UK, AUSTRALIA AND US EMBASSIES JOINTLY DEMARCHE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT LOUIS 000224 DEPT FOR AF/E; AF/S SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC PHUM KDEM ZI MP SUBJECT: UK, AUSTRALIA AND US EMBASSIES JOINTLY DEMARCHE MAURITIAN PRIME MINISTER REGARDING ZIMBABWE Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Virginia M. Blaser for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On 24 June, DCM met with the High Commissioners of Australia and the UK to demarche the Mauritian Prime Minister regarding Zimbabwe. The joint demarche was somewhat disappointing, with the Prime Minister agreeing to take only modest actions with regard to Zimbabwe. Specifically, PM Ramgoolam agreed to call South African President Mbeki to express concern over the growing problems in Zimbabwe. He also agreed to call for a SADC meeting regarding Zimbabwe during the upcoming African Union Summit in Egypt this week. He did not agree with UK requests to make a formal statement of condemnation for the violence in Zimbabwe; nor did he agree to personally attend the AU summit. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) At the request of the UK High Commissioner, DCM and the Australian High Commissioner elected to do a joint demarche on Zimbabwe and on 24 June called for an urgent meeting with the Prime Minister. At the last moment of the day, the PM agreed to an "immediate" meeting. DCM opened the joint demarche noting the important role Mauritius plays in SADC as a strong and vibrant democracy. She thanked Mauritius for sending observers, as part of their concern for human rights and electoral freedom in Zimbabwe, and asked for Mauritius to continue to take a forward-leaning stance in working toward stopping the violence and finding a resolution. The UK High Commissioner focused his requests on obtaining the PM's commitment to make a public statement both against the violence and to note that Mauritius would not accept any results from Zimbabwe elections that may take place on 27 June. Although diplomatic in response, PM Ramgoolam declined to make such a statement. He reasoned that making such statements would do two things; first, it would undermine the work of President Mbeki, who is conducting "behind closed doors" negotiations; and second, that such a statement could put at risk the handful of remaining Mauritians in Zimbabwe. ¶3. (C) The PM said that he spoke with Mbeki very late in the evening on 23 June, having returned Mbeki's call following the PM's long night in parliamentary budget discussions (NOTE: These discussions ended after midnight Mauritius time on 24 June). According to Prime Minister Ramgoolam, Mbeki was upset by the statements that had been made by other SADC countries, and felt strongly such statements were not helpful to his efforts. For this reason, PM Ramgoolam is not inclined to make a statement because he does not wish to alienate President Mbeki. Ramgoolam did agree, however, to call Mbeki again on 24 June to express greater concern over the lack of results from current negotiations and to urge him to affect positive results quickly. ¶4. (C) Ramgoolam noted that during his conversation with Mbeki last night, Mbeki did not mention the UN Security Council statement. Ramgoolam speculated that perhaps the statement had not been concluded prior to his phone call with Mbeki. The PM believes that Mbeki looks to him for support and guidance. Ramgoolam did note that Mbeki expressed some guilt over a recent incident in which Mbeki convinced a member of the opposition, who was in South Africa as part of an opposition delegation meeting for negotiations with Zimbabwe government officials, to return to Zimbabwe. According to the PM, Mbeki spoke to Mugabe personally to ensure the safety of the returning opposition member and was satisfied that his safety was assured. Unfortunately, immediately upon returning from South Africa, the opposition member was arrested. ¶5. (C) Part way through the meeting with the PM, the Mauritian Foreign Secretary Anand Neewoor joined the meeting. Neewoor noted shortly upon entering the PM's office that he was suspicious of Tsvangirai's presence in the Danish Embassy, implying that Tsvangirai is not a "courageous" leader because he is afraid to die. The PM noted that it is important for leaders to be courageous, and gave an anecdote of death threats he received when he first decided to run for Prime Minister. DCM acknowledged that it did indeed often take courage to be a leader, and asked the Prime Minister to consider the courage to take a proactive role, as both the leader of a key democracy in Africa and as a respected member of SADC. ¶6. (C) The PM agreed that perhaps Mauritius could play a greater role, and to that end said he would ask for a SADC meeting on Zimbabwe along the margins of the upcoming AU PORT LOUIS 00000224 002 OF 002 discussions in Egypt. He noted, however, that he would not be attending the AU meeting because of parliamentary discussions still underway on his budget proposals for the year. (COMMENT: Foreign Secretary Neewoor will be representing Mauritius at the AU summit. Post doubts he will have much impact there.) ¶7. (C) As a final positive from the discussions, the PM did agree to keep Mauritian election observers in Zimbabwe for the present time. He planned to speak to them in the next day or so, to get an on-the-ground account from his own staff. He said he tried to contact them earlier, but did not have success in reaching them because phone service into Zimbabwe was "sometimes difficult." ¶8. (C) On 23 June, DCM took advantage of a pre-arranged meeting with the Prime Minister's Cabinet Secretary, Suresh Seeballuck, to also raise the issue of Zimbabwe. During this meeting, Seeballuck expressed grave concern over the situation and repeated several times his disgust that Mugabe would claim to be in power as an "act of God." He agreed that Mauritius should take a more active role, and promised to raise his opinions with the Prime Minister. (Comment: While there was no evidence of Seeballuck's opinions surfacing during our meeting with the PM, Seeballuck is one of the few close advisors to the PM, and post believes his views will be considered when the PM makes decisions on Zimbabwe. End Comment.) ¶9. (C) COMMENT: We expected Prime Minister Ramgoolam to be more inclined to action. It is with disappointment that the joint demarche seemed, to Post, to make so little immediate headway. The UK High Commissioner, however, felt quite differently. He remarked that in all the time the he had demarched the PM on Zimbabwe, this joint demarche was the first time the PM agreed on any action, however small. END COMMENT. CABRERA