THE TROUBLEMAKERS PREPARE TO ASSUME THE EU

C O N F I D E N T I A L PRAGUE 000727

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV EZ EUN
SUBJECT: THE TROUBLEMAKERS PREPARE TO ASSUME THE EU
PRESIDENCY

REF: A. SADOWSKA-BLAHA E-MAIL DATED NOVEMBER 18

B. PRAGUE DAILY NOVEMBER 12

C. PRAGUE 704

D. PRAGUE 681

E. PRAGUE DAILY NOVEMBER 4

F. PRAGUE 666

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Mary Thompson-Jones for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: While both proud and abashed to be known
as the "troublemakers" for speaking their mind and
occasionally standing alone among the EU member states, the
Czech government over the last several months has worked hard
to change this perception to one of a serious and responsible
EU member. While they have not changed their beliefs or
principles, the Czechs have quietly devoted serious attention
to preparations for assuming their upcoming leadership of the
EU and tried to avoid making waves with EU partners. Similar
to many previous EU Presidencies, the Czechs have divided the
labor between Deputy Prime Minister Alexandr Vondra's office
(internal Czech Ministry coordination) and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (EU Presidency coordination with external
partners). Czech preparations continue apace, but it is
readily obvious that in light of the recent regional and
senate elections (Ref D-F),the current GOCR coalition led by
PM Topolanek faces a number of domestic political challenges
over the next two months. These challenges may make for a
rocky start to the January 1, 2009 Czech EU Presidency,
especially if there are -- as stated by the PM -- changes in
certain GOCR ministries. END SUMMARY.

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Czech EU Presidency: Organization and Priorities
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2. (SBU) Within the GOCR, Deputy Prime Minister Alexandr
Vondra's office is responsible for internal Czech Ministry
coordination (rather analogous to the USG's NSC) and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for EU Presidency
coordination with external partners. So far, there have been
no major bureaucratic problems regarding the development of
their EU Presidency agenda, which is focused on: EU
Competitiveness, EU Energy Security and Sustainability, and
External Relations (Transatlantic Relations, the Western
Balkans, and the EU's Eastern Neighborhood Policy). When it
comes to Transatlantic Relations, the Czechs are enthusiastic
proponents of an ever closer relationship with the U.S., and
they are particularly eager to be leading the EU during the
USG transition period. This Czech enthusiasm is likely to
mean that the Czechs will zealously court U.S. engagement on
a range of issues.

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Czech EU Players: Vondra and Schwarzenberg
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3. (C) While the division of labor between FM Schwarzenberg
and DPM Vondra makes sense on paper, and they have a close
working relationship, in practice there is likely to be a
fair bit of overlap. While FM Schwarzenberg engages in the
details of certain subjects (Burma, Cuba and the Balkans
readily come to mind),he tends to take a hands-off approach
to many other topics, leaving the details in the capable
hands of his Deputy, Tomas Pojar, and Political Director,
Martin Povejsil. As some close Czech MFA contacts have
pointed out, this has lead to some early coordination
difficulties (both internally and externally) with respect to
Czech policy on Russia. Whereas the MFA has pushed a fairly
tough line on Russia, the Czech Ministry of Industry and
Trade (MIT) has been reluctant to appear to be provoking
Russia and has dragged its feet on the planned "Southern
Corridor" meeting on energy security. According to these
same contacts, Schwarzenberg has been "too much of a
gentleman" to push his colleagues at MIT too hard, even when
it is necessary, and he has also been reluctant to make calls
(to people like French FM Kouchner or Swedish FM Bildt) when
requested by his staff.


4. (C) By contrast, DPM Vondra engages readily on all manner
of topics, particularly in the area of transatlantic
relations. Thus, while Vondra's EU Policy Coordination
office has responsibility for defining and shaping the
direction of the Czech EU Presidency with other GOCR
ministries, we can expect that this office, and likely Vondra
himself, will assume a role that goes beyond Vondra's
position description. Indeed, DPM Vondra, who served as
Czech Ambassador to the U.S. in the late 1990s, visited the
U.S. the week of November 17 for early consultations with
contacts with links to the Obama transition team, as well as
Defense Secretary Gates accompanied by staff from his office
and that of the Czech MFA.

