SCENESETTER FOR USDP EDELMAN'S VISIT TO CZECH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 PRAGUE 000663

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/CE
DOD FOR OSD/SADOWSKA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV EZ
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR USDP EDELMAN'S VISIT TO CZECH
REPUBLIC

Classified By: DCM MARY THOMPSON-JONES FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Under Secretary Edelman, Embassy Prague looks forward
to welcoming you again to the Czech Republic. Your visit
will underscore the importance of our strong transatlantic
partnership. The year since your last visit has seen
tremendous progress on Missile Defense, with the Ballistic
Missile Defense Agreement and the Status of Forces Agreement
both having been completed. The two agreements now face a
tough ratification fight in the parliament in the coming
months, and your discussions with Czech officials can be
helpful here. The Czechs' increasing engagement
internationally - from Kosovo to Afghanistan - also
demonstrates their commitment to our two countries' shared
security priorities. Again, the Czech government is facing
strong opposition to its 2009 foreign deployment plans, and
your visit can help buttress the government's case,
especially with regard to Afghanistan. Your visit will also
help set the stage for an even closer U.S.-Czech
collaboration during the upcoming Czech EU Presidency on our
shared priorities: strengthening security and advancing
freedom and democracy around the world.

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Domestic context
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2. (C) Nineteen years after the 1989 Velvet Revolution, the
Czech Republic today is a prosperous market economy, a stable
democracy, and a committed American ally. Accession to the
European Union in 2004, like accession to NATO in 1999, has
solidified and accelerated the transition away from the
country's communist past. The economy today remains
relatively strong, with significant investment flows, modern
manufacturing base, healthy banks, low unemployment and
moderate but declining inflation. The country has so far
escaped the worst of the global financial crisis, although
the crisis has contributed to a slow down of Czech economic
growth, largely by depressing demand within Western Europe
for Czech exports. Analysts are now forecasting that Czech
real GDP will increase about four percent in 2008 and three
percent in 2009, after three years of over 6 percent growth.


3. (C) Elections in June 2006 produced a deadlock, with the
200-seat Chamber of Deputies split evenly between left and
right. The country was without a confirmed government for
seven months while the politicians sorted out a compromise.
In January 2007, PM Topolanek won a vote of confidence with
the help of two defectors from the opposition. Topolanek
heads the center-right Civic Democrats (ODS) and governs
together with the smaller Christian Democrats and the Czech
Greens. Both because it lacks a reliable majority in
Parliament and because of internal conflicts among and within
each of the three coalition parties, the Topolanek government
has had to scale back its ambitions, especially with regard
to health care and social system reforms.


4. (C) The defections from the opposition's ranks have
created an incredibly charged political atmosphere, where the
coalition and opposition rarely cooperate in the parliament.
This political tension has been exacerbated by the
approaching regional and senate elections, in which the
opposition is expected to make significant gains. You will
arrive just after the results of the regional elections and
of the first round of the senate election will have been
announced. Consequently, the Czech political establishment
will be preoccupied with sorting out the election outcome and
impact on the ruling coalition. Depending on the results,
the opposition Social Democrats (CSSD) may call for a vote of
no confidence during the week of your visit.


5. (C) If called, the vote of no confidence will most likely
fail, as have three previous attempts by the opposition to
unseat PM Topolanek. A greater problem for PM Topolanek
would be poor results by ODS in the regional and senate
elections. If ODS losses were serious enough, PM Topolanek
could be challenged as chairman of the party at the next ODS
party congress in December.

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U.S.-Czech Relations
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6. (C) Our tw countries enjoy excellent relations. We have
worked well with both of the main parties to pursue common
goals. The country is active within NATO and the EU, and
generally supportive of U.S. policies. This is particularly
the case regarding democracy promotion. While much of the

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Czech support for democracy and freedom is rightfully
associated with former President Vaclav Havel, the Czech
commitment to this agenda remains strong. The Czech MFA, for
example, has a special unit designed to promote
transformational diplomacy in countries that are not yet
fully free. The Czechs have been our strongest partners in
Europe on Cuba, and active supporters of the democratic
opposition in Cuba. Likewise in Belarus, Burma, Iraq and
other countries in transition, the Czech government and NGOs
work to support peaceful transformation and pass along the
lessons learned from their own history. Since 1995, Prague
has been home to the U.S.-funded Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty.

