that Bem would have needed to turn the
pro-Topolanek tide.


3. (C) Consequently, the ODS congress reelected PM
Topolanek, who won in the secret ballot 284 out of 486 valid
votes, or 58 percent. Bem won the support of only 162
delegates (33 percent),the vast majority of which probably
hailed from Bem's own Prague ODS organization and its close
affiliate, the Central Bohemian ODS organization. While
Topolanek's victory was described in some media as crushing,
it was in fact much less convincing than his victories in
2004 and 2006, when he won 91.7 percent and 69.3 percent of
the vote respectively. Consequently, Bem and his supporters
immediately questioned whether Topolanek in fact received the
"strong mandate" he claimed in his acceptance speech.

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END OF THE KLAUS ERA
--------------


4. (C) Topolanek's victory, however, was not the only
headline emerging from the ODS congress. President Klaus,
who had founded ODS nearly 18 years ago, signaled a few days
before the congress that he might choose not to accept the
party's invitation. In the end, Klaus announced on December
4 that he would attend. His much anticipated speech to the
congress lasted barely four minutes, and its terseness added
to the drama of Klaus' announcement that he was giving up the
post of the party's honorary chairman. Jiri Payne, one of
Klaus' closest advisers, told us subsequently that Klaus
asked for three different versions of the speech to be
drafted for him. He chose the shortest and least
conciliatory version. In his speech, Klaus stated that ODS
was no longer the party he founded. Rather than a
right-wing, civic party, ODS was in his view becoming "a

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party of the political center and a party of lobbyists'
interests rather than of ideas."


5. (C) The lukewarm applause following his speech
demonstrated better than anything else the prevailing view
among the ODS delegates: that Klaus was guilty of
ingratitude and deserting the party in probably its most
challenging moment since the Sarajevo split in 1997/8 (ref
A). Many delegates commented afterwards that his departure
would help "clear the air" and free Topolanek to implement
the changes necessary for the party to remain a viable
alternative to the opposition Social Democrats (CSSD). Many
also felt that Klaus' critique that ODS was becoming too
centrist missed the target. Minister of Industry Martin
Riman, whose right-wing credentials are unimpeachable,
delivered a devastating analysis of Klaus' years as prime
minister, which clearly showed that even Klaus failed to meet
his own conservative standards. Similarly, analyses of the
October elections demonstrated that ODS can win future
elections only if it is positioned firmly in the center.


6. (C) Following his speech, Klaus refused to discuss his
rumored support for the formation of a new right-wing,
euro-skeptic party that would focus initially on the June
2009 elections to the European Parliament. In the past two
weeks, the newspapers have been full of reports that Klaus
would throw his clout behind one or more such parties, which
could be affiliated with the Libertas movement of Ireland's
Declan Ganley. In front of the microphones, however, Klaus
refused to comment, noting only that such a discussion was
not "currently relevant" and that he, as president, "would
not be founding a political party." It is indeed true that
Klaus had promised to stay above politics following his
reelection in February 2008. However, if the past 18 years
serve as a guide, it is not Klaus' nature to withdraw from
politics and control.

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ONE NEW FACE AMIDST THE STATUS-QUO
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7. (C) The elections of the party's deputy chairmen provided
some excitement in that they at least appeared to be a real
contest. The victory of David Vodrazka, a young (37) and
relatively unknown mayor of Prague 13, in the closely watched
contest for the first (principal) deputy chairman was termed
a surprise by many observers. Topolanek played a decisive
role in his election, calling on delegates to support
Vodrazka over Minister of Interior Ivan Langer. One could
not, however, shake the feeling that the Vodrazka-Langer
contest was a carefully staged -- and predetermined in
advance -- show to send a signal that ODS leadership was
indeed capable of change. There is no doubt that Langer was
the better, more capable candidate. He is an excellent
speaker, manager, and a master of political intrigue.
However, there were several factors working against a Langer
victory. Although the delegates reelected Topolanek, it was
clear that some change in the leadership was necessary. ODS
Senator Tomas Jirsa, one of the delegates, told us that it
would have been disastrous for the party's public image if
the top two ODS posts remained in the hands of "two old ODS
matadors" who were at least in part responsible for the
October electoral disaster.


8. (C) With Vodrazka's election, Topolanek was also able to
placate the Prague wing of ODS, which is the largest -- and
probably the richest -- regional organization within the
party. Bem's loss in the chairman contest and departure from
the post of first deputy chairman would have meant that
Prague would lose its preeminent status within ODS. That
would not bode well for the party's unity, Topolanek's stated
number one goal. Another factor working against Langer's
candidacy was the seemingly inconsequential fact that he is
from Olomouc, a city in Moravia. However, since Topolanek is
also from Moravia, the Prague ODS faction was dead-set
against the party's most important jobs being held by two
Moravians. Again, for the sake of party unity, Langer had to
withdraw, which he did. He was promptly elected as one of
the four deputy chairmen. The other three deputy chairman
posts were claimed by DPM and Minister of Labor Petr Necas,
Minister of Agriculture Petr Gandalovic, and former governor
of Central Bohemia Petr Bendl. Like Langer, all three were
already deputy chairmen prior to the December 5-7 congress.

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MISSILE DEFENSE AND THE LISBON TREATY
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9. (C) The MD radar and the Lisbon Treaty were the key
foreign policy issues before the congress. The party's
position on MD has always been one of strong support, but the
question was what if anything the party's leaders would say
on the subject. Nearly all speakers expressed their support
for MD and called for the MD agreements' speedy ratification.
The final resolution of the congress reflected the
importance of this foreign policy priority to the party:
"The ODS congress requests of ODS representatives that all
legitimate means be used for successful ratification as early
as possible of the agreements pertaining to the stationing of
the U.S. radar on the territory of the Czech Republic."


