THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND A RESURGENT RUSSIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRAGUE 000623 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT EUR/CE AND EUR/RUS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2018 TAGS: EPET ENRG ECON PREL RU EZ SUBJECT: THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND A RESURGENT RUSSIA REF: PRAGUE 447 Classified By: DCM Mary Thompson-Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1.(C) Summary: The Czech Republic is now tackling the question of how to deal with a resurgent Russia. Almost all Czech politicians, except for the unrepentant Communists, continue to view NATO and (to a lesser extent) EU membership as their best line of defense. Nevertheless, the current Civic Democrat (ODS)-led government is increasingly worried about the country's reliance on Russian energy supplies and about Russia reasserting political and economic influence over Central Europe. The conflict in Georgia has further heightened suspicions. To counter the perceived threat, Prime Minister Topolanek is a strong proponent of missile defense and will make energy security and improving transatlantic relations major planks of the upcoming Czech EU presidency. 2.(C) Despite the strained political relationship, trade and investment between the Czech Republic and Russia continues to expand. All Czech political parties recognize the vast potential of the Russian market. The ODS-led government, however, is very concerned about Russian investment in the Czech Republic, especially in the energy and media sectors, and regularly intervenes to prevent Czech assets from falling into Russian hands. We can expect the Czechs to be allies on issues relating to Russia, but their views are nuanced and complex. End Summary. Strong Relations with U.S. as Counter to Russian Threat -------------- -------------- 3.(C) ODS-led governments defined Czech foreign policy from 1989-97 as a "return to Europe," focusing specifically on NATO and EU accession. Historical suspicion of Russia drove many of the government's policies and projects, including the construction of the Ingolstadt-Kralupy-Litvinov (IKL) pipeline in 1994, designed to reduce Czech dependence on Russian oil. The Social Democrat (CSSD)-led left-of-center governments that ruled between 1998 and 2006, however, generally muted their criticisms of Russia and sought to expand bilateral trade ties. For example, in 2000, CSSD Prime Minister Milos Zeman (1998-2002) negotiated with Russian President Putin agreements on visa free travel to Russia and the resolution of Soviet-era debts. 4.(C) With the formation in January 2007 of Mirek Topolanek,s new ODS-led government, the Czechs have moved to counter what the government perceives as a gathering Russian threat by deepening its security partnership with Washington. MFA Eastern European Department Director Daniel Kostoval described Topolanek,s political "reassessment" of Russia,s intentions as a "necessary corrective" to a decade of CSSD-led governments that almost exclusively focused on economic relations. At the September 4 Strategic Dialogue, DFM Pojar argued that Russia is not a normal European country and does not want to be. He termed Russia "an expansionist empire;" the only good news about Russia, he added, is that its population is decreasing. 5.(C) Most Czechs consider their NATO membership as key to meeting possible threats against the country. However, several senior MFA contacts have voiced concern to the Embassy that a 27-member alliance may be too cumbersome to respond effectively in a crisis. Therefore, they privately view their plans to host a U.S. ballistic missile radar as a way of bolstering their security and easing their doubts about NATO,s Article 5 protections. For ODS, having "U.S. boots on the ground" adds an extra dimension to Czech national security. MFA Security Policy Department Director Veronika Kuchynova-Smigolova told the Embassy that Russian threats of retaliation for hosting MD have only confirmed Prague,s conviction that a U.S. military presence in the Czech Republic is an essential deterrent against a resurgent Russia. Topolanek has repeatedly argued publicly that having U.S. troops in the Czech Republic will increase Czech national security. He recently called the Russian actions in Georgia "proof" that hosting the radar and U.S. troops is needed to help check Russian ambitions and enhance Czech national security. 6.