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Czech Foreign Deployments
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7. (SBU) The Czechs remain actively engaged supporting U.S.
and NATO-led coalitions. Czech soldiers are currently
deployed in Iraq (approximately 20 trainers in Baghdad and at
the Iraqi Armor Training Center in Taji) and Afghanistan,
where the number of troops is currently just under 500. In
March 2008, the Czechs established the first provincial
reconstruction team (PRT) in Logar province (SE of Kabul),
significantly expanding their military and civilian presence
in the country. The Czechs recently deployed a 100-man
Special Forces detachment under Operation Enduring Freedom to
Kandahar Air Field (KAF) and FB Anaconda. Along with the
Czechs' sizable commitment to Afghanistan, they have an
infantry battalion of around 450 troops deployed on a
permanently rotating basis to KFOR's Multi-National Taskforce
Center.


8. (C) The Czech government approved the Ministry of
Defense's (MOD) 2009 Foreign Deployment Plan at its October 1
cabinet session. Under the draft plan, the total number of
Czech troops deployed abroad in 2009 would increase from
approximately 900 to just over 1380, not including
commitments to the EU Battle Group (EUBG) or the NATO Rapid
Reaction Force (NRF). In 2009, the Czechs propose having
approximately 745 troops in Afghanistan, up from this year's

495. Due to a deteriorating security situation, the Czechs
intend to increase the number of infantry soldiers assigned
to the Czech PRT in Logar, bringing the total size of the
Czech PRT from about 200 to 330. In Kosovo, the Czechs
propose a deployment of 550 troops. The Czech Air Force will
accept the mission of guarding the airspace of the Baltic
states from May to August 2009. In Iraq, the Czechs will
keep five instructors under the NATO training mission,
withdrawing their recently deployed training team assigned
under Multi-National Forces Iraq (MNF-I). The total cost of
these deployments is expected to be 2.5 billion crowns, (USD
145.8 million).


9. (C) The deployments legislation must now be approved by
the Czech parliament. The proposed increase of Czech troops
in Afghanistan, coupled with the MOD's failure to reach out
to the opposition, has already generated questions from
across the political spectrum, raising doubts about the
deployment bill's prospects in the parliament. A recent
public opinion showed that a majority of the public is
opposed to sending additional troops to Afghanistan. In the
end, we expect the vote to be extremely close, but believe
that the MOD's plan with some possible adjustments in troop
levels will be approved. To help the Czech government gain
the necessary parliamentary support, we have requested
meetings for you with several key members of the parliament,
including the opposition leader, Jiri Paroubek.
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Missile Defense
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9. (C) Topolanek and his government have taken a great
political risk in pursuing MD in the face of strong public
and political opposition to the project. The government will
introduce in parliament the two MD agreements in the coming
weeks. It is still possible - but may be difficult, given
Czech parliamentary rules - that the agreements could come up
for the ratification vote by the end of the year. The
parliament must also pass a constitutionally-required
resolution permitting the stationing of U.S. troops on Czech
soil. The resolution has been drafted and will likely
proceed through parliament in parallel with the BMDA and
SOFA. The government is expecting a tough fight in the
narrowly divided parliament. We encourage you to urge the
Czech government at every opportunity to complete the
ratification process this year.

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10. (C) The politics of MD in the Czech Republic are
complicated: Topolanek's ODS strongly supports; the small
Christian Democrats are less solid, but most are behind the
proposal; the Green party is utterly divided. On the other
side of the political spectrum, the Communists are naturally
ardently against. The leadership of the largest opposition
party, the Social Democrats (CSSD),has used its anti-MD
stance to boost its popularity in advance of the regional and
senate elections. We do have indications that some CSSD
members would support MD if they were allowed to vote their
conscience.