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PM Topolanek: Preoccupied with Domestic Challenges
--------------

5. (C) Prime Minister Topolanek has been preparing for the EU
Presidency for months. In July he hosted an "off-site" on
what makes for a successful EU Presidency with his cabinet,
other key GOCR officials, and officials from Brussels.
Nevertheless, the Czech domestic political scene has consumed
much of PM Topolanek's time recently, and will continue to do
so at the very least until the ruling Civic Democratic Party
(ODS) congress in early December. This is because
Topolanek's ODS party suffered major blows in the October
Senate and regional elections, which prompted talk of early
elections and the downfall of the PM. Things remain tense
but stable now within the coalition as there are signs that
the GOCR and Social Democrats (CSSD) may be able to put the
needs of the state above party politics.


6. (C) PM Topolanek and CSSD leader Jiri Paroubek have met
twice recently to discuss the EU Presidency. This is
noteworthy because the last time the two leaders met in
private was December 2007. DPM Vondra told Ambassador Graber
after the first of these meetings that it was clear the GOCR
would have to communicate and, if possible, cooperate with
CSSD. Subsequently, Paroubek stated that he would be
prepared to "tolerate" the Topolanek government during the
Czech EU Presidency if the GOCR did not make any "big
mistakes." During a November 18 meeting with Defense
Secretary Gates, DPM Vondra predicted that the PM and
Paroubek would agree on some arrangement to facilitate
coordination between the GOCR and opposition on issues
relating to the Czech EU presidency.


7. (C) It appears that PM Topolanek and Paroubek are inching
toward a political deal, which according to press reports,
will be hammered out by DPM Vondra and CSSD Shadow Foreign
Minister Lubomir Zaoralek. If PM Topolanek and Paroubek do
reach an accord, and if Topolanek is able to fend off the
challenges within the ODS for the party leadership, Topolanek
would then be able to turn his attention to leading the Czech
EU Presidency. While acknowledged big "ifs" at the moment,
Topolanek appears to have strengthened markedly his position
in recent days. He is a skillful politician and still in
control of key levers of political power. If however, he
does not succeed in the ODS race, possible scenarios include
PM Topolanek continuing as premier, but not ODS chairman; a
newly reconstituted coalition government under a new premier;
and a technocratic government with early elections. The last
two of which, could make it difficult for the Czechs to
credibly lead the EU.

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The Wild Cards: Klaus and Paroubek
--------------

8. (C) For opposition leader Paroubek, what constitutes
"tolerance" and "big mistakes" are clearly two terms open to
interpretation, and Paroubek is a politician who pays
attention to his own interests. Thus, it is unclear how long
his "tolerance" will last, or even what the PM may have
agreed to in order to achieve this. If this truce crumbles,
the opposition could keep the coalition occupied on the
domestic front, thereby hampering the GOCR's ability to act
at the EU level.


9. (C) Czech Head of State President Vaclav Klaus is perhaps
the most dangerous wild card and distraction for the ruling
coalition. While President Klaus and PM Topolanek are both
of the ODS party, which leads the coalition government, they
have been at loggerheads for years both over political and
policy issues. Klaus is a notable euroskeptic who does not
shy away from controversy or publicity. He courted both on
his recent state visit to Ireland, where he met with
anti-Lisbon treaty movement head Declan Ganley and held a
joint press conference in which Klaus referred to both
himself and Ganley as dissidents within the EU. When this
prompted Irish FM Martin to accuse Klaus of unseemly and
"inappropriate" remarks, Klaus shot back calling the FM's
comments "hypocrisy." While most Czech dailies reference
this row as yet another example of "Klaus being Klaus," his
euroskepticism complicates things for the coalition
government. The GOCR will need to walk a fine line in order
to calm the fears of EU member states that wonder about the
Czechs' ability to lead the EU, and the Czech domestic
audience, which wonders if Klaus well might be right to treat
the EU with a measure of skepticism. (Note: As one example,
over 50 percent of the Czech public opposes the Lisbon
Treaty, which is not well understood here. End Note.)

