TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO'S RELATIONS WITH CUBA

C O N F I D E N T I A L PORT OF SPAIN 000121 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CAR, WHA/CCA, AND INR/IAA E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2018 TAGS: ETRD PGOV PREL CU TD SUBJECT: TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO'S RELATIONS WITH CUBA REF: A. PORT OF SPAIN 48 ¶B. PORT OF SPAIN 88 Classified By: DCM Len Kusnitz; Reason 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Trinidad and Tobago's relations with CUBA are a mixture of pragmatism and pan-Caribbean solidarity. Along with a number of other Caribbean states, it has had diplomatic ties with CUBA since 1972. Although Fidel enjoys a positive image among the minority of Trinis who reflect on foreign policy, many of these persons also recognize that human rights are violated in CUBA and have no interest in that country's political or economic system. This line of thought is often submerged in an overall view that is one part mysticism over CUBA "standing up" to the U.S., one part "let's look at the (alleged) social gains," and another part arguing that CUBA has helped its Caribbean brothers and gratefulness should be the reaction. Upon Castro's "retirement," Prime Minister Manning cleaved to the latter sentiment, noting his own medical treatments in Havana. Despite the fondness sometimes expressed for Cuba, Manning and company are hardheaded realists. The GOTT will not act or speak against Cuba, but it won't go out of its way either to take a tack likely to irritate the United States. End Summary. A Little History -------------- ¶2. (C) T and T Prime Minister Eric Williams, considered the father of the nation, joined Guyana, Jamaica and Barbados in recognizing CUBA in December 1972. The rationale was to diversify links and to show independence from the U.S. Gaining credibility inside the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) also played a role, as did Williams' personal background. In addition, internal Trinidad politics fed into the decision, especially after the 1970 upheavals. Though a democrat, Williams also shared the leftist pedagogical thinking style prominent among third world academics at that time. Nonetheless, he understood the world he lived in -- a trip by Williams to CUBA in 1975 reportedly reinforced his view that free market capitalism was superior to a planned economy. That Caribbean solidarity only went so far also was underscored when CUBA became involved in internal conflicts in Africa. In 1975, it requested permission for aircraft to refuel in Trinidad en route to Angola. Williams declined this request. Consistency in Policy 
 -------------- ¶4. (C) The "yin and yang" policy on CUBA set in Eric Williams' time still casts its shadow today. Solidarity, mixed with mutual assistance, jumbled with mild rhetorical support and sotto voce recognition that CUBA is a model for no one are the policy's essentials. T and T politicians, when dealing with Havana, keep in mind the Caribbean neighborhood they live in, but also have an eye on U.S. reaction and, more recently, the view from Caracas. One person close to the PM told us, for instance, that the GOTT knows what side of the dividing line it falls on, but as a small nation, being friendly with all (by upholding the "principle of non-intervention") is the greater part of valor. The Past is Prologue -------------- ¶5. (C) The departure of Fidel and confirmation of Raul highlighted again the shape of Trinidad's policy toward CUBA (ref a). Commenting on the changeover, Manning took note of Cuban assistance to T and T and Havana's Caribbean-wide aid, adding his personal thanks for the medical treatments he had received in CUBA (heart valve surgery in 1998 and a pacemaker in 2005, as well as laser eye surgery). Despite this hagiography, Manning was circumspect and said nothing about Cuba's internal political and economic system. Broader comments on change, though, did appear in the press, with editorialists mixing the elements noted above, but also focusing on potential opportunities when (not if) CUBA opens its economy. That T and T could -- or should -- even try to encourage change in CUBA was a bridge too far, though, for the local mindset. Diplomatic ties -------------- ¶6. (C) There is a small three-person Cuban Embassy in Port of Spain. Though the Cuban Ambassador is seen at events, Havana's mission keeps a relatively low profile. For its part, in September 2007, T and T formally opened a Havana trade facilitation office. Presiding over the ceremony, Manning announced that Trinidad would "shortly" open an Embassy. When this officially occurred is not clear, but the GOTT acquired office space in Havana in October 2007 and, according to the MFA, Flora Parris-Mills is running the Mission as Charge, with Yvonne Gittens-Joseph, T and T High Commissioner in Jamaica, accredited as Ambassador. It is possible that this is simply a matter of semantics and Manning was referring to the