CZECH REPUBLIC: MISSILE DEFENSE RATIFICATION END

S E C R E T PRAGUE 000208 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2018 TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV NATO EZ RU PL SUBJECT: CZECH REPUBLIC: MISSILE DEFENSE RATIFICATION END GAME REF: A. PRAGUE 75 ¶B. 07 PRAGUE 1193 ¶C. PRAGUE 113 Classified By: Ambassador R. Graber for reasons 1.4 b and d. 1.(C) Summary and Comment: With the negotiations on the Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement (BMDA) and the Supplemental Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) nearing completion, we need to focus on the end game with the Czechs, and specifically on a strategy to win parliamentary approval. The political landscape has worsened recently, due in large part to last month's bruising presidential election, which hurt relations not only between the government and opposition, but also within the coalition. Support from the opposition Social Democrats for a vote in favor of the MD agreements now appears highly unlikely. This makes it critical for the government to win the support of all votes within the coalition, including the skeptical Greens. A key determinant of their support will be the language on MD that comes out of Bucharest. We need the best possible communique language, but also a coherent effort to play up the Bucharest results and to frame the eventual agreement with Russia. We have several opportunities to influence Czech public and parliamentary opinion, including press events at and following Bucharest and Sochi, as well as the signing of the two agreements. Post specifically requests the following Washington support to help win the debate in the Czech Republic: -- a senior USG official to visit Prague immediately after Bucharest (ideally one who has also been at Sochi) to speak directly with Parliamentarians and the press in order to make sure the U.S. message is not distorted, and -- signing of the BMDA in Prague on May 5, which is the anniversary of General Patton's liberation of Bohemia in WWII, and also the date of a major conference, which will feature the NATO Secretary General and which will aim to highlight the linkage between MD and NATO. End Summary and Comment. BMDA and SOFA Negotiations -------------- 2.(C) Prime Minister Topolanek is personally discussing the final wording of the BMDA's environmental clause with Deputy Prime Minister Vondra and Green Party Chair Bursik. MFA officials assure us Czech agreement with language acceptable to the USG will be forthcoming before the Bucharest Summit. But for domestic political reasons it is critical that the Green Party be involved in the decision-making. The Czechs want a joint U.S.-Czech announcement that we have concluded negotiations at Bucharest, and have also proposed that Foreign Minister Schwarzenberg and Secretary Rice meet briefly on the margins of the April 2 Foreign Ministers' dinner to officially and symbolically conclude the negotiations. The Czech's believe that, if other NATO allies believe the third pillar will be built, they will agree to release a stronger, more forward leaning statement on missile defense. Such a statement will help the Government gain greater support among Parliamentarians and the Czech public. 3.(SBU) The next round of SOFA negotiations is scheduled for April 9-11 in Prague. Per ref A, the major outstanding issues continue to be the strong environmental language favored by the Greens and the Czechs' continued insistence on a limited scope. Other remaining areas of concern include language demanding compliance with, versus respect for, Czech laws and procedures; criminal jurisdiction; construction permits; and claims. The Embassy had hoped this would be the final round, but the decision to postpone a planned April 8 Security Council meeting, which would potentially have included changes to the SOFA mandate, to April 15th may mean an additional one or two rounds of negotiations. Czech Parliamentary Strategy -------------- 4.(C) Ambassador Graber met March 22 with Deputy PM Alexander Vondra to discuss government plans for MD in parliament (note that with Government MD Spokesman Tomas Klvana about to return to the private sector, Vondra appears to have become the default official handling the political side of MD). Vondra outlined to the Ambassador two potential ratification scenarios. Frist, the Czechs could submit the agreements to Parliament in late spring for a late summer vote. The Government would like to hold the vote well before regional elections in the fall. However, quick ratification carries risks. Vondra believes that no cooperation is possible with the opposition Social Democrats (CSSD) prior to the fall elections. The government is also concerned that the Polish negotiations will not be completed in time, although it is prepared to go forward even if this is the case (see further below). Vondra's second option is for the Czechs to sign the agreements in the spring, but hold off submitting them to Parliament until they are sure they have at least 101 votes in favor in the lower chamber of parliament (this has the added benefit that the Polish agreements are more likely to be finished if the parliamentary process is not rushed). The Government has not made a final decision, but Vondra told the Ambassador that the rapid ratification scenario is more likely. Vondra is confident that the government can get 101 votes in favor, even without CSSD support. He said the government is actively focused on the Greens and the few undecided or opposed deputies among the Christian Democrats (KDU-CSL). CSSD: Paroubek Strengthens His Opposition -------------- 5.