(C) The presence of former anti-Communist activists in key foreign policy positions has contributed to Prague,s more assertive stance towards Moscow. Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg and Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Vondra were both ardent anti-Communist activists before 1989 and have remained among Moscow,s most outspoken critics in the Czech Republic, most recently on Russia,s actions in Georgia. PRAGUE 00000623 002 OF 004 Schwarzenberg has repeatedly denounced Russian threats to retaliate against the Czech Republic, should it agree to host the missile defense radar. Vondra has publicly called for a boycott of the 2014 Sochi Olympics over Russia,s invasion of Georgia. Schwarzenberg and Vondra have also set the tone for Prague,s democracy promotion efforts in Eastern Europe and its bid to expand NATO to Georgia and Ukraine. 7.(C) In sharp contrast to Schwarzenberg and Vondra, Czech President and Honorary ODS Chairman, Vaclav Klaus, has been outspoken in defense of Russia. On August 18, Klaus contradicted Schwarzenberg,s calls for greater allied support to Georgia by blaming the conflict mainly on Georgian President Saakashvili. Klaus, who traveled to Moscow in 2007 to receive the Pushkin Award for his fine Russian, stands in contrast to many Czechs who disdain to speak or have little interest in studying it. Despite the attention that Klaus, dissenting opinion garnered in the media, Schwarzenberg and Vondra continue to drive Prague,s policy towards Russia. ¶8. (C) The much-delayed Czech recognition of Kosovo reflected the ambivalence of Czech views toward Russia. The highly controversial move brought out much debate about pan-Slavism and differences between Slavs and the West. The Czechs, usually unabashedly Western-oriented, truly hesitated and agonized over the recognition issue. Rising Russian Trade Ties -------------- 9.(SBU) All major politicians and parties recognize the vast potential of Russian markets. In just the past few years, bilateral trade with Russia has increased dramatically, even under the ODS-led leadership. Imports from Russia, excluding oil and gas, have grown from $1.55 billion in 2005 to $2.35 billion in 2007. After gas and petroleum, industrial metals, such as iron, steel and nickel, make up the largest portion of Czech imports from Russia. Exports to Russia have also grown, doubling from USD $1.4 billion in 2005 to USD $2.8 billion in 2007. Major Czech exports include cars, machine tools, and other manufatured goods. While some of this increase in trade is attributable to the increase of commodity prices and the depreciation of the U.S. dollar, the recent growth is still significant. The number of Russian tourists visiting the Czech Republic has also significantly increased, rising from 185,705 in 2005 to 321,250 in 2007, an increase of 73 percent in just two years. Russians now make up the fourth largest group of foreign tourists visiting the Czech Republic, following Germany, the UK, and the U.S. 10.(SBU) Despite the current ODS-led government's concerns about Russia's growing regional influence, it continues to support Czech ivestment in Russia. In 2007, during President Klaus' visit to Moscow, the Czechs signed agreements for the avoidance of double taxation and the protection of intellectual property. The Czechs and the Russians also set up in 2004 an Intergovernmental Commission for Economic, Industrial, and Scientific Cooperation, which has had some success in removing trade barriers. Concern About Russian Investment -------------- 11.(SBU) Russian investment into the Czech Republic, however, is another matter. The current ODS-led government has become increasingly concerned that Russian investment could grant Moscow greater political influence in the Czech Republic, especially in critical sectors such as energy and the media. Officially, Russian investment remains modest. In 2007, the Russian Central Bank reported that direct Russian investment in the Czech Republic was around $248 million, while portfolio investment totaled $500 million. Examples of Russian investment include Pilsen Steel and the nuclear engineering firm Skoda JS (owned by the Russian construction firm OMZ) and Vitkovice Steel (owned by the Evraz Group). Lukoil also owns 44 filling stations (and is sponsoring the Russian translation of President Klaus,s book questioning climate change) and Gazprom is rumored to be behind the Bank for International Cooperation, a new entrant into the Czech financial market. 