placement of a resident Ambassador in Havana. Retired MFA Permanent Secretary Lester Efebo Wilkinson is reportedly in line for that position. ¶7. (C) Structurally, CUBA does not fall within the Americas Unit of the MFA's Bilateral Division (where the U.S. resides),but in a separate CARICOM and Caribbean Affairs Division. This organizational split reflects geography and the MFA mindset (Caribbean solidarity),but also helps keep policy formation toward CUBA -- at least at the lower levels -- somewhat insulated from U.S. "pressures" or broader hemispheric concerns. On a multilateral level, Trinidad and Tobago is very open to Cuban inclusion. The Association of Caribbean States (ACS),which includes CUBA as well the continental Latin states bordering on the Caribbean, has its headquarters in Port of Spain. Nonetheless, the GOTT has been clear that it is not interested in leading any pro-Cuba charge for OAS reinstatement. The Cubans also have not been involved in any Summit of the Americas planning and are not expected to be invited to attend to the event. Economic and Other Ties -------------- ¶8. (C) Unsurprisingly given its strong economy, Trinidad and Tobago is one of Cuba's leading Caribbean commercial partners and interested in the potential for expansion if the Cuban economy opens up. Currently, T and T has a roughly equal trade balance with CUBA (about $35 million in total two-way trade),with its exports centered on ammonia and steel. Although CUBA is attempting to expand oil production and Trinidad and Tobago is offering free technical assistance to a number of emerging producers, there has been no cooperation in this sector. This may be due to Venezuela's influence, as well as GOTT hesitation to be seen encroaching on Caracas' area of energy influence and concern about getting sucked into PetroCaribe. ¶9. (C) Despite some well-trained local medical personnel, serious problems exist in the public health sector and T and T has accepted Cuban assistance. There are approximately seventy Cuban doctors and nurses here (the first arrived in 2003),mostly in rural areas and small towns in the east and south. While only a handful have defected since the program began, a number have married and remained in Trinidad. Though some Trinis do travel to CUBA for medical care (like the PM),the proximity of Miami, and cultural ties to the UK, mean that most in search of complex care go elsewhere. ¶10. (C) On the agricultural front, the GOTT has had periodic discussions with the GOC on how to increase the locally grown food supply (food price inflation here tops 20 percent per year). In 2007, T and T finalized arrangements for Cuban agricultural experts to serve as technical advisors for a 200-acre farm in Tucker Valley (about a 30 minute drive from the capital). The site is one of 15 large farms that PM Manning proposed in his 2007 budget as a way to revive agricultural production. The other farms are on offer to international investors, although Post is not aware of any serious expressions of interest (though there have been some rumors involving Germans). Opposition politicians have criticized the "mega-farm" approach as at best irrelevant and (in somewhat of a contradiction) at worst an effort that would depress local farm incomes. One well-to-do farmer, not friendly to the government, told us that the "mega-projects" were a "joke" and, focusing on Tucker Valley, that production costs there would be far beyond what could be recouped. The Cuban-assisted farm is expected to launch soon (a status it has had for some time),with the first crops (possibly tomatoes and beans) coming to market in 2009. Comment: Stuck in the Middle with You -------------- -------------- ¶11. (C) With admitted nuances depending on who was in office, the core Trinidadian policy toward CUBA has not appreciably varied over the years. Absent major changes in Cuba, the local policy course will remain on its current track -- friendly to Cuba, but not too friendly, advising the U.S. to talk to CUBA (allowing for a bit of moral high-ground posturing),but not being vociferous or proactive about this, willing to take assistance from CUBA and reciprocate as well, but not in any large ways, and keeping an eye (but only one) on potential economic opportunities on that island. Similar to its relations with Venezuela (ref b),T and T seeks to take what it believes is a middle course in navigating between Washington and Havana. While it will not push the GOC, it also will not act in any way it judges might be inflammatory to the U.S. At least one person in the GOTT has told us that the government's stance means it will be well positioned to talk to the Cubans when a democratic opening occurs (and PM Manning has privately implied this as well). We are not so sure, though, and the government might be hesitant to act absent a "CARICOM consensus." In any case, it is worthwhile to keep the Cuban change issue before the GOTT, if only to be able to go back to it at a critical future moment and ask, "Well?" AUSTIN