11. (C) Given the lack of a stable parliamentary majority for
the coalition, we have been particularly focused on outreach
with the parliament. The strong MD language in the Bucharest
NATO Summit communique helped some Christian Democrats and
Greens overcome their doubts, but a few individuals remain
convinced that this is a purely bilateral project that will
somehow hurt NATO. In a situation where every vote will
count during the ratification in the parliament, ongoing
outreach to the Czech parliamentarians remains a priority.
We are planning an opportunity for you to meet with key
parliamentarians during your visit. The meeting will be a
chance for you to present an overview of how MD fits into the
broader U.S. view of transatlantic security arrangements,
affirm U.S. commitment to a European MD site, discuss
relations with Russia, and answer questions. Among the points
to stress with the parliamentarians:

-- the urgency of the threat to the U.S. and Europe;
-- commitment to linking the U.S. MD system with NATO;
-- commitment to working with Russia to address its concerns,
but with three important caveats: 1) Russia will not have a
veto; 2) United States will not reach an agreement with
Russia on observers and other transparency measures without
Czech approval; and 3) Russia will not have a permanent
presence at the radar site.


12. (C) Russia's position on the MD radar has been a
prominent facet of the debate here. Russian opposition to MD
and the resulting threats to the Czech Republic and Poland
were used by many pro-radar Czechs, including Topolanek and
his Civic Democrats, as justifications for their support of
the radar and of tying the Czech Republic even more closely
to its American ally. Topolanek said in an August 2008
editorial that Russia's invasion of Georgia is proof that
hosting the U.S. radar facility with U.S. "boots on the
ground" will enhance Czech national security. However, the
neuralgic Czech public reaction to the notion of Russian
observers being present at the radar site demonstrated last
fall that these anti-Russian sentiments could turn against us
at any point when the Czechs would believe that the United
States is negotiating "o nas bez nas" ("about us, without
us"). With the recent 40th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact
invasion in August, the Czech anti-Russian sensitivities are
even more pronounced.


13. (C) Public opposition to MD is frequently cited by
opposition politicians as the reason for their negative
stance. If you meet with CSSD leader Paroubek, you may hear
this line of reasoning. Polls continue to show that 55-70
percent of the public is opposed to MD. These disappointing
poll results, however, do not reflect other aspects of the
public's views on MD: 1) Czechs want to be protected from
the ballistic missile threat; and 2) they rank MD far behind
their other concerns, which are predictably dominated by
pocketbook issues. Unfortunately, the Czech government's
effort to communicate the reasons for the radar is generally
considered as a failure. The anti-MD groups - an amalgam of
pacifist, humanist, and communist elements - have mounted an
active PR campaign which, according to some media reports,
may be partially funded by Russia. The embassy's priority
has been to provide as much information as possible to the
Czech public and especially to the parliament.


14. (C) Topolanek's government also continues to face
criticism from some MD-opponents, who have argued that the
Czechs should have adopted a tougher negotiating position
like Poland. Topolanek, who is a confirmed transatlanticist
and who sees MD as a natural next step in the partnership
between our two countries, has responded by pointing to the
Czech Republic's responsibilities as a NATO and U.S. ally.
The Czech government plans to highlight the recent U.S.
Czech-Strategic Dialogue and our Declaration on Strategic
Defense Cooperation as examples of how the Czech Republic
gains from our strengthened partnership. Topolanek also sees
MD as an opportunity to expand science and technology, as

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well as economic, cooperation with the United States. Both
the MOD and the MFA will raise with you their frustration
that DOD and MDA have not been able to commit even symbolic
money for MD-related research and economic cooperation.


15. (C) The MOD will also undoubtedly ask about the status
of the assistance that we offered the Czechs in September
2008 in conjunction with the Declaration on Strategic Defense
Cooperation. First Deputy Minister Bartak will be seeking
assurances that the approximately 32 million dollars of
deployment support in Afghanistan and the promised assistance
in obtaining and fielding EDA C-130 transport aircraft will
indeed continue to materialize. The Czech MOD is sending a
team during the week of October 20 to evaluate the KC-130R
aircraft that we have offered; MOD remains somewhat sensitive
to the refueling designation of these aircraft and has made
it clear that the Czech Air Force does not want anything to
do with the aerial refueling mission. These aircraft would
be singularly intended for the transport mission. We further
expect the MOD, and especially Bartak, to push for logistics
and training assistance for any C-130s that the Czech Air
Force obtains, additional (financial) deployment support
beyond FY-2009, and additional equipment including MRAPS for
their Afghan deployments.