12.(C) Actual investment, however, is probably much greater. According to the Czech MFA and the head of the Czech Chamber of Commerce for the CIS, the Russians prefer to do business outside of the spotlight and through off-shore or non-Russian companies. The head of the CIS Chamber told us that neither he nor the Czech Government had any clear idea of what holdings Russian companies owned or controlled in the Czech PRAGUE 00000623 003 OF 004 Republic. The Government sees this "stealth investment" as a threat, but can do little to stop or control it. 13.(C) The Czech government has actively intervened to prevent Czech assets from falling into Russian hands. This summer, the Czech Government successfully lobbied the owner of the Czech publishing house Ekonomia not to sell to a suspected Russian front company (registered in Dominica),out of fear that the Russians could try to use Ekonomia,s publications to manipulate Czech public opinion. In the end, Ekonomia was bought by wealthy Czech banker and investor Zdenek Bakala, who also owns the well-regarded weekly Respekt. Last year, the government also intervened to prevent the sale of ConocoPhillips,s 16.3 percent stake in the biggest Czech oil refinery company, Ceska Rafinereska, to Lukoil. Ultimately, Unipetrol, which is majority owned by the Polish petrochemicals giant PKL Orlen, bought ConocoPhillips,s shares The current ODS-led government is also concerned that the Russians could end up winning the upcoming privatizations of Czech Airlines and the Prague Airport. Aeroflot, Russia,s national airline, has already expressed interest in acquiring Czech Airlines. 14.(C) Nevertheless, CIS Chamber of Commerce Chair Frantisek Masopust predicted that Czech-Russian trade and investment will continue to grow no matter which party is in power. Likewise, neither Russia,s invasion of Georgia nor the July 8 signing of the Ballistic Missile Defense agreement were likely to slow the burgeoning Russian-Czech economic relationship. Leading Czech businessman (and billionaire) Petr Kellner, who has significant holdings in Russia, was more sanguine. Kellner raised concerns to the Ambassador September 4 that increased U.S.-Russian tensions would negatively affect Czech business in Russia as Czechs are increasingly seen by ordinary Russians as U.S. proxies. He noted that almost every Russian he meets raises their disappointment with the Czech government,s decision to host the U.S. radar station and truly appear to feel betrayed that fellow Slavs would support a U.S. military presence in the region. Russian Meddling in Czech Domestic Politics -------------- 15.(C) The current ODS Government has also been concerned about alleged Russian efforts to block ratification of the missile defense agreements. In May 2008, several Czech newspapers published articles speculating on the funding sources of "No to Bases," the leading anti-missile defense protest group. The articles centered on the fact that the Luxembourg-based ad firm Big Board donated 10 billboards valued at 100,000 CZK (approximately $5,880) for the campaign. The corporate registrar in Luxembourg does not list any shareholders. The articles tried to link Big Board to Russia by noting that the Soviet KGB used such anonymous companies to fund anti-missile groups in the 1980s during the debate over installing U.S. intermediate range missiles in Europe. When asked about these charges, Russian diplomats in Prague stated that these accusations were baseless and planted in the media by a Czech government desperate to build public support for the radar. ¶16. (C) Despite these Russian denials, Czech MFA Director Petr Kostoval alleged that Russian embassy officials are soliciting Czech deputies and may seek to influence their votes on radar ratification this fall. Last winter, the domestic Czech intelligence service, BIS, publicly released a report alleging that Russian intelligence was stoking public opposition to hosting an MD radar base. Energy Dependence: A Strategic Liability -------------- ¶17. (C) Topolanek,s government views Czech dependence on Russian oil and gas as a strategic vulnerability. While the Czech Republic is a major exporter of electricity (produced mainly from domestic coal and two nuclear power stations), the Czechs are dependent on Russia for roughly 70 percent of their gas, 66 percent of their oil, and 100 percent of its nuclear fuel. The Czechs are also increasingly concerned that the Druzhba