(C) Last month's bruising presidential election (ref C) has altered the political landscape and the strategy on MD ratification. While previously we and the government believed that CSSD Chairman Paroubek could be convinced to offer some form of cooperation that would get the agreements ratified (ref B),Paroubek's position has hardened since the election, both specifically on MD and generally in terms of cooperation with the Topolanek government. Paroubek earlier this month repeated to the Ambassador threats that he has also made publicly: that any CSSD deputy voting in support of the MD agreements (i.e., against party instructions) may not find a place on the CSSD ballot in the next elections, and that if he became prime minister again he would find a way to abrogate the MD agreements if they were passed on the basis of CSSD votes that the Topolanek government had "stolen"(a reference to the CSSD renegade who switched sides in the presidential vote, alledgely after considerable arm twisting and other influence from the ODS). In previous meetings with the Ambassador, Paroubek had taken a much more moderate tone. We will continue to meet regularly with Paroubek and his deputies to discuss MD, but we can no longer assume that we will win any CSSD votes. How to get to 101 Votes -------------- 6.(C) The coalition now has 100 votes among the three parties, plus three CSSD renegades (including the one thrown out of the party after the presidential election; his support on MD is not yet a given, although the other two votes are considered safe). There are at least three votes in both of the smaller coalition parties that are not yet firm. Both the Greens and KDU-CSL have made the inclusion of the radar in a future NATO-wide system a major issue for them. A strong statement coming out of the Bucharest summit should help to increase their support for missile defense. But the government realizes that they may not get enough from Bucharest to convince the toughest critics, including Education Minister Liska. In this case it will likely try to strike bargains to bring along individual members, such as agreeing to changes to the recent health care reform. They may not win every coalition vote in this fashion, but could likely get the 101 votes needed. 7.(C) The alternative to making a deal would be to resort to the tactics used in the presidential election: stealing votes from the opposition. This is a much riskier strategy, not only because of Paroubek's threat to scuttle an agreement if he were elected PM in 2010. It would taint the MD agreements and make even more difficult the long-term objective of winning public support for a project that 70 percent of the population opposes. Russia and Poland -------------- ¶8. (S/NF) The Czechs are actively following developments in Poland and Russia. They now seem to have accepted that they may have to go to Parliament without the Poland negotiations completed. Or, in the worst case, with the U.S.-Poland negotiations having broken off. Deputy FM Pojar is already talking about a Plan B in this case: the GOCR will need to present clear arguments to the parliament about how the Czech radar would help contribute to Czech and European security, as well as alternate scenarios for European interceptors. ¶9. (S/NF) Russia also needs to be handled carefully. The opposition is quick to evoke memories of 1938 by claiming that the great powers are negotiating about the Czech Republic without Czech participation. The Czech government support the confidence building measures we are discussing with the Russians, but only with very clear caveats: any Russian "presence" in the Czech Republic to monitor the MD assets must be provided on a reciprocal basis (with Czechs in Russia also given access to Russian sites),and there must be no permanent Russian "presence" at the site itself. As USG officials have done carefully in recent statements, we must continue to stress Czech sovereignity and continue to take every effort to coordinate with the GOCR as we go forward with Russia. And we will need to carefully roll-out to the Czech public and parliament the results of the Sochi Summit and any eventual US-Russian agreement in order to take ammunition out of the hands of MD opponents. High-Level Support from Washington -------------- 10.(C) We face an uphill battle to win the ratification effort. The Embassy has undertaken a very active parlimentary outreach effort, but particulary in these final stages we will need high level State Department visits to meet our immediate objectives of maximizing the impact of Bucharest (and minimizing the potential negative impact of an agreement with the Russians) and taking full advantage of the signing of the BMDA. Specifically, we request the following: a) Post requests that a senior USG official attending Bucharest (and ideally also at Sochi) visit Prague immediately after these two events. Acting U/S Fried would be best placed for this; USD(P) Edelman, Acting A/S Volker, or Ambassador Nuland would also be excellent. This would be used primarily to meet with influential members of parliament and conduct public outreach with a view to getting our message on Bucharest (and Russia) firmly implanted in the public and parliament. b) It is important that FM Schwarzenberg sign the BMDA himself. He is nominated by the Greens and is one of the most popular politicians. Therefore the Czechs are aiming for a signing involving the ForMin and Secretary Rice. The best scenario for signing in terms of having a noticeable impact on the Czech public and parliament would be a signing ceremony in Prague, and specifically on May 5, the date of a major conference here on NATO and MD (the Czechs have already invited the Secretary to attend),and also the anniversary of the 1945 liberation of western Bohemia by U.S. troops under General Patton. This carries great symbolism, especially since the planned site for the radar is near to some of the major liberaton celebration sites. An alternative to a signing in Prague is the possible travel of Schwarzenberg to Washington in late April, however a final decision on this will only come on April 7 (Schwarzenberg recently underwent heart surgery, and he and his doctors want to see how he handles the travel to Bucharest before deciding on anything more arduous). Graber