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Visa Waiver
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16. (C) On October 17, President Bush is expected to announce
the Czech Republic's entry into the Visa Waiver Program,
effective in mid-November. This much-anticipated milestone
will eliminate the one major irritant in our otherwise
positive bilateral relationship. We have been careful to
stress that visa waiver and missile defense are separate
issues and that the success of one initiative is unrelated to
the success of the other. The Czech public, however, has
always connected the two given that these initiatives have
advanced roughly in the same time frame. We expect the visa
waiver story to inject some positive energy into the
bilateral atmosphere for the next month; the story will get
an additional boost when DHS Secretary Chertoff visits on
October 27, and when the first visa waiver travelers actually
fly, expected to be on November 17.

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Czech EU Presidency and Energy Issues
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17. (C) The Czechs are increasingly focused on their very
first EU Presidency during the first half of 2009. Under the
leadership of Deputy Prime Minister Alexandr (Sasha) Vondra,
the Czechs have been preparing their agenda, under the
overarching theme "Europe Without Borders." Following
extensive consultations with their EU partners, the Czechs
have outlined their top three priorities for the EU
Presidency: EU Competitiveness, Energy Security and
Sustainability, and External Relations. Within External
Relations the Czechs plan to focus on the Western Balkans,
transatlantic relations, and the EU's Eastern Neighborhood
Policy. We share the same broad goals with the Czechs; the
challenge will be finding a way to help the Czechs forge an
EU consensus close to our shared goals.


18. (C) Energy security is a key focus for PM Topolanek. The
Czechs are especially concerned about the reliability of
Russian supplies and Russian efforts to buy up Central
European energy infrastructure and assets. The Czech
Republic is dependent on Russia for 70 percent of its gas, 65
percent of its oil, and 100 percent of its nuclear fuel. The
level of Russian crude oil deliveries to the Czech Republic
has declined - ostensibly for technical reasons - since the
U.S. and Czech Republic signed the Ballistic Missile Defense
Agreement in early July. Russian oil deliveries were
completely cut off for one week this month. While the Czechs
continue to publicly downplay the significance of the ongoing
supply disruptions, they are becoming increasingly concerned.
Czech goals in this area include progress on a more united
and coherent EU energy strategy and greater outreach to
Caspian energy producers. The Czechs have already indicated
that we can play a useful role by timely support of Czech
energy security-related initiatives during their presidency.
You may wish to reiterate our willingness to work closely
with them in this area.

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PM Topolanek: Shoring Up His Political Future
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19. (C) Your visit to Prague precedes by a week PM
Topolanek's visit to Afghanistan and to Washington. PM
Topolanek, who is under great political pressure from the
opposition, but also from within his own ODS, needs both
visits to shore up his political standing. In Afghanistan,
he plans to visit with Czech troops on October 28, the Czech
National Day and the 90th anniversary of Czechoslovak
Republic's founding. The next day, PM Topolanek will meet
with President Bush at the White House. This second White
House meeting in 2008 is a key milestone for PM Topolanek,
who is a convinced and committed transatlanticist with a firm
belief in strong ties with the United States. Nevertheless,
his domestic audiences will be foremost on PM Topolanek's
mind when he meets with President Bush. He will seek to
demonstrate that under his leadership the Czech Republic is a
respected and valued partner of the United States on a whole
range of issues, including global security, economic and
technological cooperation, and democracy promotion. Your
visit to Prague will help the government and the Prime
Minister preview and underscore that message. It will be
especially important, if in your public remarks you put MD in
the broader context of the overall trans-Atlantic cooperative
security relationship, and at the same time stress the
clarity of the international community's goals in Afghanistan
and the importance of the mission's success to all members of
NATO and the international community.
Graber