pipeline, through which the Czech Republic now gets crude oil from Russia, will soon cease to be a reliable source. The Czechs believe the Russians (and Ukrainians) are unlikely to make the significant investments needed to maintain and upgrade the increasingly antiquated pipeline for two reasons: Russia,s new oil fields are in Eastern Siberia; Russia sees investment in new ports and tankers as a greater priority. This summer,s disruptions in deliveries of PRAGUE 00000623 004 OF 004 Russian crude oil through the Druzhba (reftel) have reinforced this fear. The Czechs are also very concerned that the Slovaks will sell Yukos Finance,s 49 percent stake of Transpetrol -- which owns and operates the Slovak segment of the Druzhba oil pipeline -- to other Russian interests, once its purchase is complete. ¶18. (C) Czech initiatives on energy security include: --Support for RWE Transgas,s plans to build the Gazela gas pipeline, which would link the Czech Republic (and southern Germany) to Nord Stream in northern Germany. --Efforts to purchase a stake in the Trans-Alpine (TAL) oil pipeline consortium. The Czechs are talking with Exxon-Mobil about buying a small part of its 16 percent stake. Note: The TAL pipeline runs from Trieste to Bavaria where it connects to the Inglostadt-Kralupy-Litvinov pipeline. --Efforts to find an alternative to the Druzhba oil pipeline (after TAL). Possible solutions include reversing the flow of oil through the Odessa-Brody pipeline to run north, thus providing the Druzhba with an additional supply of oil, or construction of an alternate pipeline originating in northern Germany. --The quiet start of feasibility studies on expanding the Czech Republic,s two nuclear power stations. No final decision on expanding nuclear power, however, is expected during this government, due to strong opposition from the Greens. Energy Security a Czech EU Presidency Priority -------------- - 19.(SBU) Energy Security will be one of the Czech Republic,s main themes during its upcoming EU presidency. Czech priorities include progress toward a more unified and coherent EU energy strategy, increased outreach to Caspian producers, greater liberalization and connectivity within the internal EU market, and increased energy conservation. Deputy Prime Minister Alexandr Vondra has also told the press that the Czechs will use their presidency to promote the proposed Nabucco pipeline. The Czechs also plan to host both an EU-Caspian Producers' Summit and a Conference on increasing interconnectivity within Europe and are proposing a special U.S.-EU Transatlantic Economic Council devoted exclusively to energy security. A Valuable Ally, But Nuanced and Complex -------------- 20.(C) Comment: The ODS-led government views strengthening the U.S.-Czech strategic partnership as a critical counterweight to a more assertive Russia. The positions of the U.S. and Czech governments on Russia, the Georgia conflict and energy security largely overlap. Consequently the Czechs are and will continue to be a valuable ally on these and other issues within NATO and the EU, especially during the upcoming Czech EU presidency. However, the Czechs are keenly aware that as EU President, they must temper their ODS government,s views on Russia to achieve EU consensus. We believe this is one reason that PM Topolanek has recently used less strident rhetoric about Russia. The attitudes of other political parties and the public at large toward Russia remain more nuanced and complex. For example, Russian actions in Georgia have not shifted public opinion on the proposed U.S. radar station, but they have made some MPs aware that unpredictable threats to Czech security exist. 21.(C) The Czech approach on energy security has been somewhat amateurish and inept. Post has seen senior MFA officials lobby unsuspecting U.S. Codels here on other business; on June 12, on the margins of the Afghanistan Donors, Conference, Deputy Foreign Minister Pojar, passed a "memo" for President Bush to Ambassador Stapleton, a former U.S. Ambassador to the Czech Republic. (Note: This "memo" was duly passed to the EUR Front Office. End note) The U.S. Embassy is regularly asked to intervene on behalf of the Czechs with private sector companies. While these unorthodox approaches betray them as newcomers to a complex issue, the Czechs are fast learners and determined players. They have sent us multiple signals that their approach to energy security has dramatically intensified. End Comment. Graber