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Lisbon Treaty: Ratification Unlikely by Czech EU Presidency
Start

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10. (C) While Czech Constitutional Court officials indicated
this summer that they planned to render a decision on the
constitutional challenge to the Lisbon Treaty in
mid-September, this soon changed to November 10 (after Czech
regional and Senate elections). This then changed again, to
November 25, so that President Vaclav Klaus, who submitted a
brief in the case, may attend the public hearing. While GOCR
officials still anticipate that the court will decide that
the Lisbon Treaty does not contravene the Czech Constitution,
the treaty will still need to be approved by both chambers of
parliament and signed by President Klaus in order to be
ratified.


11. (C) While the Czechs have been under constant pressure
from EU member states such as Germany and France to ratify
this document before the end of the year, DPM Vondra has gone
to great lengths to publicly emphasize that whether or not
the Czechs ratify the treaty by January 1 would have no
impact on the functioning of the EU until all of the EU
member states ratify it. (Note: A select number of EU member
states, most notably Ireland, have yet to do so. End Note.)
Perhaps to temper expectations as well as to appear to be an
EU team player, Vondra stated in Paris earlier this month
that it would be good for at least one of the two Czech
chambers of parliament to vote on it prior to the start of
the EU Presidency.

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The French Connection
--------------

12. (C) On October 21, when French President Sarkozy outlined
his ideas on the creation of a robust "economic government"
composed of the 15 Eurozone members (Note: the Czechs are not
members),there was a flurry of Czech press speculation that
Sarkozy was attempting a power grab. The Sarkozy plan as
outlined would, by the very nature of the Eurozone, exclude
most of Eastern Europe, and perhaps lead to the dreaded
"two-track" Europe, leaving behind many of the smaller
European economies. However, during PM Topolanek's October
visit to Paris, Sarkozy made clear publicly that he would not
call for any Eurozone summits during the Czech Presidency.
He also took pains with the media to dispel the idea that he
wants to extend the French Presidency beyond December 31.
Nevertheless, Sarkozy's has yet agaQstepped into the
limelight and ruffled feathers with Czech officials for his
public statements proposing a January 8-9 economic summit
related to the global financial crisis.


13. (C) Thus, Czech officials anticipate that the French will
try to remain engaged in presidency matters next year. The
Czechs believe that some other probable areas of French
engagement are Iran, Africa, and European Security and
Defense Policy (ESDP). The Czechs have a limited number of
Embassies in Africa, and thus their ability to engage or
report in certain regions is limited. When it comes to the
highly sensitive nature of EU relations with Iran, the Czechs
are also hamstrung, given that they are represented only at
the charge level in Tehran (Note: Iran has yet to approve any
of the Czechs several requests for agrement in the last
decade. End Note.) Czech DFM Tomas Pojar told visiting USDP
Edelman in October that in this area the Czechs would
probably accede to having the French (who have an ambassador
in Tehran) continue to represent the EU in Tehran during the
Czech presidency.

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The Known Unknowns
--------------

14. (C) While Topolanek has indicated that he plans to make
changes in his cabinet, what those changes will be or how
deep they will go is mere conjecture at this point. Health
Minister Julinek, Agriculture Minister Gandalovic, and
Justice Minister Pospisil regularly feature in the Czech
press as possible Ministers to go, but this is only
speculation at the moment. It is unclear when and if such
changes will occur, as much will depend on the results of the
ODS party congress December 5-7. What this means for the EU
Presidency is that there may be new people assuming
leadership of certain ministries only weeks before the start
of the Czech Presidency. Our regular and sustained
engagement with both the MFA and the DPM's office will thus
be critical Qwe strive to advance transatlantic relations
on a range of topics.
Graber