10. (C) The final resolution also includes text that seeks
to link the ratification of the MD agreements with the
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty: "The ODS congress leaves
the decision regarding the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty
under the purview of the parliamentary and senate club of
the ODS. At the same time (the ODS congress) strongly
recommends priority ratification of the international
agreements regarding U.S. missile defense." This formulation
is critical in that it strengthens, rather than ties,
Topolanek's hands. Initially, the party's die-hard
euro-skeptics and anti-Lisbon activists proposed that the ODS
congress bind its MPs and senators to vote against the Lisbon
Treaty. With such a resolution, Topolanek would have been
unable to negotiate the Lisbon for MD swap that everyone now
believes will be necessary in order to ratify both. The
resolution, as adopted, should help Topolanek in the
negotiations with his coalition partners and the opposition,
both of whom are pressing for an early adoption of the Lisbon
Treaty.


11. (C) The timing of the votes on Lisbon and MD remains
unclear. The opposition CSSD has tried to force Topolanek's
hand by scheduling in the Lower Chamber a special session on
the Lisbon Treaty for December 9. The Deputy Chairman of the
Foreign Affairs Committee, Tomas Dub (ODS),told us that ODS
MPs had successfully managed to defer consideration of the
Lisbon Treaty in both the Foreign Affairs and Constitutional
Committees last week. Nevertheless, even without the
committees' action and recommendation, the Lower Chamber
could take up the Lisbon Treaty's second -- and final --
reading. To prevent the Lisbon Treaty from moving forward
without concurrent progress on the MD agreements, Dub told us
that his party would try to prevent the adoption of the
program for the December 9 session, which would essentially
cancel the session. We have now heard from several Czech
interlocutors that both MD and Lisbon would be held until the
February session of the Lower Chamber. (Note: At present,
there is no January session scheduled. End Note.) However,
much will depend on the results of Topolanek's negotiations
with his coalition and with the opposition. DPM Vondra told
us that Topolanek is scheduled to meet with opposition leader
Jiri Paroubek (CSSD) on December 8. (Note: Ambassador
Graber is scheduled to meet with Paroubek in the morning of
December 9, and we will report on this meeting in our Prague
daily. End Note.)

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MORE BATTLES AHEAD FOR TOPOLANEK
--------------


12. (C) With the ODS congress safely behind him, Topolanek
can now turn his attention to all the matters he has had to
put on hold, including a cabinet reshuffle, cease-fire
agreement with the opposition, and passage of key pieces of
legislation such as the budget and the foreign deployments
bill. The ODS congress gave some clues about who would
likely survive the cabinet reshuffle. The ministerial seats
of Langer, Gandalovic, and Necas, the three old-new deputy
chairmen, are probably safe. Bendl has been rumored to be in
line for a new deputy prime minister for economics post, and
his retention as deputy ODS chairman seems to support these
rumors. Commentaries have already appeared in the press
predicting that the cabinet changes will be merely cosmetic
and will affect little known and unimportant ministers.
(Comment: These predictions are probably correct. Despite
his success at the ODS congress, Topolanek remains weakened
and in charge of an equally weak and divided three-party
coalition. Pushing through more than marginal changes may be
impossible for Topolanek at this point. End Comment.)


13. (C) Topolanek will also have a hard time in his
negotiations with Paroubek. Paroubek has worked very
systematically to ensure that he holds as many bargaining

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chips as possible when he sits down with Topolanek. For
example, one CSSD member of the Defense Committee told us
that Paroubek held up an agreement on the country's 2009
foreign deployments, which had been worked out in the Defense
Committee between the government and opposition, because he
saw this issue as one of those bargaining chips. Paroubek is
clearly in a much stronger position than Topolanek, but it is
likely that the two will forge some sort of a political
compromise in the coming days, if for no other reason than
Paroubek's ego and desire to play a greater role during the
EU presidency. (Note: In the event that Topolanek and
Paroubek reach an agreement, it is likely that Paroubek will
take over as chairman of the Lower Chamber, a position that
would accord him greater visibility during the EU presidency.
End Note.) Strategically, speaking, it is also not in
Paroubek's best interest to bring down Topolanek's government
now, when he would have to deal with the consequences of an
approaching economic downturn.

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COMMENT
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14. (C) The ODS congress was a glitzy affair, but the mood
of the participants was decidedly downcast. The October
election defeat is generally being taken as a sign of defeats
yet to come -- in the 2009 European Parliament elections and
the 2010 parliamentary elections. The party delegates seemed
almost resigned to their fate, electing the same leaders,
with the notable exception of Vodrazka. We heard from many
delegates that they did not really expect a course correction
from Topolanek. Bem's comment after his defeat aptly
described the congress' personnel decisions: "The congress
decided for a non-change." Change, however, is exactly what
the party needs. Klaus' speech to the congress may have been
short, but it was on the mark with its critique of the party
as one built on lobbyists' interests, rather than ideas.
Topolanek will be distracted with the EU presidency and with
the day-to-day tasks of governing, which in the current
situation of uncertain majorities in the parliament has
become extremely complex. He is therefore unlikely to bring
the fresh ideas and energy which the party desperately needs.
He is also unlikely to sever the party's ties to and
dependence on deep-pocketed lobbyists, many of whom were
invited as "guests" to the party congress. As a result, the
public perception of the party, which mirrors Klaus'
assessment, is unlikely to change. ODS may be doomed to
repeat in 2010 what occurred in the 2006 election: the
opposition did not win because of its brilliant ideas or
program; it won because of the ruling party's lackluster
performance, corruption, and inept leadership.
Graber